793.94/2210b: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert)
97. Reference my telephone conversation this morning with you.69 I wish to enforce what I said then. You are not to participate in any discussions except with regard to possible invocation of the Pact of [Page 214] Paris as a means to mobilize world opinion against war. The Far Eastern situation changes from day to day, and if the League Council believes it to be unwise to appeal to the Kellogg Pact, you are not to urge it under any circumstances. If, on the other hand, the Council should decide to invoke the Pact, it should be made quite clear by you that the initiative must be theirs. I well understand the difficulty of the Council, as such, invoking the Pact, but I do not see any reason why the initiative toward effecting its invocation should not be taken by the individual members of the Council acting as representatives of governments which have signed the Pact. Under existing circumstances I am not able to initiate it here. The whole purpose in authorizing you to sit with the League Council was that, since Geneva should take the initiative in connection with discussing the question of the Pact’s invocation, I was willing through your participation to have you express this Government’s cooperation.
If I were to summon the representatives here of the various signatory Governments to make the suggestion, this might lead to the crossing of wires. If the Council should ask this Government itself to invoke the Pact or to propose its invocation, this would be most unfortunate, and you should make every effort to prevent this. No doubt Japan is anxious not to have the Pact invoked, and presumably it was to prevent it if possible that the Japanese raised objection to an American sitting at the Council meeting. Therefore, if this Government is put in the position of itself urging other nations to invoke the Kellogg Pact, Japan would assume that this Government had failed in neutrality, while a peaceful solution of the dispute might actually be delayed. This situation between Japan and the United States has been made far more serious by the events of the last 2 days. Not only did Japan object to American representation on the Council, but the Tokyo Foreign Office spokesman yesterday made other statements tending, unfortunately, to inflame public opinion in Japan against the United States.70 As a result of all this, the appearance of the American Government as urging the Kellogg Pact’s invocation would be resented instantly and deeply in Japan. The very fact of such an appeal being made here, with a Washington date line attached, might well cause such irritation in Japan that the hoped-for effect from an appeal based upon the Pact to the disputants might not only be nullified but might result even in the postponement of a solution of the issue. Accordingly, you will understand how important it is for you to remain in the background lest any possible suspicion should arise that the United States is taking the initiative in or is in any way pressing for, the Pact’s invocation.
- See memorandum of trans-Atlantic telephone conversation, p. 203.↩
- See memorandum by the Secretary of State of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, October 16, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 26.↩