711.94/2460
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador, accompanied by Minister Wakasugi, called on the President. The Secretary of State was present at the express wish of President Roosevelt. The Ambassador, after a few preliminary remarks, proceeded to read as under instruction from his Government the following communication:
“I am now going to explain to you the salient points of the proposals which my Government has instructed me to submit to your Government. As you will recall, it was on the 25th of September that the Japanese Government, last made its proposals to the United States Government, and, gathering from the observations which the Secretary of State made on them on the 2nd of October and also from the views which were subsequently expressed by the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State Mr. Welles, the greatest difficulties arose from three points, that is:—
- 1.
- The application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations,
- 2.
- The attitude of our two Governments toward the European war, and
- 3.
- The question of the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces.
“In regard to the first question, that is, the principle of non-discrimination, my Government has now decided to accept its application in all the Pacific areas, including China, as your Government desires, on the understanding that the principle is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world as well. The Secretary of State has repeatedly pointed out to me that it has been his long-cherished scheme to see the application of the principle throughout the whole world. I therefore hope that the assurance to be given by my Government in this connection will be gratifying to you.
“As to the second question, the attitude of our two Governments toward the European war, my Government proposed, in the draft of September 25th, that
‘both Governments will be guided in their conduct by considerations of protection and self-defense.’
In this connection I have to inquire if the United States Government is in a position to give an assurance that it has no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the term ‘protection and self-defense’ that may lead to an abuse of the recognized right based upon it. The Japanese Government would be ready to give a similar assurance on the basis of reciprocity, that is, if the assurance is forthcoming from the United States Government.
“In the draft of September 25th referred to, my Government proposed that
‘in case the United States should participate in the European war. Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the [Page 716] Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.’
It will hardly be necessary to point out in this connection that the fundamental motive for initiating the present conversations was the preservation of peace in the Pacific by all possible means. The present circumstances under which Japan is placed do not permit my Government to go any further to write in black and white than what it proposed in the draft of September 25th which I have just quoted. All I have to ask you is to ‘read between the lines’ and to accept the formula as satisfactory. (Deleted by Ambassador Nomura.) You will agree with me that where there is no mutual confidence and trust, a thousand words or letters would not be a satisfactory assurance.
“In regard to the third question, the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces, the formula which my Government wants to submit is as follows:
‘With regard to the Japanese forces which have been despatched to China in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas of North China and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as general peace is restored between Japan and China and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order.’
“In submitting this formula, the Japanese Government has gone a great deal further than it went previously in that the formula specifies not only the areas in, but also the duration for, which the Japanese Government desires to have its forces remaining in China, clearly indicating that the stationing of the Japanese forces in China is not of a permanent nature. You will readily agree that, while complete and immediate withdrawal of all the Japanese forces from China may be desirable, it is impracticable under the present circumstances. I therefore earnestly hope that you will give favorable consideration from a practical standpoint.
“I have been instructed to add that, in regard to the Japanese forces in French Indo-China, the Japanese Government proposes the following formula:
‘The Japanese Government undertake to respect the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or an equitable peace is established in East Asia.’”47
The Ambassador then read the following manuscript which he said was an oral statement by him:
“I am very glad to be able to see you to-day, because since the resignation of the Cabinet of Prince Konoye, the conversations between the Secretary of State and myself had to be left alone for nearly three weeks—three weeks, even three days, are very precious time under the present circumstances. I am sure you will agree with me that the situation between Japan and the United States must not be left alone to take its own course and drift away beyond rescue.
[Page 717]“It is more than six months since the present informal conversations were started. From the very beginning the Japanese Government was very anxious to reach the earliest possible conclusion and the Japanese people placed a great deal of hope on it, but the conversations dragged on and on and, on the other hand, the relations between our two countries became more and more strained, the people of my country becoming more and more impatient.
“As viewed from the Japanese side, the Japanese Government has made not a few concessions in its assertion at various stages while the United States Government has, it seemed to the Japanese, remained adamant on its contention and has shown little sign of reciprocation, and thus I must frankly inform you that in certain quarters in my country some skepticism has arisen as to the true intention of the United States Government. Personally I do not like to say it, but it is true. People in my country take the freezing of the assets as an economic blockade and they go even so far as to contend that the means of modern warfare are not limited to shooting. No nation can live without the supply of materials vital to its industries. Reports reaching me from home indicate that the situation is serious and pressing and the only way of preserving peace is to reach some kind of amicable and satisfactory understanding with the United States without any unnecessary loss of time. In the face of these mounting difficulties, the Japanese Government bent all its efforts to continue the conversations and bring about a satisfactory understanding solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific. My Government therefore is now submitting certain proposals as its utmost effort for that purpose, and I shall feel very grateful if I can have the views of your Government on them at the earliest possible opportunity. Suppose we come to an understanding with this country, the psychological effect of it upon our people will mean much more than what is actually written upon the paper, and the policy of our Government will necessarily be guided and dictated thereby. I confidently hope that the views and desires entertained by the Japanese Government are fully shared and reciprocated by your Government.
“I may add for your information that in view of the serious situation now prevailing in the relations between our two countries, the Japanese Government is sending over here Ambassador Kurusu to assist me in the present conversations and also that the conversations will be taken up by Foreign Minister Togo with Ambassador Grew in Tokio in a parallel line.
“I am afraid I may have used to-day some words which a trained diplomat must not use, but I hope you will kindly forgive my transgression, for it was only because of my earnest wish to keep and direct the relations of our two countries in the course which I believe is best for both of us.”
The Ambassador appeared very much in earnest in reading the statement.
[Page 718]The Ambassador made some reference to commercial policy as discussed and proclaimed by the President and Prime Minister Churchill at their sea conference some months ago. He referred complainingly to the fact that the Japanese went into Shantung and were only allowed to remain there some six years, at the end of which time they were requested to move out their troops.
The President then read the following oral statement in reply:
“The entire world has been placed in a precarious position as a result of the havoc which has been wrought by the forces of aggression. Our common sense tells us of the extreme need that the world come back to ways of peace. It is the purpose of this Government to do its best in the spirit of fair play to contribute to establishing a basis for peace, stability, and order in the Pacific area. As a means of achieving these objectives it is essential that emphasis be laid upon giving practical effect to a sound philosophy of human welfare. We have often and quite recently made clear publicly what we have in mind in this regard. We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek.”
The President also referred orally to his opinion that nations must think one hundred years ahead, especially during the age through which the world is passing, and that the Chinese Government for the past thirty years has been passing through a new experience. He referred to extraterritorial courts and other unusual conditions that had accompanied this new experience of China. If I understood the Ambassador correctly, he said it took three years to develop and dispose of the Shantung problems. The President thereupon replied that the Ambassador, Secretary Hull and himself had only consumed some six months in discussing a solution of our relations and those of other countries in the Pacific and that patience was necessary. The President spoke of a modus vivendi as being not merely an expedient and temporary agreement, but also one which takes into account actual human existence. The Ambassador dwelt briefly again on the question of the Japanese getting out of China by degrees and adding that there would be no annexation, no indemnity, et cetera.
There was nothing said about when the next conversation would take place. The President brought up his program to visit Warm Springs at the end of this week for some ten days. The Ambassador said that Kurusu would be here about Saturday.47a The President said that, of course, he expected to see Kurusu and confer with the [Page 719] Ambassador and the Minister and their associates. The Ambassador said that Kurusu was only coming to assist him and coming at his request and that he did not have anything new to bring so far as the Ambassador knew.