711.94/2625
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
Mr. Kase47b called this morning at the request of Mr. Togo to say that while the Foreign Minister of necessity could not with entire freedom tell me certain things directly, he regarded it as of great importance that the Government of the United States should have in mind a completely clear understanding of the situation in this country in so far as it affects the present endeavors of the Japanese Government [Page 720] to reach a settlement of the relations with the United States and for this reason the Minister had asked Mr. Kase to convey to me the following.
Mr. Togo had been “shocked” (a term which Mr. Kase later changed to “concerned”) to receive the impression from the latest reports of the Japanese Ambassador in Washington of his talks with the President and the Secretary of State that the Government of the United States does not fully grasp the urgency of successfully concluding the current conversations in the shortest possible time. Mr. Kase told me that not only does Mr. Togo consider that the preliminary conversations have now entered the stage of negotiation but also that he considers that these negotiations have now reached their final stage since the Japanese Government has already made the greatest possible concessions.
Mr. Kase then went on to say that the last government of Prince Konoye had conducted the conversations with the support of the country as a whole but that the long period of time which had elapsed since their inception without any clear indications of progress had given rise to the opinion in Japan that the Government of the United States was endeavoring to utilize the conversations as a means of concealing the preparations which it was carrying on to complete the encirclement of Japan. While the present Cabinet does not agree with this opinion, however, it has undertaken its present task of reaching an agreement with the United States against a considerable body of opposition and, although despite this opposition it has had the courage to embark on its present efforts and is according its unanimous support to the Foreign Minister in this respect, a very critical and dangerous state of affairs will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in successfully concluding the negotiations. Those elements who are opposed to a continuance of efforts to reach an adjustment with the United States will seize upon any such delay as evidence of the correctness of “their views. Mr. Kase was emphatic in his statement that his remarks in this connection contained no implication of threat whatsoever and should not be so regarded, but should be taken only as a factual statement. Mr. Kase added that Mr. Togo entirely realizes that his own life is at stake, to say nothing of his official position, but that nevertheless he has had the courage to make this final attempt in full cognizance of the consequences of failure.
I told Mr. Kase that his observations were virtually the same both in general and in particular as those which had been made to me during the last Konoye Cabinet both by Admiral Toyoda and by Prince Konoye himself and which of course had been reported in full to my Government. Mr. Kase replied that there was a considerable difference [Page 721] between the present situation and that which had obtained previously, and he again emphasized the vital importance of concluding the negotiations without further delay and reiterated his previous statement that the Japanese Government considered that the final stage of the negotiations had already begun.
At this point I permitted Mr. Kase to read the Department’s telegram No. 728, November 8, 8 p.m.,48 which set forth the Secretary’s interview with Admiral Nomura on November 7. After reading the telegram Mr. Kase said that the account of the conversation contained therein followed very closely Admiral Nomura’s report. He added that Mr. Togo had taken especial note of the suggestion of the Secretary contained in paragraph eight of the Department’s telegram concerning an expression on the part of China of its desire to establish genuinely friendly relations with Japan and the readiness of the Chinese Government to make every effort toward peaceful cooperation with Japan. Mr. Togo was now wondering how this suggestion might be put into actual effect. I told Mr. Kase that, since the point would seem to me to be directly linked with the general program which Mr. Hull envisages for an adjustment of the whole Pacific problem, the Japanese Ambassador might care to discuss the suggestion fully with the Secretary of State.
Mr. Kase then inquired if I had received an account of the conversation on November 10 between the President and the Japanese Ambassador, to which I replied that I had not, adding that the failure of the Department to send me a report probably meant that there had been little difference between the conversation on November 10 with the President and that of the Ambassador with the Secretary of State on November 7. Mr. Kase said that the tenor of the two conversations had been different, to which I replied that I should then probably in due time receive an account of the conversation with the President on November 10.
I then allowed Mr. Kase to read my telegram No. 1782, November 10, 8 p.m.,49 setting forth my interview with Mr. Togo of that date. Mr. Kase said that with the exception of the last sentence in paragraph one the account was completely accurate. With reference to the sentence in question Mr. Kase said that it was not his recollection that Mr. Togo had stated that “he did not wish to press the point” regarding the transference of the conversations into “negotiations”, particularly as Mr. Togo felt strongly that the vital stages of the actual negotiations had begun. (According to Mr. Dooman, who was present at that interview and who had noted down the Minister’s remarks, the latter did make, in Japanese, the comment reported in my telegram [Page 722] referred to above, but quite likely this observation did not appear in the official transcript made by Mr. Kase as interpreter.)