762.94/275: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
73. Japan has entered into negotiations with Germany and Italy for a definite alliance, both military and political. The questions under present consideration concern the exact scope of the understanding; that is, whether it is to be aimed only at Russia or against other nations also. The above is based on reliable reports. Germany and Italy are said to be asking for the broad application while Japan wishes to restrict the scope of the alliance.
Apparently the Germans, and to a less extent the Italians, are seeking an arrangement recognizing and giving effect to the superior strategic position which they hold as compared with the Japanese should a conflict arise between Russia and any member of the alliance. We are reliably informed that the Germans and Italians consider Japan a natural ally because they feel sure that Japan would seize [Page 162] the opportunity to attack Russia should that power become engaged in war with either Germany or Italy or with both of them. That is why they do not wish to make commitments to come to the aid of Japan if only Japan comes into conflict with Russia.
Important moderate influences are in operation to keep the Japanese Government from joining itself completely with the Rome-Berlin Axis. However, strong pressure is being exerted on the other side; the younger army officers are especially keen for this tie-up. It is thought that Foreign Minister Arita favors making the alliance. It was he who sponsored the anti-Comintern Pact.
I have acted through informal channels to convey to Arita the idea that Japan would do well to consider, before taking an irrevocable step, what would be the possible effects upon relations with the United States of such an alliance. My British colleague feels that it would be useful for me to seek an interview with Arita on this question but I am not convinced that a direct approach is desirable. It is my belief that the best course would be to limit myself, should future conversations with Arita bring up this question naturally, to stressing the view that if her ultimate welfare is to be served Japan must cultivate and maintain friendly relations with all nations, and that friendly relations with the United States and Great Britain are of especial value because Japan’s rapid development economically and industrially would have been impossible without the liberal American and British trade policies. It seems to me that the principal benefit to which we can invite Arita’s attention as an offset to whatever the Japanese expect to gain from an arrangement with the Axis is the value to Japan of British and American markets. No matter what a government’s policy may be, a government cannot necessarily control moral sanctions by the people.
The Department can determine better than I the advisability of approaching the Foreign Minister directly on this matter and whether such an approach, if made, should be under instructions or on my own responsibility.
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