711.94/1936: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State
126. Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s remarks in the session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee yesterday, first published here this morning, are summarized as follows:
1. The time has passed for Japan and the United States to engage in arguments but since the interpolator has raised the question, certain points in Secretary Hull’s statement require clarification. His statement is based on erroneous thinking and his language is violent. The assertion that the Manchurian incident was the first step toward destruction of civilization is based on a superficial point of view. [Page 134] Rather, the Anglo-Saxon support of the status quo in East Asia, except [sic] when such status quo was injurious to Japan, must be blamed. Chinese resistance must be in large part attributed to Anglo-Saxon encouragement. An extremely generous Japanese policy served only to make the Chinese think that Japan would suffer all insults. Traditional Japanese patience was finally exhausted and the Marco Polo Bridge attack carried out.
2. American statesmen do not want to understand Japan’s policy. We are endeavoring unsuccessfully to urge the Americans to reflection. “Since the United States has no correct understanding of Japan’s thoughts and actions we have no recourse but to proceed toward our goal. We cannot change our convictions to accommodate the American viewpoint. There is nothing left but to face America, though we shall continue without disappointment or despair to try to correct the fundamental misconceptions held by that nation.”
3. During the tenure of the two previous Cabinets there seemed to be some effort on the part of the American Government to reach an understanding with Japan. Mr. Hull is pardoned on this point. However, it has become evident that American conditions are the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and abandonment of [or?] 50% curtailment of Japan’s continental and southward advance policies. “Not one Japanese in the Empire would assent to the abandonment of these policies.” This American demand is equivalent to Japan’s offering friendship to America in return for abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine, admission that predominance in the Western Hemisphere is wrong and immediate granting of independence to the Philippines.
4. The United States seems to consider all of Asia and the South Seas as first line of defense. Japan’s domination of the Western Pacific is absolutely necessary to accomplish her national ideals. “My use of the word ‘dominate’ may seem extreme and while we have no such designs, still in a sense we do wish to dominate and there is no need to hide the fact. Has America any right to object if Japan does dominate the Western Pacific?”
“As Minister of Foreign Affairs, I hate to make such an assertion, but I wish to declare that if America does not understand Japan’s rightful claims and actions, then there is not the slightest hope for improvement of Japanese-American relations.” Japan will still not give up the small hope remaining that a change in American attitude can be brought about.
5. America’s stiffened attitude may be partially attributed to an illusion that Japan’s military power is weakened, and to the rumors that certain influential quarters in Japan secretly oppose the tripartite pact8 and say that Japan will not follow its obligations even though the United States should enter the war. However, the provisions of article 3 of the treaty will come into effect in almost every case except that of an overt German attack upon the United States. If the treaty is invoked after consultation of the three powers it is not believed that Japan will without reason take the narrow viewpoint and for its own selfish advantage remain an onlooker in the war even though it means staking the fate of the nation on the outcome.
[Page 135]6. Relations with Soviet Russia have considerably improved. An agreement has been reached to open negotiations for an important treaty. England and America are watching the progress of Japanese-Soviet relations with the greatest interest.