740.0011 European War 1939/10905: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State

673. 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has been suffering from bronchitis and still coughs badly, received me today for the first time since his return from Berlin and after completing the routine business I asked whether he had any particular thoughts with regard to the present general situation.

2. The Minister’s subsequent remarks, which he said he was addressing to me as “an American friend and not as the American Ambassador” were bellicose both in tone and substance. He said that he was exceedingly worried lest the United States should proceed to convoy its ships to Great Britain, which would almost certainly lead to war with Germany. He said that to declare a neutral zone in the Atlantic or any other ocean was contrary to international law and that in the face of our supplying Great Britain with war materials he thought that Hitler had shown great “patience and generosity” in not declaring war on the United States. He said he knew that Hitler desired to avoid such a war but that it was doubtful whether his patience and restraint could continue indefinitely. He said by way of example that if the United States were to convoy its ships in bringing aid to Chiang Kai-shek they would be torpedoed by the Japanese Navy just as he would expect the American Navy to act similarly in a reverse situation. He said that if, in spite of previous forbearance, Hitler should not [now?] sink our ships in the Atlantic and if we Americans should then attack the German submarines he would regard this as an act of American aggression which would call for [Page 146] deliberation as to the applicability of article III of the Triple Alliance Treaty of September 27, 1940,16 and he thought there was no doubt that such deliberation Would lead to war between Japan and the United States.

Thin issue he said, therefore, lies exclusively in the hands of President Roosevelt. Mr. Matsuoka added that in view of the present American Government and actions he felt that the “manly, decent, and reasonable” thing for the United States to do was to declare war openly on Germany instead of engaging in acts of war under cover of neutrality. He developed the foregoing thoughts at considerable length but the main points brought forward were as stated above.

3. I rebutted each of Mr. Matsuoka’s remarks in turn and said that whether he was speaking to me as the American Ambassador or not, I as an American citizen emphatically resented his charge that my country was guilty of unmanly, indecent, and unreasonable conduct. Mr. Matsuoka thereupon said that he would withdraw that remark. To my reference to Japan’s actions in attacking China and in ruthlessly bombing undefended cities and populations without a declaration of war (in connection [with] the Minister’s observation anent the failure of the United States to declare war on Germany) Mr. Matsuoka merely remarked that the situations were entirely different, and changed the subject. I pointed out the utter fallacy of Mr. Matsuoka’s reasoning with regard to our alleged breach of international law, spoke of our consistent policy concerning the freedom of the seas and argued the full justification of such measures as we might put into force in the face of Hitler’s continual breaches of international law with special reference to the illegal form of submarine warfare being waged by the Germans. I explained at length our policy of supporting Great Britain and the compelling reasons which had led us to adopt that policy. No point of course by Mr. Matsuoka was allowed to pass unchallenged but we finally agreed that such debate was profitless and that a meeting of minds was impossible.

4. The discussion then turned to Japan’s policy in connection with the southward advance and I said that in spite of the Minister’s constant assurances of peaceful intentions we realized that there were other schools of thought in Japan as exemplified by the writings and speeches of many highly placed Japanese who were openly advocating that the southward advance should be carried out by force.

The Minister replied that he deplored the sort of utterances which I had mentioned as much as he deplored all anti-foreign agitation in Japan which he was steadily working to put an end to. He said that he was dissatisfied with the lack of energy on the part of Mr. Ito, President of the Information Board, in failing to eliminate the publication of such utterances and he proposed to have a talk with him on [Page 147] this subject shortly. If necessary the Minister said that he was prepared to place a definite ban on the publication of material of this kind. Prince Konoye and he himself were determined that the southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful measures but he added significantly “unless circumstances render this impossible.” I asked him what circumstances he had in mind. He replied that he had in mind especially the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other provocative British measures. When I pointed out that such measures were purely of a defensive nature and that Great Britain certainly had no intention of provocative or of aggressive action in the Far East but had been obliged to adopt these defensive measures as a result of concrete evidence indicating that Japan’s intentions to the southward might not be peaceful at all, the Minister’s reply was that these British measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public and if the public should become too much disturbed, pressure might be brought to bear on the government to act. So far as the attitude of the Government of the United States was concerned I pointed out to the Minister situation would be utter folly for us, having adopted a policy of supporting Great Britain, to supply Great Britain by the Atlantic while complacently watching the downfall of Britain through the severance of the British lifeline from the East. The potentialities of this situation were therefore of grave concern to the United States and this concern must be increased in the light of the Minister’s remark that Japan’s peaceful intentions were dependent upon “circumstances.”

5. In the course of further conversation I said that it was a constant cause of regret to me that Japanese-American relations were for the moment negative and non-constructive; that I had steadily worked to build up something permanently constructive in our relations and had been very hopeful of attaining concrete results during the period of the Yonai Cabinet16a and it had been a profound disappointment to me that Japan’s complete change of policy had made these efforts abortive. I said I still look forward to the day when only [once] again our two countries could begin to reconstruct their relations on a firm basis. The Minister replied that he also was constantly hopeful but he added that the whole future of the world and of civilization now lies in the hands of one single man, President Roosevelt. My last remark before the termination of the interview was that the United States could only be guided by deeds and that our future relations must depend not upon what Japan might say but upon what Japan might do.

6. Just as I was about to despatch this telegram I received a letter from Mr. Matsuoka written in his own hand. The letter (except for [Page 148] one paragraph referring to a protection case which I took up with him) reads as follows:

“Dear Mr. Ambassador … I was wondering, to be frank, why you appeared so disturbed when I referred to the American attitude and actions. After Your Excellency’s departure, it all suddenly dawned on me that I misused a word (of course I was not speaking in my own language and you must make some allowance for my occasionally making mistake in choosing words, particularly when I speak off hand). Of course, I didn’t mean to say ‘indecent.’ No! I wanted to say ‘indiscretion.’ What I wished to say (and that not as Foreign Minister but as a man who regarded himself a quasi-American and felt could talk almost as if he were an Ambassador) was that I should have liked to see the American Government exercise more discretion and be careful to give an appearance of ‘reasonableness;’ in a word, to be more cautious and careful.

I write you the above in order to remove any misapprehension; I’d feel very sorry if I caused any.

Very sincerely yours, Y. Matsuoka.”

Grew
  1. Telegram in four sections.
  2. Post, p. 165.
  3. January 16–July 16, 1940.