Office of the Historian

711.94/1532: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, June 12, 1940—11 p.m.
[Received June 12—6:12 p.m.]

448. Our 429, June 10, 6 p.m.62 Strictly confidential oral statement (off the record):

1. In digesting the remarks which Your Excellency made during our conversation on June 10 I am filled with a spirit to endeavor to improve at this time Japanese-American relations and am also prepared to respond with a similarly friendly spirit.

2. I gain the impression from Your Excellency’s remarks, however, that the use of military force by Japan in China is the cause or injury to Japanese-American relations. That the United States is not similarly using military force as an instrument of national policy requires no explanation and it is abundantly clear that in view of the causes of the China incident and actual conditions at present Japan is unavoidably using military force. Accordingly, as has been frequently announced, Japan, should reasonable terms be available, is prepared to bring this incident to a close at any time.

3. Therefore, if some way to improve Japanese-American relations is to be found it is essential on the one hand, realizing the necessity of quickly bringing to a close the China incident, to endeavor at every opportunity to effect its termination, and on the other hand, at the same time it is necessary to devote great effort to the solution of other problems. To accomplish this end problems of common interest to Japan and the United States should be studied dispassionately and open-heartedly and I believe the time to be opportune to reach proper settlement of those questions.

4. From the above point of view the following problems are worthy of particular study:

(a)
Is Japan’s economic policy to be to adopt an entirely closed economy? If conditions give the appearance of a closed economy wherein do the causes lie?
(b)
Once the hostilities in China have been terminated, actually to what extent will there remain measures of an exclusive nature in the economic field?
(c)
Solution of the Tientsin question. Is Japan’s peaceful policy adequately attested to by such measures as our policy toward the Netherlands Indies and the neutrality treaty with Thailand?

Further, upon study of the above questions and in view of general Japanese-American relations, the following points should be borne in mind:

(a)
May it not be necessary in order to rectify the treatyless condition which is the greatest cause of uneasiness in the relations between our two countries at least to conclude as a temporary measure a commercial modus vivendi.
(b)
May it not be within the realm of possibility to cease material and financial assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and to cooperate in the reconstruction of China.
(c)
May it not be possible to recognize new conditions in East Asia and may not Japan and the United States, each preserving its sphere of influence on the Pacific Ocean and acting in concert, contribute to the peace of the world.”

Grew
  1. Not printed; it reported the conversation of June 10 between the American Ambassador in Japan and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩