11.94/23444/25
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary’s apartment at his request.96
The Secretary inquired how the Ambassador felt about the general situation. The Ambassador replied that he was pleased over the tone and contents of the President’s reply. With reference to the Oral Statement handed to him by the President he said he felt that our request for information in regard to the Japanese Government’s attitude on the three fundamental questions on which our views remained unreconciled at the time conversations were interrupted last July had already been largely disposed of, in spirit at least, by the statement which the Ambassador had given the President on August 28. He said he thought that there was now no essential difference of views between the two governments in regard to the fundamental principles of peace.
The Secretary repeated to the Ambassador what he had said many times before in regard to the necessity before entering into any formal negotiations of consulting with the Chinese, the British and the Dutch in order to enlist their support for a broad program of peace in the Pacific area. He pointed out that this was especially necessary with the Chinese who might otherwise be apprehensive lest we betray them. He felt that before we are in a position to go to the Chinese the American and Japanese Governments should reach a clear understanding in principle on the various points to be discussed affecting China. The Secretary said he believed that after these points were cleared up it would enable us to move more rapidly toward taking up arrangements for the proposed meeting.
[Page 596]The Ambassador said that with regard to one of the points at issue, namely Japan’s obligation under the Tripartite Alliance, as those obligations affected and were affected by our self-defense program, he felt that as the Tripartite Alliance was purely defensive and was designed to prevent the entry of the United States into the war he felt sure there was no question of Japan’s attacking the United States should the United States enter the war.
The Secretary pointed out that if we went into an agreement with Japan without obtaining explicit assurances on that point difficulties might arise when he went before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
In reply to further questions by the Ambassador in regard to the Secretary’s views on preliminary discussions, the Secretary suggested the desirability of further broadening our proposed commitments affecting trade. He observed that our original proposed formula covering this subject had been successively narrowed down by the Japanese, which he felt was contrary to Japan’s own interest, especially in the light of the exigencies of the problems of economic reconstruction which would arise after a peace settlement has been reached. He said he had been looking into this matter with the economic experts of the Department.
The Ambassador said that he had asked his government for instructions in regard to its present attitude toward the three fundamental points at issue and was awaiting his government’s instruction. He then handed the Secretary a new complete draft of the Japanese proposals, which he said was a redraft of ours of June 21, and the Secretary said he would study it.
As the Ambassador rose to go he said he had been asked by his Government to take up the question of a public announcement in regard to the proposed meeting as the Japanese Government considered this urgent in view of the publicity which had already been given. The Secretary said that, while he had no objection to an announcement that formal exploratory conversations were taking place, he felt strongly that any announcement in regard to negotiations should be deferred until we had completed our preliminary discussions and had approached the other interested governments.
- Mr. Obata accompanied the Ambassador.↩