793.94/2015: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Paraphrase]
Geneva, October 7, 1931—1
p.m.
[Received October 8—8:50 a.m.]
[Received October 8—8:50 a.m.]
160. (Section 3.)2 Department’s 63, October 3, 5 p.m.
- (1)
- Regarding a possible Council meeting on October 14, Drummond said it might not be necessary if things took a favorable turn, [Page 129] though present indications allowed no definite forecast. He expressed the hope that if the Council meets it might be made stronger through the presence of more Foreign Ministers than attended the final part of the regular session in September when the case between China and Japan came up (see my 141, September 26, 9 a.m., paragraph 4). Drummond thinks Briand3 at any rate is quite prepared to attend.
- (2)
- Regarding the policy of the Council in this matter, Drummond expanded on one point (see my 150, October 1, 9 a.m., for Council’s resolution, point 3). The Council has insisted all along on using the term “withdrawal of troops within the railway zone” or some such phrase, but the Chinese have used and tried to have adopted the phrase “reestablishment of the status quo ante” or something of similar purport. Drummond said Sze had urged on him that the expression “status quo ante” be employed, to which he had countered with the suggestion of the term “in accordance with treaty stipulations”. Drummond’s suggestion had caused Sze to retreat from his position, since his Government, I understand, has taken the stand of not recognizing the “validity” of the treaties concerned and since, as I gather, under those instruments Japan is entitled to more troops in the railway zone and to occupation of more points than is envisaged in Sze’s “status quo ante”.
- (3)
- I wish to add, in connection with the above, that Sze yesterday
came to me. First he made some statements respecting the position of
the forces in Manchuria, etc., chiefly repetitious of assertions
previously made by the Chinese, and then he took occasion to state
that it was Chinese policy to demand in turn the taking of three
successive steps; namely:
- (a)
- reestablishment of the status quo ante;
- (b)
- reparation for damages; and
- (c)
- examination of the causes for the difficulty in the general situation in Manchuria with a view to a settlement.
- (4)
- Regarding China’s policy in general, Drummond concurred in the opinion which was expressed in the last two paragraphs of my 150, October 1, 9 a.m., and remarked that, while he was merely giving his personal views, it was his belief that, if Japanese withdrawal within the railway zone were successfully achieved, the League would attempt to follow its usual course by having both parties agree to procedure for the adjustment of other outstanding questions through direct negotiations between the two countries. Judging by the Chinese attitude, this might be made difficult by them, but Drummond felt it was desirable since otherwise the danger might remain thereafter of the Chinese bringing every small question before the League or appealing [Page 130] to the League at each hitch. Should the Chinese persist in trying to keep the matter on an international plane, Drummond of course cannot foresee the outcome.
- (5)
- Drummond expressed concurrence with the opinion expressed in my 141, September 26, 9 a.m., paragraph 7, and agreed that an extremely difficult situation would be caused if Japan should prove recalcitrant in executing the program accepted hitherto. In view of the present situation in the world, Drummond agreed that pressure through economic sanctions would be entirely out of the question, but it had occurred to him that, if worst came to worst, the leading powers might possibly withdraw their mission chiefs from Tokyo. This, he believes, would prove to be a type of pressure which it would be most difficult for the Japanese to resist.
Section 4 follows in my 161.
Gilbert