Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[Tokyo,] September 18, 1941.

Mr. Ushiba^11a called me on the telephone yesterday afternoon at my house, asking whether he could call on me immediately. I told Mr. Ushiba that I had gone to bed with a cold, but that if he wished to risk the chances of an infection I would be glad to see him for a short while. Mr. Ushiba arrived at about five o’clock and stayed until shortly before seven.

Mr. Ushiba asked whether the Ambassador had received any comment from Washington on his report of the meeting which recently took place between the Ambassador and the Prime Minister. I replied that the Secretary of State had telegraphed in appreciative terms concerning the attitude and views of Prince Konoye, but that a paper which Admiral Nomura had handed in to the State Department on September 4 had so confused matters that the Ambassador had not felt that he had sufficient material to warrant his asking for a further meeting with the Prime Minister.

Mr. Ushiba said that the Cabinet had been completely upset by the information which Mr. Grew gave Admiral Toyoda on September 10 with regard to the action of Admiral Nomura. He said that Admiral Nomura had received from Prince Konoye a draft which was responsive to the American draft of June 21, but that in view of the Cabinet crisis in Japan Admiral Nomura had not handed in that document. He had instead written a brief letter to the Secretary of State which was not in any way helpful. Mr. Ushiba gathered that the Nomura paper of September 4 was not the draft received from Tokyo, for the reason that one of the basic ideas of the Japanese Government has been right along to have recourse to the good offices of the President in opening up a path between Japan and China—and apparently Admiral Nomura’s paper of September 4 made no reference to the good offices of the President.

I then explained to Mr. Ushiba the combination of circumstances which had led to difficulty in Washington in understanding precisely what the position of the Japanese Government was, say as of September 4. I hoped that we were succeeding in untangling the crossed wires, but the loss of a week or more in straightening matters out was due in no part to any action of ours.

Mr. Ushiba remarked with surprising candor that he did not blame our Government in any way for wanting to know precisely what the aims and objectives of the Japanese are before committing itself to such a dramatic move as that of a meeting between the heads of Government of the United States and Japan. After all, the crux of the problem was China. He felt that the Japanese Government had shown very clearly that it proposed to maintain the principle of the Open Door in China, but that it had failed thus far to indicate clearly the terms which it would propose to China for settlement of the China conflict. Months had dragged on in conversations in Washington, and the Secretary of State had all along shown very clearly that he did not intend to commit the American Government in any decision until he knew in advance what the Japanese peace terms were and was satisfied that those terms were in conformity with the principles which he advocated for the regulating of relations between nations. Mr. Ushiba suggested that our Government should ask the Japanese Government to disclose those terms, as he could assure me that his Government would immediately respond to any such request. I said that I was unable to follow him in those observations: as Mr. Ushiba had himself suggested, we had long expressed desire to know the character of the Japanese peace terms; in our draft of June 21, Section III, we had inserted a phrase which was designed to indicate that the Japanese Government would have communicated those terms to the American Government before any approach was to be made by the President to the Chinese Government. I had therefore assumed that failure on our part to be apprised of the Japanese peace terms was caused by refusal on the part of the Japanese Government to disclose them to us. Mr. Ushiba said that he did not know precisely how the present situation arose, but that he could assure me that the Japanese Government would be only too glad to communicate the terms to the President and to have the President show them to the Chinese and other interested Governments. After some discussion, it seemed desirable that the initiative with regard to communication to us of the peace terms come from the Japanese side. Mr. Ushiba would suggest to Prince Konoye that he communicate the terms to Mr. Grew as further evidence of the good faith of the Japanese Government and of its eagerness to enter into formal negotiations with the American Government. It was also agreed that if Prince Konoye should feel that some further initiative should come from the American side, Mr. Grew—if he felt that he was in a position to do so—would express to Prince Konoye desire to be apprised of the character of the Japanese peace terms.

We then discussed the question of the attitude of the United States and Japan respectively toward the European war. Mr. Ushiba said that it was impossible for Japan to give to the United States a prior undertaking that it would interpret as a defensive act any action on the part of the United States against Germany which might lead to war between the United States and Germany. He thought that the formula which had been communicated by Admiral Toyoda to Mr. Grew was about as far as the Japanese Government could go prior to the proposed meeting. He added, however, that an understanding had been reached among the various influential elements in Japan which would enable Prince Konoye to give orally and directly to the President an assurance with regard to the attitude of Japan which, he felt sure, would be entirely satisfactory to the President. Another matter which troubled him very much in this connection was precisely in what terms the Japanese Government would explain to Germany any understanding which might be reached with the United States on this point. I remarked that the United States, which was committed to supporting the principle of the sanctity of treaties, could not well request Japan to betray its treaty commitments. It seemed to me, however, that there was a very definite difference between the Treaty of Alliance, with its rights and obligations, and the formulation of policies by the concerned allies. It followed as a matter of course that allies pursued policies which served their common end, but there was no obligation arising out of the Three Power Alliance which required Japan to follow policies which would serve exclusively the ends of Germany. Could not, therefore, Japan inform Germany that Japan had undertaken to pursue policies conformable to those of the United States, although Japan was prepared to fulfill its obligations under Article III of the treaty? Technically the Alliance is a defensive alliance; and it is clear from the rescript issued by the Emperor at the time of the signing of the Alliance that it was then considered by the Japanese Government as an instrument for peace. Mr. Matsuoka informed certain of the Ambassadors in Tokyo upon his return from Moscow that, in the event of a war occurring between Germany and the United States, Japan would consult its allies with regard to the antecedent circumstances, and that he felt confident that the Japanese Government would decide, in almost every conceivable instance, to enter the war on the side of Germany. Mr. Ushiba expressed amazement. He said that he knew that Mr. Matsuoka had interpreted Article III of the Alliance in a sense which was entirely contrary to Prince Konoye’s interpretation, but that he did not know that he (Mr. Matsuoka) had disclosed his interpretation to representatives of foreign Governments. Apropos, he said that Mr. Matsuoka had told the Prime Minister that Mr. Grew had reported to Washington that the last Cabinet change was due to American pressure on Japan. I told Mr. Ushiba that we had reported nothing of the sort. I said that I could tell him in confidence that we had reported that the Cabinet change was due chiefly to two causes: first, the German attack on Soviet Russia, which upset Japanese expectation, when signing the Alliance, that peace would be maintained between Germany and Russia; and, second, the conflict of interpretations by the Prime Minister and Mr. Matsuoka with regard to the scope and significance of the Triple Alliance. Mr. Ushiba said that we had been entirely correct.

The concluding portions of the conversation were devoted largely to Mr. Ushiba’s stressing the importance of the American Government’s returning a favorable reply to the Japanese proposal as soon as possible. Mr. Ushiba reverted again and again to the approach of the 27th of September, the first anniversary of the signing of the Alliance.¹²

E[ugene] H. D[ooman]

1. Private Secretary to the Japanese Prime Minister.
12. On September 18, 1941, the Counselor wrote the following memorandum: “Mr. Ushiba today telephoned to me to say that Prince Konoye would within the next day or two convey to the Ambassador the terms of peace which the Japanese Government is willing to offer to China.”