Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2222

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Castle) of a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi)

[Washington,] October 12, 1931.

Mr. Debuchi told me that he had taken up with the Secretary the following four points.³¹

1. Shidehara feels strongly that the Commander of the Japanese Army in Manchuria is not in position to take charge of any diplomatic negotiations. The question therefore as to whether Marshal Chang can be recognized or not is one to be decided only by the Japanese Government.

2. It was very far from the thought of Shidehara to minimize the Chinchow incident. This was an isolated military action and in no way reflected the attitude of the Japanese Government.

3. Shidehara wants the Secretary to be assured that the fixed policy of Japan toward China, which is a policy of peace and friendship, will not be influenced by incidents brought about by military officers under the stress of excitement.

4. Shidehara entirely approved Mr. Debuchi’s explanation of the recent Japanese memorandum sent to the Nanking Government.³² He added that although the terms of the note were rather severe in language, this was customary in notes to the Chinese Government.

The Ambassador asked me if I would tell him what I thought the American attitude was toward the Manchurian situation at the present moment. I told him that I thought at the beginning, although people felt that the Japanese military authorities had gone too far, nevertheless American opinion was restrained in the matter, possibly because many people realized that the Japanese in Manchuria have suffered many and continued irritations. I told him that everyone was relieved when the League of Nations passed its resolution of September 30th concurred in by the Japanese and Chinese Governments, but that since that time we had all been profoundly disturbed by the fact that Japan did not seem to be carrying out its own commitments under that resolution in that there was very little evidence of an attempt to withdraw the troops within the railway zone and that there was, on the other hand, an apparent willingness to go on further than they had already gone. I pointed out to him that even in war time such an incident as that of Chinchow would have caused serious criticism and that for the Japanese planes to fly far outside the lines was a provocation which seemed to have no justification under international law. I told him, therefore, that in spite of the fact that the Chinese did not appear to be taking the steps they should take to protect Japanese lives and property, I felt that the Japanese unwillingness to carry out their own commitments was rapidly turning American sentiment against them, and in this case American sentiment would inevitably be similar to that of the rest of the world.

I told the Ambassador that we still looked for direct negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese as the only solution of the matter and reminded him that he had himself said he thought the Chinese terms, that they would negotiate when the Japanese troops had been withdrawn from the railway zone, were fair. The Ambassador said that he did not pretend to be a military man, and that he could not understand why the withdrawal of these troops had been so slow.

Mr. Debuchi said that Baron Shidehara was very anxious to negotiate with the Chinese and showed me, in the utmost confidence, one of the statements which Baron Shidehara was prepared to make as one of the bases of these negotiations. This statement was a very vigorous assertion that Japan did not wish any territorial concessions in Manchuria, including the eastern provinces thereof and that it did not wish to interfere with the Chinese administration of the country. He repeated continually the determination of the Japanese not to go to war and did not once attempt to defend the army for its advances since the commitment was made to the League of Nations.

The Ambassador, of course, represents the Shidehara policy which is essentially peaceful and friendly. He said that the latest batch of Japanese newspapers he had received played up the friendly attitude of this country in the present crisis and said that he hoped nothing might happen which would change that attitude. I told him that I also hoped nothing would happen to change the American sentiment, but that I felt it depended very largely on Japan and the actions of the army in Manchuria, since after all there was a strong feeling for the sanctity of treaties and the Japanese must not drive American opinion, as unfortunately they were rapidly doing through such incidents as the bombing of Chinchow, into the idea that Japan did not consider treaties as real obligations.

W. R. C[astle,] Jr.

31. See memorandum by the Secretary of State, October 12, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 22.
32. For text of memorandum dated October 9, see telegram No. 736, October 10, noon, from the Minister in China, p. 151.