Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/1957: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, October 1, 1931—9 a.m.
[Received 3:25 p.m.]

150. Council last night resumed consideration of the Sino-Japanese dispute.

The opening statement of the President was substantially as follows:

Under article 11 of the Covenant the duty of the League is to safeguard peace and the Council has concluded to this end the withdrawal of Japanese troops into the railway zone is of paramount importance; it is recognized that a certain time must be allowed for this withdrawal. Since both parties have concurred in this view, without prejudice to the method of settlement of questions between them, the President was of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the discussions of the Council but it was his understanding that the Council “will follow the further developments of this affair” and “will be ready at all times to render any assistance that may be useful”. Other portions of the President’s statement were in line with the resolution later adopted. He then proposed the following resolution which is given in full as it forms the basis of the League’s position:

“The Council

1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

2. Recognizes the importance of the Japanese Government’s statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

3. Notes the Japanese representative’s statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;

4. Notes the Chinese representative’s statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside of that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are reestablished;

5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

6. Requests both parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above-mentioned undertakings;

7. Requests both parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation;

8. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th, 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;

9. Authorizes its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14 should he decide, after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two parties, that in view of such information as he may have received from the parties or from other members of the Council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary.”

The Japanese delegate accepted the resolution. He declared, however, it was entirely useless to take special measures for investigation particularly as there are “many persons” on the spot from whom information can be obtained. He then suggested that members of the Council send to the Secretary-General for communication to the Council if he deems it desirable whatever information their respective Governments could collect.

The Chinese delegate in reply noted that the Japanese Government now recognized the necessity of neutral information. He interpreted the resolution as meaning that “the Council is conscious of its responsibility to help both parties to secure the complete and prompt withdrawal of the armed forces of Japan and the full reestablishment of the status quo ante and remains in session until that responsibility is fully discharged.” If the establishment of the status quo ante is not achieved by October 14 he expected the Council to examine what other means may be required; in this connection he recalled his two proposals: (1) commission of inquiry, (2) local arrangements for investigation on the spot. Sze also stated he considered the establishment of the status quo ante as a preliminary step and reserved its [the?] right under the Covenant to look to the Council later for aid in determining the civil responsibility of the two parties.

The Japanese delegate declared that he could not accept the interpretation given by Sze but could only accept the resolution as presented.

The President thereupon stated that it is not necessary now to enter upon questions of interpretation and that the rights of the two parties remain intact.

The resolution was then adopted.

[Paraphrase.] Referring to the Chinese “compromise” proposal in regard to an inquiry commission (see Consulate’s 149, September 30, 10 a.m.), it may be noted that it was not presented to the Council. Sze told me confidentially, after the meeting of the Council, that he was persuaded not to bring it forward, although it was circulated to the Council members as an “elucidation” of his proposal presented on September 28 to the Council meeting (see Consulate’s 144, September 29, 9 a.m.), and that he was holding this proposal in reserve to bring it forward if necessary upon “further developments of the affair” which the President mentioned in his speech.

While the European press seems to be designating Sze as Chinese Foreign Minister, he told me in conversation that the post had been offered him and he had informed his Government that he would not for personal reasons be able to accept. [End paraphrase.]

Those representatives of the powers in Geneva who seem to be best informed on Far Eastern affairs have expressed their opinion on happenings here as distinctly a Chinese diplomatic victory, the Chinese having attained their objective of keeping the matter in the hands of the League. They also express their belief that future Chinese policy will be to employ this present incident indefinitely in the future in securing the League’s continuing concern with the whole Manchurian situation.

The implication which one present at the proceeding draws is that on the one hand it is the desire of the leaders in the Council to restrict the Council’s action to the single question of the withdrawal of the troops while on the other hand it is the policy of the Chinese to involve the Council as deeply as possible in all of the aspects of the situation.

Gilbert