Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/217813/18

Memorandum of a Conversation

[Washington,] July 25, 1941.

At the invitation of Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa, Mr. Ballantine lunched with them at their apartment. Mr. Wikawa was late in arriving and the greater part of the conversation that ensued took place before Mr. Wikawa arrived. Colonel Iwakuro expressed regret that from the point of view of relations between Japan and the United States the situation has developed the way it has. He said that the question of Japanese occupation of bases in Indochina had been before the Japanese Government before he left for this country in February, and the underlying purpose of the effort to reach an understanding was to set in motion a trend away from southward advance and thus avert the possibility of such a step as had just now been taken. He thought that if there had not been a delay in reaching the understanding, which had raised in the minds of many Japanese leaders a suspicion that this Government was not acting in good faith—and Colonel Iwakuro hoped that I would understand that the Ambassador and his associates here had no doubt whatever of our good faith, the Japanese action in Indochina would not have occurred. He said that the British Government had recently put an embargo on the export of rice from Burma to Japan and that Japan has only French Indochina and Thailand to rely upon for imports of this foodstuff. He declared that his Government was apprehensive of the DeGaullist activities in south Indochina and that there was real danger of Japan’s supply of rice being cut off by disturbances created there.

Colonel Iwakuro went on to say that the Embassy had again last night received a third instruction from, his Government urging that an effort be made to resume conversations with this Government looking to an understanding. He said that while the resumption of conversations would not have any effect in influencing the Japanese Government to revoke its action in Indochina, the establishment of an understanding would be effective in stopping Japan from moving further south, providing that this Government did not take measures in the nature of embargoes or freezing of assets against Japan. If such measures were invoked by the United States^65b he believed that Japan would have no alternative but sooner or later to go south to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies in order to obtain essential supplies. Colonel Iwakuro observed that the Ambassador, being of a gentle disposition, would not have expressed these views as positively as Iwakuro had. He suggested that, while he did not wish to be understood as making any request, he would be glad to talk himself with the Acting Secretary or the President if we should so desire. He said he and Mr. Wikawa had already obtained passage on the Tatuta sailing from San Francisco on July 31, although there was a possibility that their sailing would be deferred until the Asama Maru sailed early next month. He added, however, that they would be glad to stay longer if we should desire to resume conversations.

Mr. Ballantine said that our position on the matter of the Japanese occupation of Indochina had already been made quite clear and that he could not add anything to what the Acting Secretary had already told the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the position of this Government.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese Government had no intention whatever to interfere with the internal affairs of French Indochina and he could not understand why we regarded their action as any different from our occupation of Iceland, which, he said, was a puppet country following the German occupation of Denmark.

Mr. Ballantine said that there was no point in his arguing over the facts connected with the Japanese step in relation to Indochina, but he desired to point out that Iceland was a fully independent country and not a dependency of Denmark, although up to the time of the German occupation the King of Denmark was also King of Iceland. Mr. Ballantine said that according to his understanding the Icelandic Parliament had full constitutional authority to enter into agreements with foreign countries. Colonel Iwakuro suggested that we had been influenced by propaganda of third powers interested in preventing the consummation of an agreement between Japan and the United States.

Mr. Ballantine replied that this was not the case, but that, as stated in the Secretary’s oral statement of June 21, we had accumulating evidence that important elements in the Japanese Government desired Japan to pursue a course supporting Hitler in his movement of world conquest and that the only kind of an agreement with the United States which they desired would allow Japan to pursue such a course.

Colonel Iwakuro then went on to say that even though we could not profitably pursue conversations at the present time an opportunity might arise again in future, perhaps if Germany should vanquish Russia and move over to the Far East. He thought that under such circumstances the basis of our conversations might be different.

Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa spoke warmly of our courtesies to them and expressed the hope that the Secretary would have no doubts about their sincerity and earnest desire to improve Japanese relations with the United States.

Mr. Ballantine obtained the impression that Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa had no real expectation that conversations would be resumed and that their principal purpose was to fulfill their ideas of propriety. Accordingly Mr. Ballantine made no effort to argue with them at length.⁶⁶

J[oseph] W. B[allantine]

1. See press release issued by the White House on July 25, 1941, p. 266.
66. On July 26, 1941, Mr. Hamilton noted: “It is Mr. Ballantine’s and my view that in view of the circumstances no reply to Colonel Iwakuro’s approach is called for and that the matter should rest with the statements made by Mr. Welles and by the President to the Japanese Ambassador.”