711.94/25403/35
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary’s apartment.41 Before the Ambassador had said anything in regard to the purpose of his call the Secretary took up with the Japanese Ambassador the question of three American missionaries who had been taken into custody by the Manchurian authorities at Harbin, as referred to in a separate memorandum.42
The Secretary then went on to say that situations like that relating to the missionaries referred to and the publication in this country of various press reports of utterances in the Japanese press advocating extremist policies increased our difficulties over here in connection with our discussions with the Japanese Government. He said that various people keep coming to him, refer to these reports and then ask how this Government can expect to improve relations with Japan in view of a situation such as the reports under reference revealed.
The Ambassador said that since the advent of the new Cabinet he had not sought to talk with the Secretary as he had had no definite instructions and as he consequently did not wish to take up the Secretary’s time. He said that he had now received instructions [Page 707] and that in accordance therewith he desired to resume the conversations.
The Ambassador said that the new Cabinet in Japan had deliberated very carefully upon the various provisions of a proposed settlement between our two Governments and had examined very carefully our draft of June 21 with a view to making the utmost concessions that they could make, having due regard for the situation in the Far East and of the attitude of public opinion in Japan. He referred to the three principal questions on which our respective views had diverged and he said that, with regard to two of those questions, namely, Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact and nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, he thought that it would not be difficult to reconcile our views. In regard to the question of the desire of the Japanese Government to retain for some time a certain number of troops in north China and Inner Mongolia, he said he realized that difficulties of reaching an agreement were greater.
The Ambassador then went on to say that in view of the gravity of the situation he was very conscious of his responsibility and in order to minimize the possibility of any blunder on his part he had asked the Japanese Government for the assistance of an experienced diplomatist and that in accordance with his request the Government was sending Mr. Kurusu to assist him. The Ambassador expressed the hope that in view of Mr. Kurusu’s personal ambassadorial rank the President would receive Mr. Kurusu.
The Ambassador then handed the Secretary a document, copy of which is attached,43 containing formulas captioned as follows:
“Disposition of Japanese forces
- (A)
- Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:
- (B)
- Stationing of Japanese forces in French Indochina and the withdrawal thereof:
Principle of non-discrimination”
The Secretary glanced over the document and inquired what proportion of the Japanese troops now in China Japan would propose to retain there. The Japanese Ambassador replied that, as the Secretary was aware, Japan already had the right under the Boxer Protocol to station troops in the Peiping and Tientsin areas; that as the Soviets had troops in Outer Mongolia the stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia was desired as an “equipoise” to those troops. The Ambassador, without making any direct reply to the Secretary’s specific question, went on to refer to armed forces maintained by other countries in China and he said also that when Chiang [Page 708] Kai-shek first entered Shanghai44 the British had asked the Japanese to take joint action with them at Shanghai, but that the Japanese had declined to do so. He said that notwithstanding the moderate attitude of the Japanese, the Japanese soon thereafter became the object of a bitter Chinese boycott campaign.
The Secretary said that, although he had told the Chinese Ambassador that we were having exploratory conversations with the Japanese, he had not acquainted the Chinese Ambassador with any of the substance of the points we were discussing. He then recalled to the Japanese Ambassador that, as he had on numerous occasions said to the Japanese Ambassador, we proposed before entering into any formal negotiations to discuss the matter with the Chinese and the British and the Dutch. The Secretary said that an idea had just occurred to him which he had so far discussed with no one, namely, supposing the Chinese were now to say that they desired a real friendship with Japan and would do everything in their power to work together along peaceful ways, would not this be a wonderful opportunity for Japan to launch forth on a real new order, an order in which Japan would gain her real moral leadership in the Far East? At a time when Hitler was leading his people over a precipice and when Europe was threatened with anarchy, would not the adoption by Japan of a new policy of conciliation and friendship with China not maintained at a sword’s point provide Japan with a real opportunity for progressive leadership in which Japan and the United States could cooperate to save the world? The Ambassador and Mr. Wakasugi appeared to be very much impressed with this suggestion and said that they would refer it to their Government for its consideration. The Ambassador said that he was personally convinced of the wisdom of the Secretary’s policies and that when he went back to Japan and retired he would use his influence in a direction away from outmoded ideas such as would call for the retention of Japanese troops in China. The Secretary reviewed again the advantages which this Government had derived from renouncing its previous policies of stationing armed forces in Latin-American countries. He mentioned the great increase that had taken place in United States trade with those countries. He expressed the conviction that if Japan should adopt a broad-gauge liberal policy in relation to China Japan would derive incalculable advantage in the way of trade and prosperity.
With reference to the question of Japan’s relations to the Axis powers, the Secretary expressed the hope that some concrete statement could be worked out which would help us. The Ambassador expressed the view that, considering the attitude of the Japanese Government [Page 709] which manifestly desired to maintain peace in the Pacific area, it did not seem to him that any further statement was necessary than had already been made. The Secretary pointed out that such manifestations of the attitude of the present Japanese Cabinet might not cover the situation should some new government come into power in Japan.
The Ambassador expressed the hope that, in view of the urgency of the matter, as the Japanese Government considered the situation critical at home, we would expedite our study of the document which the Ambassador had left with us. The Ambassador added that he had been instructed to present his views to the President and asked the Secretary if he would be so kind as to arrange an appointment. The Ambassador said that he would not take up much of the President’s time but would present him with a written document in order to conserve the President’s time. The Secretary said that he would be glad to comply with the Ambassador’s request. He asked the Ambassador whether the document which the Ambassador had presented was to be taken in conjunction with the previous documents which had been exchanged. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Ambassador said that there was our document of June 21 and their document of September 25. The Secretary added “and our document of October 2”.