793.94/2006: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
723. In reference to Legation’s 708, October 6, noon, Consul General at Nanking reports further under date of October 6, 11 a.m. and October 6, 3 p.m.
- “1. Soong gave me the information reported in my October 4, 10 p.m. and added that Shidehara had convinced the State Department, according to his report, that the civil element in the Japanese Government still controlled the military and that troops would be withdrawn as required. Soong cannot but feel that withdrawal will not be accomplished unless a strong stand is taken by the League or by one or more powerful nations independently of the League. As part of his grounds for holding; this view he said that Chang Kia-ngau, President of the Bank of China in the days immediately following September 18th had spoken with Count Uchida and Kimura of the South Manchuria Railway Company, [with the] editor of the South Manchuria Daily News, with the Japanese Consul General and with other Japanese and that all had spoken of the two wars Japan had waged for Manchuria and had said that since events had taken their present course Japan would not relinquish this area.
- 2. I inquired what steps China was taking on her own part to ascertain whether Japanese troops were being withdrawn and he replied that the Chinese Government on October 4th had sent a communication to the Japanese Government stating that instructions had been issued to Chang Tso-hsiang and Wang Shu-chang to enter into negotiations with the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria in order to reestablish Chinese control over areas progressively evacuated. He said no reply had been received from the Japanese Government.
- 3. Soong said that if the justice of Chinese position were not vindicated in some way by October 14th he did not think the Government could survive popular resentment if the Government passively accepted the situation.”
“Shortly after our conversation and before his departure Soong sent by confidential messenger a second statement with request that I telegraph it to you. This morning he sent me a note written on the train expressing fear that the statement might seem to you somewhat presumptuous in tone in that it offers advice regarding course to be taken by the United States; he asked me to explain that the statement arose from our discussions of possible action which the United States might take on behalf of China. Soong also sent me Rengo report dated from Mukden October 18 [sic] stating that Kwantung army headquarters will broadcast daily from Northern Wireless Station ‘for purpose clarifying impartial stand of Japanese troops Manchuria and conveying correct information on various Manchurian problems for home and abroad.’
[Page 135]Soong made marginal notation ‘while talking this evening about how sensitive Japanese really are to world opinion.’
Second statement follows:
‘The following facts for His Excellency Minister N. T. Johnson: The action of the League of Nations weakened perceptibly on the reported announcement that the United States proposed to take no action concerning the Manchurian crisis. It is believed here that the attitude of the United States was inspired by an appeal from Shidehara that public pressure on the part of the powers would soon result in a military coup d’état and the formation of a military dictatorship in Japan, and that on the other hand the Japanese Government desired and was succeeding in ordering military uprisings.
Through reliable official reports from Manchuria and from the interviews which the governor of the Bank of China, Mr. Chang Kia-ngau, [had] with General Honjo, Consul General Hayashi, Count Uchida and Mr. Kimura, the last two as late as October 2d, it is clear that both the Japanese military and civilians have the firmest determination not to withdraw troops, and further they are organizing local shadow governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, which will be autonomous and under their protection.
Such being the case, the Manchurian crisis is reaching to a climax and it is to be hoped that as stated United States addressed [will address?] both to China and Japan the hope that the two countries will withdraw their troops, and as Japan will not carry out her promise of so doing, the United States will make its influence felt in Tokyo, Japan not daring to oppose a firm attitude of the United States of America. This will encourage the League of Nations, particularly if the United States of America would assure it that the United States will view with sympathy action calculated to bringing Japan to carry out her undertaking to withdraw her troops, which she morally bound herself to carry out before October 14th.’”
- Telegram in five sections.↩