793.94/1820: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 21—2:15 p.m.]
116. Late Saturday afternoon,26 following a private session of the Council in which the affair was presumably discussed, the Japanese delegate, at the request of the President of the Council, made a brief statement concerning the Mukden incident.
This statement was to the effect that the information received by him was meager and that he had requested further details from his Government and would keep the Council informed of developments. He added that the Japanese Government would doubtless take measures to attempt to insure that this local incident should not lead to more serious complications, and to effect an appeasement of the situation.
Dr. Sze, the Chinese delegate, took the occasion to speak immediately afterwards expressing deep concern in regard to this “highly regrettable incident”. He added that the information thus far at hand seemed to indicate that the Chinese were not responsible for [Page 18] the incident. He stated that he would not fail to communicate to the Council any authentic information which he obtained.
The President of the Council, Mr. Lerroux of Spain, noted the statements and said that the Council had heard with satisfaction that the Japanese Government would take the necessary measures to bring about an appeasement of the situation and expressed the hope for a prompt settlement of the question.
No other member of the Council spoke on the subject. It was evidently the intention of the President to attempt to allay apprehension by the public declarations referred to above.
[Paraphrase.] This morning Dr. Sze called on me to say that he was aware of my following in a strategical way the Council’s proceedings, so he thought the Chinese position in this matter might be of interest to me.
I was told by Sze that the chief delegates of certain powers had met informally and privately prior to the Council’s meeting on Saturday and had more or less decided against having the question brought up before the Council. This attitude Sze attributed to Japanese influence. Certain delegates after the meeting approached him as to whether he intended to present the question, and for reasons to be explained later in this telegram, he would not say what he planned to do. He gave as his excuse that he was receiving messages from Nanking which might control his action. In consequence of his reply, another meeting was held by the same delegates, and following this (in this case apparently as a result), the question was presented to the Council by the Japanese delegate. This Japanese action, incidentally, is interpreted here as a Japanese desire (as they do not know Sze’s plans), by taking the initiative, to prevent bringing up the aspect of good faith. However, it resulted in allowing the Chinese delegate to make a move without initiating it in a way which might be interpreted to be tantamount to an appeal to the Council.
I learned from Sze that he was not able and probably would not be able during the present Council session to communicate to it any more authentic information regarding the Mukden situation, since he had been informed from Nanking of the cutting by the Japanese of communications from Mukden to Peiping and Nanking, thereby preventing his getting any information from Mukden. Sze attributed this Japanese cutting of communications as an act to prevent the true facts becoming known before the Council’s meetings have concluded. He also revealed to me that instructions from his Government on the position he should take at Geneva had not yet been received; that his action would be governed by these instructions, [Page 19] but that he would put off this action as long as he could, even if directed to present the question to the League.
After the above statements, it became apparent why Sze had come to see me. The press in Europe has published articles under a Washington date line about the United States considering the relationship of the current situation to the Four-Power Pacific Treaty’s provisions. Sze said he felt that action under this treaty or under the Kellogg Pact of 1928 would be better for China than League of Nations action, since the stronger position of Japan in the League would militate against China. According to Sze, Japan can use its position by employing its relations to questions of Europe as trading points. Sze has no wish to fall between two stools, but if there is a possibility that Washington may take the action mentioned above, Sze does wish to avoid an appeal to the League, especially as he feels that possible American action might be prejudiced by prior League action. From the foregoing it will be noted that neither Japan nor China has as yet requested the League Council to act in this matter.
While listening to Sze’s statements, naturally I made no comments. If the Department should make any public statements or any statements to the press on the situation, I should appreciate having their substance. It is probable that nothing will happen tomorrow, but at the meeting of the League Assembly, scheduled at present for September 22, the matter may come to a head. [End paraphrase.]
- September 19.↩