711.94/1539a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
215. 1. Unless you perceive any objection, it is my desire that at an early moment you call upon the Foreign Minister and in strictest confidence explore with him in continuation of your conversations of June 10 and June 19, the question of possibly arriving at an understanding between the American Government and the Japanese Government through an exchange of notes along the following lines:
The interest of both countries in keeping to a minimum the adverse effects of the war in Europe is the basis upon which the understanding would be premised. The understanding would refer to this interest. In the proposed notes there would be expressed the agreement between the Government of the United States and the Japanese Government that they have a common desire that the status quo, except as it may be modified by peaceful means, be maintained with regard to the possessions and territories of belligerent European powers in the Pacific area. There might also be in the proposed notes a provision for consultation between the Governments of the two countries should any question arise involving the status quo in respect to the Pacific possessions and territories of belligerent European powers which renders consultation desirable in the opinion of either the Japanese Government or the Government of the United States.
2. In the proposed exchange of notes this Government envisages and would understand the phrase relating to possessions and territories in the Pacific area of belligerent European powers to cover and include their possessions and territories in all parts of the Pacific Ocean.
3. This suggestion relates to a particular and definite problem, that of averting an introduction of new complications and new possibilities of difficulty and friction into the general situation in the Pacific. As you will realize and will keep constantly in mind, it does not involve and should not be inferred to imply any withdrawal from positions heretofore taken regarding any specific problems in the relationships between the two countries. It is intended as a preventive rather than a curative measure. At the same time, it is our belief, and we hope it will be that of the Japanese, that the possibility of contributing substantially toward making situations better is within procedures which tend to prevent situations from becoming worse. If adopted, we believe this procedure would tend to turn public thought toward consideration of peaceful and constructive processes. It would tend to dissipate various suspicions which apparently prevail among the public and to curtail various types of inflammatory discussion and agitation. It would take care of the particular present and future problem to which it would expressly relate, and, although it would in no way dispose of the many and various specific questions which have been and are the subject matter of current and past discussion between our two Governments, it might facilitate solution of some of them.