The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the
United States as gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause
Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinarily
direct and sparing of words. Upon listening attentively to what Mr.
Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr. Ohashi
remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst
forth with the question “Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack
Singapore there would be war with the United States?” Mr. Dooman
replied, “The logic of the situation
[Page 138]
would inevitably raise that question.” Mr. Ohashi
then left that subject and adverted to the character of the reports sent
to London by the British Ambassador. Circumstantial evidence that Mr.
Ohashi was affected by the interview was given by Sir John Latham, the
Australian Minister, who called on Mr. Ohashi a few minutes after Mr.
Dooman left. Sir John, without being aware that Mr. Dooman had just
called on Mr. Ohashi, told me that he found Mr. Ohashi greatly agitated
and distrait.
I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka, with whom I have an appointment this
morning, that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Ohashi were made
with my prior knowledge and have my full approval.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in
Japan (Dooman)
[Tokyo,] February 14,
1941.
I called this afternoon by appointment on Mr. Ohashi, the Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs. He greeted me quite politely, saying
that although we had several mutual friends it was, so far as he
knew, the first time we had met. I replied that I had on various
occasions taken notice of statements which he had made in various
capacities of the past, in Manchuria, and elsewhere, but I had,
unfortunately, not been able to profit by opportunities which had
presented themselves to make his acquaintance. Mr. Ohashi said he
understood that I had just returned from leave in the United States
and that he supposed I had received a number of interesting
impressions in the United States. I replied that my furlough in the
United States coincided with one of the most significant and
important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had
time I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and
heard while at home. Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not
busy that day and that I could stay as long as I wished.
I gave Mr. Ohashi a fairly long account of the trends in opinion with
regard to the war in Europe as they developed during the election
campaign. I dwelt on the remarkably swift crystallization of opinion
at home with regard to the question of American aid to England,
which I attributed in large part first to the disclosure on the part
of the British that they were rapidly approaching the end of the
resources in dollar exchange, and second to the belief that the
effects on Britain’s capacity to produce aircraft and other
munitions of German bombing raids had been more serious than the
British communiques would lead one to suppose. I said that although
the large majority of the American people abhorred the idea of
American
[Page 139]
involvement in
war, the fact was that an equally large majority of the American
people believed that there was one consideration which transcends
even that of avoiding involvement in the war, and that is helping
England to the limit of our capacity.
I said that all this was not without direct bearing on relations
between the United States and Japan. I had found that American
opinion is pretty clearly opposed to the taking of action by the
United States which would make war with Japan inevitable.
Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily understand that the American
people, being an eminently practical people, are quite aware that an
adequate supply of airplanes and other munitions is not the only
prerequisite to a British victory: the supply to England of
foodstuffs and raw materials by the British dominions and colonies
and the maintenance of British commerce with the outside world are
equally essential to a British victory. It would be absurd to
suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into
Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of
communications between Britain and British dominions and colonies
overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice
the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by
placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she
would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States.
There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward
Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot
but be concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in
Indo-China and elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were to
occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it
could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and
create havoc with essential British lines of communication. The
United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source
of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other
products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and
for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the
sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the
Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United
States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to
create a situation which could lead only to the most serious
consequences, I recalled the axiom in geometry that two bodies
cannot occupy the same space at the same time: However greatly
Japan’s security might be enhanced by occupying the Netherlands East
Indies it must be realized by Japan that any such move would vitally
concern the major preoccupation of the United States at this time,
which is to assist England to stand against German assault.
[Page 140]
Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned
apologia of Japanese policies in recent years. He started by
describing conditions in Japan during the middle 20’s, the lack of
employment in Japan at that time was driving young Japanese to
despair; communism began to spread in amazing fashion, the estimates
being that there were at one time more than 50,000 Japanese
communists and there was fear of decay and disintegration of the
Japanese political system. There developed at the same time a
growing antagonism in China toward Japan. General Chiang Kai-shek
initiated a series of military campaigns which finally resulted in
the downfall of the northern group of Chinese generals, including
Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and others. General Chang Tso-lin9a made his historic trip to
Nanking to consolidate himself with General Chiang Kai-shek, and
upon his return to Mukden he raised the flag of Chinese nationalism
and proclaimed that his action manifested the complete unification
of China and at about this time, Mr. C. T. Wang, then Minister for
Foreign Affairs, publicly declared in a speech at Nanking that China
was now prepared to “drive Japan off the Continent of Asia”. There
had occurred elsewhere other events which also gave grounds for
complete pessimism in Japan. Pressure by the United States on
England had led to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance,
which England discarded after it had served British purposes; the
United States in 1924 excluded Japanese from emigrating to the
United States, even though the granting of a small quota of 140
would have amply served to prevent Japanese pride and honor from
being injured, and when Australia followed with its White Australia
Policy and other parts of the British Empire had also taken action
to exclude Japanese, the Japanese had found themselves effectively
prevented from expanding into areas which could use their industry
and initiative. At the same time the United States and Great Britain
encouraged China in every possible way to implement the policy
proclaimed by Dr. C. T. Wang to drive Japan off the Asiatic
Continent. He recalled travelling with Admiral Kanji Kato in 1930
from Mukden to Japan. Admiral Kato expressed himself as being
extremely despondent of the future if matters were allowed to
proceed as they were then proceeding, and he disclosed to Mr. Ohashi
the determination of certain elements in the Japanese Army and Navy
to take action toward opening up a way for Japanese expansion. This
determination manifested itself finally in the Mukden Incident of
September 18, 1931. Mr. Ohashi said that the League of Nations had
placed upon Japan the responsibility for seeking to alter by force
the status quo in the Far East. However, it
was clear that it was China and not Japan which had taken the
initiative in seeking to alter the status
quo, and the responsibility for the
[Page 141]
deplorable conflict now taking place between
China and Japan must largely be borne by those nations which
encouraged China to pursue this disastrous policy. The United States
and England must also be responsible in some measure for Japan’s
aligning itself with Germany and Italy, for the present
Sino-Japanese conflict would never have occurred if the
Anglo-Japanese alliance had not been abrogated. The United States
and England had further driven Japan into a position of complete
isolation, and it was accordingly necessary for Japan to find
friends. Japan has no special friendly feelings towards Germany and
Italy and certainly has no ideological association or identity with
either of those two countries. Nevertheless Germany, Italy, and
Japan have a close identity of interests in revolting against
attempts to keep them permanently under subjection. It would be a
great mistake to suppose that Japan would not honor its commitments
under the alliance if the United States “were to attack
Germany”.
I observed that Mr. Ohashi’s presentation of Japan’s case had the
eloquence of one suffering under a sense of grievance. We do not
deny that Japan has grievances, but we object to the methods pursued
by Japan to rectify those grievances. After the war in Europe is
over, there is bound to be a more rational world, and in the
creation of the more intelligent world economy which we must
earnestly hope will be brought into being after the war, there would
be ample room for entirely satisfying Japan’s legitimate needs. I
then quoted Mr. Churchill’s10 remark “If we allow the past to quarrel
with the present, we shall lose the future”. As difficult and
important as were the problems arising in China, they had not led to
a war between the United States and Japan. It was certainly not the
intention of the United States to seek a war with Japan, but at the
same time I wished to make it clear that it would be idle and
extravagant to believe that, so long as Japan remained a partner of
Germany and Italy and so long as she was unable to resolve her
troubles with China on a mutually satisfactory and equitable basis,
a stabilization of relations between the United States and Japan
could be hoped for. I believed that it was quite possible to pass
over the present critical period without war, but that one essential
condition to this more or less happy issue out of our difficulties
must be the realization on the part of the Japanese that they cannot
substantially alter the status quo in
Southeast Asia, particularly, without incurring the risk of creating
a very serious situation.
Mr. Ohashi asked whether he was correct in understanding me to say
that war could be averted only by Japan standing still and allowing
itself to be tied hand and feet by the United States and Great
Britain. I replied that it was not my intention to give him
specifications
[Page 142]
as to what
Japan should or should not do, but I wished to express my opinion
that if Japan did not exercise the same degree of restraint and
forbearance as that being exercised by the United States, it was
very difficult to see how a war could be averted.
Mr. Ohashi then asked me whether we had been sending to Washington
such extravagant and sensational reports as those being sent by Sir
Robert Craigie to London. Without waiting for a reply he said that
Mr. Eden11 had recently called in the Japanese
Ambassador at London and had talked to Mr. Shigemitsu very harshly
about recent Japanese moves in Siam and Indo-China. Mr. Eden was
apparently greatly excited by telegrams which he had received from
Sir Robert Craigie. Mr. Ohashi said that he had just had a talk with
Sir Robert Craigie and that he had reminded Sir Robert that he had
repeatedly given the latter assurances that Japan had no intention
whatever of moving toward Singapore and the Dutch East Indies unless
Japan was “pressed” by other nations through the imposition of
embargoes by the United States or by the sending of an American
fleet to Singapore. I said to Mr. Ohashi that, in my opinion, the
award by Japan to Siam of the provinces of Laos and Cambodia would
undoubtedly lead to the most serious disorders in Indo-China, as the
French are strongly opposed to any substantial cession of territory
to the Siamese. I asked Mr. Ohashi what Japan would do in the event
that the disorders were beyond the French to control. He replied “we
shall have to suppress these disorders”. I then went on to say “once
having occupied Indo-China, Japan would be in a position to control
Siam and to undertake operations toward Burma or the Malay States.
You see how this intervention in Southeast Asia is capable of having
the most widespread consequences”. I asked whether he should not
consider, in the light of Japanese intervention in the dispute
between Indo-China and Siam, whether alarm over Japanese policies in
this area is not justified. Mr. Ohashi protested that Japan’s
interests in Southeast Asia were predominantly economic. Was it our
intention to prevent Japan from entering into more satisfactory and
closer economic relations with Indo-China and the Netherlands East
Indies? I replied that we were not concerned with arrangements
calculated to be mutually profitable and which were entered into
freely and not as a result of demands with menaces, open or implied.
He would understand that proposals concerning trade arrangements
presented under the guns of naval vessels could hardly be regarded
as ordinary trade arrangements. Mr. Ohashi said that no Japanese
warships were in the Indies and that the commercial negotiations now
being carried on by Japan with the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China
were of a normal character.11a
[Page 143]
Mr. Ohashi said that he was awaiting with great interest reports
which Admiral Nomura would be sending in shortly of his forthcoming
interviews with the President and the Secretary of State.11b I had then been in Mr. Ohashi’s office
more than an hour. I rose to go. I said that upon my return to Tokyo
I asked various colleagues what sort of a man Mr. Ohashi was and
that they had all replied that he was extremely frank—that some had
added that he was frank to the point of unpleasantness. I went on to
say that I was very glad that he had been both frank and courteous
with me, and that he could count on me to maintain equal frankness
and courtesy with him in our future conversations. A faint smile
came to Mr. Ohashi’s face and he said that he would be glad to
receive me at any time.
