711.94/254019/35
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Secretary’s apartment. After about fifteen minutes of general conversation the Ambassador said that he and Mr. Kurusu had reported to their Government their conversation of yesterday with the Secretary and were momentarily expecting instructions, and that in fact a telegram had already come in but it had not yet been decoded. They said that they would wish to confer with the Secretary perhaps tomorrow, but would at least expect to communicate with him tomorrow in regard to a further appointment. They expressed satisfaction with what the Secretary had said to the press in regard to yesterday’s conversation and the Secretary remarked that the press seemed to be satisfied.
The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador felt about the possibilities. The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed before the Japanese move into south Indochina in the latter part of July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if something could be done on his suggestion, it would serve to relieve that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some time.
The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had not so far diverged. The Ambassador agreed. He observed, however, that the views of the Japanese Government with regard to the Tripartite Pact had been fully expressed by the Japanese Government; that is to say, that their intentions to maintain peace in the Pacific were already made clear in their draft statement of September 25, but that they could not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance and were bound to carry out their obligations. The Secretary suggested that one way in which the Japanese could be [Page 752] helpful would be to let the Russian forces in the Far East and the British forces at Singapore go back to Europe. The Secretary said that his suggestion was by way of illustration how much Japan was hindering us. The Secretary added that if Hitler were helping the world the situation would be different, but the fact was that he was injuring all of us.
The conversation then turned for a few minutes to the situation in Russia and Germany’s prospects. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu expressed the view that there seemed to be no likelihood of an early Russian defeat or of a collapse of Stalin’s regime. The Ambassador said that he had been much surprised at the strength Stalin had shown in holding his government together and he also spoke with admiration of the stubbornness of Russian defense. The Ambassador also expressed the view that he saw no prospect of Germany’s being able in the future to launch a successful invasion of England. The Secretary asked, if Germany could not conquer Stalin, could not invade England, and was faced with the hostility of the many millions in Europe which were being held in subjection by Germany, what would be the outcome for Germany. The Ambassador expressed no clear-cut views on this point. The Secretary suggested that if the Japanese Government could prevail over the views of the Japanese war party it should be possible to work out something with us. The Ambassador made a further reference to Japan’s being bound by the Tripartite Pact, whereupon the Secretary asked whether Japan was not equally bound by the neutrality pact with Russia. The Ambassador replied that if Japan was faithful to the Tripartite Pact it must be equally faithful to the neutrality pact as they were both equally binding. The Ambassador dwelt at some length upon the point that Japan was getting nothing out of the Tripartite Pact except American resentment. Mr. Kurusu then expressed the view that although he did not see any prospect of another Brest-Litovsk59 in the Russo-German situation, Japan would be very apprehensive of such a development as it would mean a combined Russo-German advance on the Far East.
The Secretary referred to the need of looking forward to the time for rebuilding the world and said that, if the Japanese militant leaders keep control of Japanese policy, they would deprive us of a chance of stabilizing the world and laying down a progressive program. The Ambassador said that the United States was likely at the end of the war to be in a position of overwhelming strength, but he intimated that we might impair our strength if we sent forces to Africa. There then ensued some discussion of Hitler’s efforts to gain control of the seas and the Secretary emphasized that this country is determined to keep Hitler from getting control of the seas no matter how long it took us. [Page 753] He expressed the view that if Hitler had striven only for limited objectives he might have had a better chance for success than he now has because of his unlimited program of conquest. The Secretary said that if the Japanese could tell Hitler to be reasonable—Mr. Kurusu interrupted at this point and said that he thought that Hitler would be willing to enter into peace negotiations. The Secretary replied that he was speaking figuratively; that what he meant was abandonment entirely by Hitler of his program of conquest. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then rose to take leave and as they did so the Secretary emphasized again that all we can do is to stand firm on our basic principles.
- Treaty of peace between Germany and Soviet Russia, March 3, 1918, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, p. 442.↩