793.94/2083: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
754. Following from Hanson and Salisbury, October 10, 8 p.m., via Harbin, October 11, 10 a.m.
“1. On September 19th Japanese women and children commenced to withdraw from Kirin, 200 Japanese troops started from Changchun for Kirin city via the Kirin-Changchun Railway. Upon learning of their approach, General Hsi Chia, Chief of Staff of Chang Tso-hsiang’s Kirin troops, ordered the 7,000 Chinese troops at Kirin city to withdraw from the town, which they did, thus avoiding a clash with the Japanese troops, who in the evening of the same day entered the city and immediately took over the wireless, telephone and telegraph stations and principal government organizations and sealed the vaults of the principal banks. The troops were preceded by Japanese airplane which dropped leaflets announcing the speedy arrival of the troops and urging the Chinese populace not to be alarmed.
2. According to a statement made at Kirin to Hanson by Jung Hou, former Taoyin at Newchwang, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs [Page 171] at Changchun and until October 2nd Provincial Treasurer of Kirin, who has been known to Hanson for 17 years, delegates from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs’ office and of various organizations met the Japanese troops, told the commander that the Kirin people were not concerned with Mukden problems; that the South Manchuria Railway zone, important to the Japanese, was far away, indeed situation in Kirin city was quiet; that no Japanese residents had been or were in danger; that the Chinese troops had been withdrawn to avoid a possible clash; and that the Japanese troops were not wanted at Kirin. They asked the Japanese Commander why the Japanese troops were being sent and were informed by him that all he knew was that he had been ordered to Kirin and that he must obey orders. Subsequently General Hsi Chia met General Tamon, the Japanese high Commander, unofficially at the Japanese Nagoya Hotel and was asked by the latter to order the withdrawn Chinese troops to surrender arms by noon of the 23rd. Protesting that this was very difficult, as the soldiers were not in barracks General Hsi Chia managed to gather several hundred rifles by the time indicated. General Tamon became enraged and accused General Hsi of trying to trick him. At the conference called to discuss this matter there were Generals Hsi and Tamon, the Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Shih Lu-pen, the Japanese Consul General Ishii, and a Chinese interpreter named Liu Chun-fen. General Tamon, stating he wished to discuss a purely military matter, requested the Japanese Consul General to withdraw from the room. Thereupon the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs also withdrew, leaving Generals Hsi and Tamon and Liu together. General Tamon then stated that Hsi deserved punishment and that he would leave him alone to think over this situation. He and Liu departed. Immediately after, two Japanese soldiers came into the room and holding pistols pointed at Hsi’s head remained with him in this position for 1 hour. General Tamon then returned and suggested to Hsi that he submit to the will of the Japanese military command, which would support him with money and ammunition in case he did and in case he formed a new government for Kirin Province, and would punish him if he did not. Again Tamon gave Hsi some time to think this over. During this interval the Japanese military adviser of General Chang Tso-hsiang and Chinese high Provincial officials entered the room and urged Hsi to accept. Thereupon Hsi accepted in order temporarily to give Kirin a breathing space with the hope of saving Province for the Chinese later. Under pressure of Japanese military Hsi abolished present form of government, as ordained by Nanking, established a new government with himself as ‘Chang Kuan’ (‘high official’) and with military and civil authorities already there under him and discharged those Provincial officials who, according to a list drawn up by the Japanese military, had shown themselves pro-Chang Tso-hsiang, pro-Chang Hsueh-liang or anti-Japanese. Among those were Chung Yu, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Harbin, and Jung Hou. The Kirin office of Commissioner for Foreign Affairs was abolished speedily. The result is that the Kirin Provincial Government is now independent of Nanking and the former Mukden Government clique and is controlled and dominated by the Japanese military.
[Page 172]3. Jung Hou’s version of what occurred at Kirin on September 21st to 24th has been confirmed to us as correct in its main points by:
A Dane who is employed by the agents of the Catford Tractor Company and who has resided in Kirin for some months past; two Chinese employees of the Chinese postal service at Changchun; a Chinese employee of the postal service, an American, three American returned students, a police inspector, and a Chinese employee of the British-American Tobacco Company, all residing at Kirin; transmitted to magistrate at Tunhwa and by the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and a Chinese official connected with the Telephone Administration at Harbin.
4. On October 9th we informed Mr. Ishii that we had learned of this report and he states there are regulations that no Japanese governmental establishment should interfere with foreign governments. On October 10th Salisbury spoke to the Mitsui official at Changchun in regard to these reports and was told first that the Japanese military forces aided Hsi to form a new government and, later, that it was Hsi’s ambition which caused him to form a new government.
When Salisbury asked the Japanese Consul at Changchun about this the Consul hesitated for a moment and said: “Did you discuss this with Mr. Ishii?” The Consul did not deny or affirm the report. In none of these instances could the inquiry be pressed because of the apparent disinclination of the Japanese to discuss this matter.
6. [sic] It might be presented here that none of the Japanese military nor consular officers with whom we spoke at Changchun and Kirin volunteered to cooperate with us by official information, except Major Hosoki who limited his voluntary explanations to personal knowledge of Japanese attacks on Chinese troops at Nanling and Kuanchengtze. The Japanese officials however were polite and hospitable in a social way, but indirectly showed much interest in the people we talked with and in our movements.
On October 8th we called at the residence of General Hsi Chia and were shown into a reception room. One of the Japanese soldiers on guard went into the residence and shortly we were informed that Hsi would receive us at [his] office a little later. We then called at his yamen where Japanese soldiers, who were also on guard at the entrances, were very much in evidence. After considerable delay, during which two Japanese in civilian clothes, without being ushered in, abruptly entered the reception room, looked at us and inquired of the attendants who we were, we were received by Hsi in a room in which three secretaries made simultaneous notes of all that was said. Hsi, a man of about 40, looked as if he were suffering from a strain. We made certain usual conventional remarks called for on a first visit and received assurance of protection while travelling to Tunhwa. Attending Hsi as interpreter was Liu Chun-fen, who was interpreter during the Tamon-Hsi interviews and who was recently made manager of the Yung Heng Provincial Bank. Hsi desired me [to] say nothing in regard to making a return call or excusing him therefrom. From all appearances, he is being closely watched by the Japanese, who do not give him an opportunity to act independently.
7. On October 7th we called on Major General Amano who stated that he was constructing an airdrome just north of Kirin because the Japanese Army needed one there, that he had about 1,500 soldiers in [Page 173] Kirin, that some of these would soon be leaving for Changchun and that he would not leave Kirin until ordered to do so by his superior officers. He added that the Chinese had removed parts from the wireless stations and he had no experts to repair and operate same, although he probably would send for some.
8. The larger stations of the Kirin-Changchun Railway are guarded by Japanese Railway guards and over some are flying the Japanese flag. Small bodies of Japanese troops are to be seen moving back and forth on the trains.
9. Kirin city is guarded effectually day and night by Japanese soldiers and gendarmes, under whom are some armed Chinese police. Business is bad. Banks are permitted to remain open a few hours a day, but the Japanese military, according to advices to reliable Chinese authority, do not allow Provincial Government funds to be sent to pay the wages of the Chinese soldiers outside the city. Chinese are leaving the city for Changchun and points south. The Japanese command has issued many proclamations which indicate that the Japanese Army is the ruling organization and that the Chinese and Japanese residents will benefit through its rule.
10. The Japanese Consul General gave us [to] understand that the reason for the Japanese military occupation of the Kirin-Changchun Railway and Kirin city (and also the Kirin-Tunhwa Railway and Tunhwa) was the protection of Japanese lives and property. The Chinese and one American we interviewed stated that there was no unrest nor anti-Japanese movement in Kirin city before the Japanese troops came. We believe that the 1,000 Japanese residents were fearful of Chinese attacks, but it appears that it would have been more reasonable and economical to have withdrawn these residents 3 hours by rail to the South Manchuria Railway zone than to have sent troops to occupy in a military sense this city of 100,000 Chinese and a railway, which, although financed by the Japanese, was run and policed by Chinese. Up to the present time the Japanese have given no indication of withdrawing from Kirin. They stated to us that they did not think Hsi’s Government strong enough as yet to protect the city from the Chinese troops which left the city and which are now without funds. The circle is vicious. The coming of the Japanese military caused these troops to leave and are now, according to reliable information, refusing to allow the Chinese authorities to use government funds to support them. I am convinced they will soon become brigands against whom it will be necessary to maintain a Japanese garrison at Kirin. Unless some provision is made for the upkeep of these Chinese troops or of a strong Chinese garrison in the city, it would be dangerous to Kirin if the Japanese troops withdrew.
[11?] The thinking Chinese at Kirin feel bitter against the Japanese military on account of their actions, although the Japanese soldiers have conducted themselves correctly and are attempting to ingratiate themselves into the good graces of the Chinese common people. The latter are extremely afraid of the Japanese soldiers.
12. According to information received by us while at Tunhwa from the evening of October 8th to the morning of October 14th as guests of magistrate Liu Hsing-pei, the Chinese garrison at Tunhwa numbering about 500 left that city of about 10,000 people on September 22nd in order to avoid a conflict with the Japanese troops, 200 of [Page 174] whom arrived on September 23rd. The latter, after occupying the Kirin-Tunhwa Railway, disarmed the Tunhwa Chinese police, occupied the barracks and governmental establishments, and released from the Chinese jail 49 Korean prisoners, who have extraterritorial rights, charged with being Communists (a large number were also on duty at Kirin). They left for Kirin on October 5th taking with them the 18 Japanese residents of Tunhwa, some rifles and some Chinese military coats. The Chinese at Tunhwa believed that the news of our coming had caused the Japanese to evacuate the town and railway, and they hoped that something might be done to prevent the return of the Japanese tyrants. The Chinese were much disturbed by the arrival of the Japanese soldiers.
13. In our presence Magistrate Liu telephoned to the Chinese garrison commander at Yenchi and was informed by the latter [that] the two divisions of Japanese troops, fully equipped and supplied to build the Tunhwa-Kwainei Railway, were stationed on the Korean side of the Tumen River, ready to cross at any moment. There was no evidence that the Japanese were planning to build this railway from Tunhwa eastward. The telegraph line to Harbin station, Yenchi and Tungning was in operation.
14. There was no justification for this military seizure of the Kirin-Tunhwa Railway and of Tunhwa in order to protect the lives of 18 Japanese and Koreans, who had few interests in Tunhwa and who might have been evacuated easily to Changchun, in case they were in danger.
15. On October 9th there appeared to be no reason to believe that the Chinese inhabitants of Tunhwa were in danger of suffering from brigand attacks, as it had a local guard and a police force amounting to several hundred persons and as the magistrate was attempting to persuade the 500 Chinese soldiers who left to return to their barracks at Tunhwa.
16. After much deliberation we accepted the offer from the Japanese at Kirin to provide us with a guard to and from Tunhwa. We felt that the chances of brigand attack would be fewer if we had a Japanese guard with us. It is natural to presume that the Japanese military would have made much capital for themselves from a brigand attack upon us. The magistrate understood our motives and the Chinese at Tunhwa were not offended by our action in this respect.”
Repeated Tokyo.
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