Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/23449/25

Memorandum of a Conversation

[Washington,] September 10, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt called at the Japanese Embassy in pursuance to an arrangement which the Secretary of State made with the Ambassador earlier this morning.⁸

Mr. Obata opened the conversation by saying that both he and the Ambassador had been surprised to learn this morning of the “misapprehension” of the American Government that the proposals communicated by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6 represented a new approach by the Japanese Government and superseded the progress which had been made in the informal conversations held before that time Mr. Obata said that the Japanese Government, he believed, intended all points previously tentatively agreed upon were “to stand” and that in addition the other assurances which the Japanese Government has made, in particular the communications which Prince Konoye had sent through Ambassador Nomura to the President, were also to be considered as representing the attitude and intent of the Japanese Government. Ambassador Nomura confirmed Mr. Obata’s remarks. Mr. Ballantine asked if this meant those portions of our June 21 draft which were identical with earlier Japanese drafts were still to be considered as representing a part of the proposed agreement between our two Governments. Mr. Obata replied that he believed that to be so but added that the document which Ambassador Nomura had given the Secretary on September 4 represented merely the Ambassador’s personal views and had not been referred to the Japanese Government and therefore did not represent, necessarily, the views of the Japanese Government. Mr. Ballantine then observed that we might take the draft of June 15 which the Japanese Ambassador had given the Secretary as a basis for comparison and that if the points in that draft together with the other assurances mentioned were to stand, there appeared to be certain inconsistencies between the September 6 proposals and earlier Japanese proposals or drafts.

Reference was made by Mr. Ballantine to the provisional commitment on the part of the Japanese Government labeled (b) in the document received September 6, in which Japan undertakes not to make “any military advancement from French Indochina against any of its adjoining areas”. He mentioned that Prince Konoye had previously given assurances concerning the withdrawal of Japanese troops from French Indochina as well as broad assurances regarding the peaceful intent of the Japanese Government. Mr. Obata replied that of course the assurances of Prince Konoye were not in the least modified by this latest proposal. Mr. Ballantine pointed out that in the report forwarded by Mr. Grew of these Japanese proposals, Japan had undertaken not to attack, “without any justifiable reason” any regions lying north of Japan, whereas in the document handed to the Secretary on September 6 the Japanese had given the same undertaking against regions south of Japan and not north. Mr. Obata said that they would immediately inquire of the Japanese Government whether “north” or “south” was meant. Mr. Obata also agreed to ask his Government whether the qualification “without any justifiable reason” applied to any military advancement against areas adjoining Indochina as well as to regions lying south (or north) of Japan. Mr. Obata referred to the assurances given by Prime Minister Konoye that Japan did not intend to use military force against any nation without provocation and indicated that in his opinion those assurances covered this question entirely.

Mr. Ballantine then took up the question of the Japanese commitment (d) and observed that the Japanese undertaking to withdraw its armed forces from China after the “rehabilitation” of general and normal relationship between Japan and China was vague and indefinite. He inquired whether the Japanese still intended, as they had proposed originally on May 12, that the President of the United States would use his good offices in bringing the Chinese and Japanese Governments together for direct negotiations. Mr. Obata said that he believed that that was still the intention of the Japanese Government. The Japanese Ambassador was not positive but said that he also believed his Government still intended to request the President to suggest to the Chinese Government that it enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese Government.

Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine pointed out that, as the Secretary had said early in the conversations, if this Government were to approach the Chinese Government with such a suggestion the Chinese Government would naturally ask us on what basis the Japanese Government proposed to negotiate peace. We would therefore want to be in a position to inform the Chinese Government of the basic peace terms of the Japanese Government and to indicate to the Chinese Government that those peace terms were in harmony with the fundamental principles to which the people and the Government of the United States are committed. Mr. Hamilton added that, as the Secretary had already told the Japanese Ambassador, we had long believed that Japan’s best interests as well as the best interests of this country and other countries interested in the Pacific would be served by avoiding any possibility of bitterness on the part of China. He pointed out that for the past nine years we have realized that far more can be accomplished by broad, liberal and progressive policy in international relations than by a narrow or conservative policy, and suggested indirectly that it would be in Japan’s best interests to follow policies and procedure along those lines toward China. Mr. Hamilton went on to say that, to speak with complete frankness, there were many critics of Japan in this country who believed the Japanese Government would or could not observe its commitments and who were outspoken in their criticisms of Japan’s previous acts in breaking treaties and agreements. He suggested that it would be of great value in disarming such critics and in proving to the world the good intentions of Japan were the Japanese Government, immediately following the conclusion of agreement, actually to take some action, such as withdrawal of troops, which would clearly demonstrate that the Japanese Government now intends to follow courses of peace and broad, liberal policies. He observed that with regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, we had in the past endeavored to obtain some indication of an approximate schedule which the Japanese Government might have in mind for such withdrawal. Mr. Obata agreed entirely with what was said and expressed the view that the Japanese Government had drafted these proposals made on September 6 in an effort to provide a basis for settling the three questions which remained outstanding when the informal conversations were disrupted last July and to provide one or two other points for discussion.

With regard to the provision for the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China, Mr. Obata remarked that this question represented a very difficult problem and suggested that this Government prepare a draft for submission to the Japanese Government of the commitment which it would be desirable to obtain from Japan on this subject. Mr. Ballantine suggested that we had on numerous occasions made clear our belief that a successive withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China as speedily as possible until complete was desirable. He observed that the Japanese Government was obviously in a better position than this Government to state explicitly its intentions and capabilities in regard to this question—in other words, the Japanese Government is far more able than this Government to draft a concrete formula. Mr. Hamilton remarked that at the present time we should first dispose of the general questions which we had brought up today before going on to the next step.

Mr. Ballantine observed that the undertaking marked (e) on the part of the Japanese Government, that economic activities of this country in China would not be restricted “so long as pursued on an equitable basis”, was not clear. Mr. Obata agreed that the phraseology was bad and indicated that in his opinion this was meant to apply to present conditions and areas now under Japanese military occupation and control. Mr. Hamilton pointed out that the wording in this paragraph suggested that Japan had a special position or special right in China and added that we were not concerned primarily with the present situation in China but were endeavoring to draft a clear picture of what the situation in China and in the Pacific area in general would be following a general settlement.

Mr. Ballantine remarked that under commitment (f) the Japanese had limited the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce to the “southwestern Pacific area” and inquired whether it was the intention of the Japanese Government that this principle should be applied to the entire Pacific area. Mr. Obata said again that he believed that the previous tentatively agreed upon commitment given in Section 5 of the June 21 draft would be concurred in by the Japanese Government and that, as indicated by Prince Konoye, Japan desired to see those principles applied not only to China but to the entire Pacific area. Mr. Ballantine recalled that the Secretary of State had told the Ambassador a few days ago that he had instructed economic experts in the Department to study the question of cooperation between the United States and Japan in economic affairs in the Pacific area. As a result of that study a new draft of Section 5 of the proposed agreement had been prepared. Mr. Ballantine gave a copy to Mr. Obata for his reference. (Copy attached.) It was pointed out that in our estimation the adoption of a formula such as contained in this new draft would be to the interests of the Japanese. Mr. Hamilton stated that this redraft of Section 5 was of course entirely tentative and merely intended for the consideration of the Japanese.

In reply to a question as to what was meant by the provisional commitment on the part of the Government of the United States marked (a), the Japanese Ambassador said that he believed the Japanese Government desired that that Government cease giving aid to China. Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine pointed out that the fundamental purpose of the proposed understanding was peace in the Pacific, that presumably peace would be arranged between Japan and China, and that this would make unnecessary any reference to the question of aid by this Government to China. Mr. Ballantine remarked that we assumed the Chinese Government to be equally interested in a just peace and therefore if the Japanese Government were to offer a just and equitable settlement to China there was no reason to expect the Chinese Government would not accept such an offer. Mr. Hamilton went on to say that, as the Secretary had previously informed the Ambassador, this Government, before completing any agreement, with Japan, would expect to discuss the question with the Chinese Government and with other governments interested in the Pacific area for the reason that the question of peace in the Pacific and a general settlement of Pacific problems is not one which can be determined by Japan and the United States alone, but is one in which other governments are interested and share the responsibilities.

Mr. Ballantine remarked that we had sent a telegram to Ambassador Grew covering the main points which had been brought up in today’s discussion.

Mr. Hamilton said that we desired this afternoon merely to present certain points which were not entirely clear to us and that we believed that once we had received clarification of these points from the Japanese Government we could make further progress in our study. Mr. Obata suggested that this Government prepare a complete draft on the basis of earlier drafts by this Government and by the Japanese Government and also taking into consideration the Japanese earlier proposals in regard to Indochina and the communications which Prince Konoye has made. Mr. Obata said that he believed in view of the agreement on principle, as already expressed by Prince Konoye, we should have no difficulty in phraseology. Mr. Hamilton replied that he believed it would be more desirable to wait until questions which we had raised today had been clarified before attempting a new redraft of the proposed agreement. Mr. Obata concurred and said that they would telegraph the Japanese Government immediately and would expect to have a reply by tomorrow afternoon.

(Comment: We came away from the conversation with the distinct feeling that Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Obata themselves were somewhat vague in regard to the intent of the Japanese Government and the meaning of the various points in the proposals given to the Secretary on September 6. They appeared to be positive on only the one point that the Japanese Government desired to arrange a meeting between the heads of states as soon as possible.)

M[ax] W. S[chmidt]

[Annex]

Draft Statement Given to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 10, 1941

V. Economic Activity of Both Nations in the Pacific Area

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves that the Japanese and the American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In pursuance of this policy, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which Japan and the United States will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and the development of its own economy. They furthermore agree to cooperate each with the other especially toward obtaining commercial access, on a non-discriminatory basis, by each of them to supplies of such basic commodities as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, and any other commodity the importation of which is essential to each country for the maintenance of its economic life.

8. Mr. Obata and Mr. Matsudaira were also present.