711.94/234424/25
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary’s apartment. He handed the Secretary a document (copy of which is attached hereto)26 containing the gist of what the Foreign Minister said in his conversations with the American Ambassador at Tokyo on September 27.
The Ambassador said with an apparent touch of embarrassment that he was very well aware of the attitude of this Government and had made this Government’s position very clear to his own Government, and that notwithstanding this his Government had instructed him to press for an answer on the Japanese Government’s proposal. The Ambassador added that he had been asked by his Government to seek a further meeting with the President, but that the Ambassador realized the situation here and that was why he was laying the matter before the Secretary.
The Secretary replied that, as the Ambassador knew, the President’s brother-in-law had died last week, that the President went to Hyde Park over the weekend, and that consequently the Secretary had not been able to see the President for the last three or four days. The Secretary said, however, that he expected to see the President today. The Secretary went on to say that he expected to be able to give the Ambassador within two or three days a memorandum having a bearing upon the Japanese Government’s proposal. The Secretary pointed out that just as the Japanese Government had its difficulties we had our difficulties, that the whole effort of our conversations had been to narrow the gap between our respective views, and that we had felt that time was necessary in order to enable the Japanese Government to educate its public opinion to accept a broad-gauge program such as we advocated.
The Ambassador commented that he himself was in favor of a broad-gauge program, but that he knew very well the psychology within the Japanese Army. He said that even the highest-ranking generals had a simplicity of mind which made it difficult for them to see why, as they saw the situation, when the United States should be asserting leadership on the American continent with the Monroe Doctrine the United States should want to interfere with Japan’s assuming leadership on the Asiatic continent. The Secretary asked why the Japanese Government could not educate the generals. The Ambassador replied that this would take twenty years.
[Page 652]The Secretary then asked whether the Japanese public as a whole desired a speedy settlement of the conflict with China. The Ambassador replied that for the last two or three years the Japanese public desired such a settlement but felt that under existing circumstances they had no alternative to continuing fighting. The Secretary observed that there have been a number of our marine guards who did not want to leave China and he supposed that in the case of the Japanese occupationary forces there were many who would not like to be recalled. The Ambassador laughed and replied that this was quite true, and he observed that when an Army general in China was clothed with the authority of a viceroy, naturally he did not welcome the prospect of being shorn of that authority.
The Ambassador, in reply to a further question by the Secretary, stated that he believed that the Japanese Government was in a stronger position internally than it had been, but that, nevertheless, in his own personal opinion, he judged that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting between the chiefs of our two Governments it might be difficult for Prince Konoye to retain his position and that Prince Konoye then would be likely to be succeeded by a less moderate leader. He suggested that this was one reason why the Japanese Government desired to move as speedily as possible. The Secretary repeated that we would expect to communicate with the Japanese Ambassador in two or three days.
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