711.94/1996

The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State

No. 5397

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of conversation which the Counselor of the Embassy had on February 14 with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, the substance of which was reported to the Department in the Embassy’s 230, February 14, 8 p.m.9

The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the United States as gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinarily direct and sparing of words. Upon listening attentively to what Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr. Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst forth with the question “Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack Singapore there would be war with the United States?” Mr. Dooman replied, “The logic of the situation [Page 138] would inevitably raise that question.” Mr. Ohashi then left that subject and adverted to the character of the reports sent to London by the British Ambassador. Circumstantial evidence that Mr. Ohashi was affected by the interview was given by Sir John Latham, the Australian Minister, who called on Mr. Ohashi a few minutes after Mr. Dooman left. Sir John, without being aware that Mr. Dooman had just called on Mr. Ohashi, told me that he found Mr. Ohashi greatly agitated and distrait.

I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka, with whom I have an appointment this morning, that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Ohashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

I called this afternoon by appointment on Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. He greeted me quite politely, saying that although we had several mutual friends it was, so far as he knew, the first time we had met. I replied that I had on various occasions taken notice of statements which he had made in various capacities of the past, in Manchuria, and elsewhere, but I had, unfortunately, not been able to profit by opportunities which had presented themselves to make his acquaintance. Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just returned from leave in the United States and that he supposed I had received a number of interesting impressions in the United States. I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had time I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home. Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not busy that day and that I could stay as long as I wished.

I gave Mr. Ohashi a fairly long account of the trends in opinion with regard to the war in Europe as they developed during the election campaign. I dwelt on the remarkably swift crystallization of opinion at home with regard to the question of American aid to England, which I attributed in large part first to the disclosure on the part of the British that they were rapidly approaching the end of the resources in dollar exchange, and second to the belief that the effects on Britain’s capacity to produce aircraft and other munitions of German bombing raids had been more serious than the British communiques would lead one to suppose. I said that although the large majority of the American people abhorred the idea of American [Page 139] involvement in war, the fact was that an equally large majority of the American people believed that there was one consideration which transcends even that of avoiding involvement in the war, and that is helping England to the limit of our capacity.

I said that all this was not without direct bearing on relations between the United States and Japan. I had found that American opinion is pretty clearly opposed to the taking of action by the United States which would make war with Japan inevitable. Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily understand that the American people, being an eminently practical people, are quite aware that an adequate supply of airplanes and other munitions is not the only prerequisite to a British victory: the supply to England of foodstuffs and raw materials by the British dominions and colonies and the maintenance of British commerce with the outside world are equally essential to a British victory. It would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and British dominions and colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States. There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot but be concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of communication. The United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences, I recalled the axiom in geometry that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time: However greatly Japan’s security might be enhanced by occupying the Netherlands East Indies it must be realized by Japan that any such move would vitally concern the major preoccupation of the United States at this time, which is to assist England to stand against German assault.

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Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned apologia of Japanese policies in recent years. He started by describing conditions in Japan during the middle 20’s, the lack of employment in Japan at that time was driving young Japanese to despair; communism began to spread in amazing fashion, the estimates being that there were at one time more than 50,000 Japanese communists and there was fear of decay and disintegration of the Japanese political system. There developed at the same time a growing antagonism in China toward Japan. General Chiang Kai-shek initiated a series of military campaigns which finally resulted in the downfall of the northern group of Chinese generals, including Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and others. General Chang Tso-lin9a made his historic trip to Nanking to consolidate himself with General Chiang Kai-shek, and upon his return to Mukden he raised the flag of Chinese nationalism and proclaimed that his action manifested the complete unification of China and at about this time, Mr. C. T. Wang, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, publicly declared in a speech at Nanking that China was now prepared to “drive Japan off the Continent of Asia”. There had occurred elsewhere other events which also gave grounds for complete pessimism in Japan. Pressure by the United States on England had led to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which England discarded after it had served British purposes; the United States in 1924 excluded Japanese from emigrating to the United States, even though the granting of a small quota of 140 would have amply served to prevent Japanese pride and honor from being injured, and when Australia followed with its White Australia Policy and other parts of the British Empire had also taken action to exclude Japanese, the Japanese had found themselves effectively prevented from expanding into areas which could use their industry and initiative. At the same time the United States and Great Britain encouraged China in every possible way to implement the policy proclaimed by Dr. C. T. Wang to drive Japan off the Asiatic Continent. He recalled travelling with Admiral Kanji Kato in 1930 from Mukden to Japan. Admiral Kato expressed himself as being extremely despondent of the future if matters were allowed to proceed as they were then proceeding, and he disclosed to Mr. Ohashi the determination of certain elements in the Japanese Army and Navy to take action toward opening up a way for Japanese expansion. This determination manifested itself finally in the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Mr. Ohashi said that the League of Nations had placed upon Japan the responsibility for seeking to alter by force the status quo in the Far East. However, it was clear that it was China and not Japan which had taken the initiative in seeking to alter the status quo, and the responsibility for the [Page 141] deplorable conflict now taking place between China and Japan must largely be borne by those nations which encouraged China to pursue this disastrous policy. The United States and England must also be responsible in some measure for Japan’s aligning itself with Germany and Italy, for the present Sino-Japanese conflict would never have occurred if the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not been abrogated. The United States and England had further driven Japan into a position of complete isolation, and it was accordingly necessary for Japan to find friends. Japan has no special friendly feelings towards Germany and Italy and certainly has no ideological association or identity with either of those two countries. Nevertheless Germany, Italy, and Japan have a close identity of interests in revolting against attempts to keep them permanently under subjection. It would be a great mistake to suppose that Japan would not honor its commitments under the alliance if the United States “were to attack Germany”.

I observed that Mr. Ohashi’s presentation of Japan’s case had the eloquence of one suffering under a sense of grievance. We do not deny that Japan has grievances, but we object to the methods pursued by Japan to rectify those grievances. After the war in Europe is over, there is bound to be a more rational world, and in the creation of the more intelligent world economy which we must earnestly hope will be brought into being after the war, there would be ample room for entirely satisfying Japan’s legitimate needs. I then quoted Mr. Churchill’s10 remark “If we allow the past to quarrel with the present, we shall lose the future”. As difficult and important as were the problems arising in China, they had not led to a war between the United States and Japan. It was certainly not the intention of the United States to seek a war with Japan, but at the same time I wished to make it clear that it would be idle and extravagant to believe that, so long as Japan remained a partner of Germany and Italy and so long as she was unable to resolve her troubles with China on a mutually satisfactory and equitable basis, a stabilization of relations between the United States and Japan could be hoped for. I believed that it was quite possible to pass over the present critical period without war, but that one essential condition to this more or less happy issue out of our difficulties must be the realization on the part of the Japanese that they cannot substantially alter the status quo in Southeast Asia, particularly, without incurring the risk of creating a very serious situation.

Mr. Ohashi asked whether he was correct in understanding me to say that war could be averted only by Japan standing still and allowing itself to be tied hand and feet by the United States and Great Britain. I replied that it was not my intention to give him specifications [Page 142] as to what Japan should or should not do, but I wished to express my opinion that if Japan did not exercise the same degree of restraint and forbearance as that being exercised by the United States, it was very difficult to see how a war could be averted.

Mr. Ohashi then asked me whether we had been sending to Washington such extravagant and sensational reports as those being sent by Sir Robert Craigie to London. Without waiting for a reply he said that Mr. Eden11 had recently called in the Japanese Ambassador at London and had talked to Mr. Shigemitsu very harshly about recent Japanese moves in Siam and Indo-China. Mr. Eden was apparently greatly excited by telegrams which he had received from Sir Robert Craigie. Mr. Ohashi said that he had just had a talk with Sir Robert Craigie and that he had reminded Sir Robert that he had repeatedly given the latter assurances that Japan had no intention whatever of moving toward Singapore and the Dutch East Indies unless Japan was “pressed” by other nations through the imposition of embargoes by the United States or by the sending of an American fleet to Singapore. I said to Mr. Ohashi that, in my opinion, the award by Japan to Siam of the provinces of Laos and Cambodia would undoubtedly lead to the most serious disorders in Indo-China, as the French are strongly opposed to any substantial cession of territory to the Siamese. I asked Mr. Ohashi what Japan would do in the event that the disorders were beyond the French to control. He replied “we shall have to suppress these disorders”. I then went on to say “once having occupied Indo-China, Japan would be in a position to control Siam and to undertake operations toward Burma or the Malay States. You see how this intervention in Southeast Asia is capable of having the most widespread consequences”. I asked whether he should not consider, in the light of Japanese intervention in the dispute between Indo-China and Siam, whether alarm over Japanese policies in this area is not justified. Mr. Ohashi protested that Japan’s interests in Southeast Asia were predominantly economic. Was it our intention to prevent Japan from entering into more satisfactory and closer economic relations with Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies? I replied that we were not concerned with arrangements calculated to be mutually profitable and which were entered into freely and not as a result of demands with menaces, open or implied. He would understand that proposals concerning trade arrangements presented under the guns of naval vessels could hardly be regarded as ordinary trade arrangements. Mr. Ohashi said that no Japanese warships were in the Indies and that the commercial negotiations now being carried on by Japan with the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China were of a normal character.11a

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Mr. Ohashi said that he was awaiting with great interest reports which Admiral Nomura would be sending in shortly of his forthcoming interviews with the President and the Secretary of State.11b I had then been in Mr. Ohashi’s office more than an hour. I rose to go. I said that upon my return to Tokyo I asked various colleagues what sort of a man Mr. Ohashi was and that they had all replied that he was extremely frank—that some had added that he was frank to the point of unpleasantness. I went on to say that I was very glad that he had been both frank and courteous with me, and that he could count on me to maintain equal frankness and courtesy with him in our future conversations. A faint smile came to Mr. Ohashi’s face and he said that he would be glad to receive me at any time.

E[ugene] H. D[ooman]
  1. Telegram No. 230 not printed.
  2. Reference is to Chang Hsueh-liang, son and successor of Chang Tso-lin.
  3. British Prime Minister.
  4. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  5. For other correspondence, see pp. 277 ff.
  6. See pp. 387 ff.