711.94/254013/25
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called by appointment made at his request at the Secretary’s apartment.55 The Secretary referred to the Japanese proposal in regard to commercial policy which the Ambassador had presented on November 7 and November 10 and offered oral comment along the line of the oral statement which, together with the draft of a joint United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy, he then handed to the Ambassador.56 The Secretary emphasized the advantageous and worthwhile character to Japan of participation by Japan in a program such as that envisaged in the draft. The Japanese Ambassador said that he could not comment upon that matter but that he would refer it to his Government. The Japanese Minister asked whether this proposal constituted our answer to the Japanese Government on the question of non-discrimination in international commercial relations which had been outstanding in our conversations. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. The Japanese Minister then said that the Japanese Government desired our reply on the two other outstanding questions, namely, the question of Japan’s relations with the Tripartite Pact and the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China. The Ambassador then stated that he also wanted to bring up the point that the Japanese Government considered that we were now engaged in actual negotiations and not in merely exploratory conversations as the American Government had contended. The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we are to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area he could do this only on the basis of carrying on [Page 732] exploratory conversations until we reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to the Dutch and say to them that he believes that the attitudes of Japan and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation. He said also that it would be impossible for him to collaborate with those other countries until we had got things on a satisfactory basis; that otherwise they might read in the newspapers that he was negotiating with Japan on matters affecting them without their being consulted. The Ambassador made no comment.
The Secretary went on to point out that notwithstanding the fact that the conversations between the Secretary and the Ambassador had related to a settlement covering the entire Pacific area and our draft of June 21 had made this clear, the Japanese proposals of September 25 narrowed the application of nondiscrimination and of peace to the southwestern Pacific area. The Ambassador replied that the question of peace in the entire Pacific area was covered in the preamble of their draft, but the Secretary pointed out that what was said in the body of the document rather than in the preamble governed. The Secretary added that he would like to know the attitude of the Japanese Government on this point.
The Secretary then said that the Japanese Foreign Minister in his conversation with Ambassador Grew on November 10 had indicated that the Japanese Government desired to conclude an agreement with the British simultaneously with concluding an agreement with this country, and yet the Japanese Government expected us to answer at once the Japanese Government’s proposals. He suggested that there was some inconsistency between the instructions which the Japanese Ambassador was being asked to carry out here and what the Foreign Minister had in mind in regard to the British. The Secretary then commented that the Ambassador said that Japan wants an answer now, but that the Secretary felt that the Japanese Government ought to come and tell us whether it intends to adopt peaceful courses. The Ambassador said that there was no doubt about the desire of the Japanese Government to have peace in the Pacific and that Japan had freedom of decision and would make its own interpretation of its obligations under the alliance.
The Secretary asked whether if the Japanese Government should enter into agreement with us the alliance would be automatically abandoned. Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether we were asking that the Tripartite Pact be denounced. The Ambassador said that he understood what the Secretary had said to mean abandoned in the sense of becoming a dead letter. The Secretary rejoined that, just as the Ambassador had suggested, could we assume that if the Japanese [Page 733] Government entered into an agreement with us the Tripartite Pact would automatically become a dead letter, for supposing that he went to the British and the Dutch and said that Japan was willing to enter on a peaceful program but at the same time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany, what would the British and Dutch say? He asked how he could make the British believe in Japan’s peaceful intentions while Japan was proclaiming its adherence intact to a military alliance with Germany. He pointed out that it would be very difficult for him to make the people of this country and the people of all peaceful nations believe that Japan was pursuing a peaceful course so long as Japan was tied in an alliance with the most flagrant aggressor who has appeared on this planet in the last 2,000 years. The Ambassador commented that the public had so much confidence in the Secretary that they would accept the agreement with us if the Secretary recommended it. The Secretary replied that if we went into an agreement with Japan while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call upon Japan to go to war with us this would cause so much turmoil in the country that he might well be lynched. The Secretary pointed out that, notwithstanding the existence of a neutrality pact between Japan and Russia, large Japanese armies in Manchuria were facing Russian armies in Siberia. The Secretary said that what we had in mind was an agreement which would promote mutual trust and enable us to get away from the expansion of military preparations, and what he desired was a clear-cut unequivocal agreement which would remove the doubts that Japan was trying to face two ways in order that we could remove distrust between nations in the Pacific area. The Secretary said that, so long as Japan insisted that it would make its own interpretation of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in the event that the United States through self-defense was obliged to take up arms against Germany, it would be very difficult for the world to see that Japan’s clear intention was to adopt peaceful courses. The Secretary said he would like to know whether, when an agreement is reached with us, Japan’s connection with the Tripartite Pact would automatically disappear.
The Japanese Minister asked the Secretary whether what he had said was the answer of this Government on the question of Japan’s relations with the Tripartite Pact. The Secretary replied that when we got an answer from the Japanese Government in regard to its attitude on the point that he had raised about the Tripartite Pact becoming automatically a dead letter in case we entered into an agreement with Japan we would be better able to make reply. The Japanese Ambassador said that he was afraid that the American Government did not trust the Japanese Government whereas there was [Page 734] no material difference between the policies of the present Japanese Government and the previous Japanese Government, notwithstanding the fact that the Prime Minister was a military man. The Secretary replied that the new Government in Japan seems to take the attitude that we must reply at once to their points, but that we do not feel that we should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese Government under circumstances where the United States has been pursuing peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government is the one which has been violating law and order. The Secretary said, in conclusion, that when we hear from the Japanese Government concerning its position on the points we had raised with them two days ago on their peaceful intentions and when we could clear up the question of non-discrimination, as suggested in our proposal of today, and also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that we could sit down like brothers and reach some solution of the question of stationing Japanese troops in China. The Secretary emphasized at the same time that we did not desire any delay and that we were working as hard as we could to bring about a wholly satisfactory and broad settlement.