Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/1965: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, October 2, 1931—5 p.m.
[Received 7:33 p.m.⁸⁸]

691. From Consul General at Nanking.

“October 2, 4 p.m.

1. Following is brief summary of informal conversation held with T. V. Soong September 30, 9 p.m., at his home; the Chinese Government is very apprehensive of a rapidly extending sentiment of friendship for the Soviet Government and of a popular feeling that ordinary diplomatic relations should be resumed immediately as offset to Japanese aggressive designs and to develop effective action by the League of Nations and signatories of the Kellogg Pact which now the Chinese people believe they can no longer hope for. Soong feels that the American Government is in some way accountable for the apparent lessening of the League’s first eagerness to bring about an adjustment of the present Manchurian controversy and has been searching for the reason for the failure of the United States, when drafting its identic notes, to point out to Japan the danger of world conflict which may follow Japan’s continued use of military force. He considered it probable that the Japanese Ambassador must have convinced the American Government of the rectitude of Japan’s intentions and of unwisdom of needlessly wounding the feelings of a sensitive people. Another explanation he finds in the possibility that the Japanese Government gave the American Government some positive assurance that Japan would desist from its present course. The sudden change of position by the head of the British delegation to the League Council he thinks also may be accounted for by some such assurance. He expressed an earnest desire to learn why the United States, as shown by its two communications, seemed to attach so little importance to the Japanese military in Manchuria. He described the steps now being taken by the Japanese to encourage rebellious movements in Kirin and elsewhere and gave me translations of confidential reports from Chang Hsueh-liang reporting machine gun and bombing operations by Japanese airplanes in various places on September 27 and military seizure of railway plant at Huangkutung on September 29. In the meantime he could not account for the ‘apathy’ of the American Government under these circumstances.

2. To give the conversation a more practical turn I inquired under what conditions the Chinese Government would consent to treat with the Japanese Government for a settlement of the controversy. He said that while the Chinese Government would never admit that Japan had any treaty right to station troops on the South Manchuria Railway he thought China could treat with Japan if all Japanese troops were withdrawn to the railway although even then the Chinese Government would be apprehensive that Japan would introduce irrelevant questions which China would be unwilling to discuss. China would, of course, expect compensation for the unwarranted damage inflicted.

3. The two dominant impressions made on me by the interview were that he still hopes that the United States will evince a stronger interest in curbing Japan’s warlike measures than the United States has hitherto shown and, secondly, that he deeply feared a popular swing toward Soviet Russia. He remarked that China for defense against Japan must place reliance either on her own military strength, on intervention by the League, the signatories to the Pact (principally the United States), or on the Soviet Government. These views seem to be held by Chinese generally. I should add that Soong is very anxious lest popular resentment among the Chinese may precipitate actual hostilities and he instanced the killing of Japanese in Hong Kong.

4. Soong appeared grateful when I said I would telegraph his remarks in substance, and that presumably you would transmit them to the Department of State. He again expressed his hope that I might be able to obtain for him some additional insight into the Department’s attitude toward events in Manchuria.”

5. Frank W. Lee since September 30 Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs called on me at the Legation. He outlined general situation much as Soong had done but the main object of his call evidently was to reiterate the hope of the Chinese Government that the United States still would issue some public statement, stronger than the identic notes, supporting the justice of China’s position via [vis-à-vis] Japan in Manchuria. He called attention to the fact that ‘The United States has a historical position with respect to Manchuria’, and he made specific reference to the statement made by the Department of State at the time when the Japanese Government formally forbade Chinese internal conflicts in Manchuria. He said that the Department’s statement had a most salutary effect at that time.

6. I pointed out that it might be necessary to recognize a general deadlock as regards situation and I repeated to him the question I asked Soong regarding the circumstances which might make it possible for China to talk with Japan. Dr. Lee told me, quite as though the matter had been in his mind, that in default of action by the League China would be willing to commence negotiations with Japan under circumstances similar to those of the Washington Conference discussions at which Great Britain and the United States had observers but that withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway area would be a prerequisite to such negotiations. Dr. Lee was positive that the Chinese Government having entrusted the protection of its rights to the League of Nations would await exhaustion of possibilities in that direction before adopting any other course. At the same time, he emphasized his earnest hope that the American Government in keeping with precedent and its past policies would take some independent action in support of China’s rights and thus save China from being coerced by circumstances either into a disastrous war with Japan or a dangerous alliance with Russia. I told Dr. Lee I would report the substance of his remarks to the American Minister.

7. Dr. Lee incidentally deplored the fact that China had no Minister in Washington, seemed to feel that the free access enjoyed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State must have had a powerful influence on the attitude taken by the American Government in regard to this controversy. I inquired when W. [W.] Yen, the Minister designate, would go to Washington and Lee replied that that date had not yet been fixed.

Johnson

88. Telegram in seven sections.