Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/217817/18

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[Washington,] July 16, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister, called at 4:15 this afternoon at his request. He referred to the conversation which Mr. Ballantine and I had had with the Japanese Ambassador yesterday evening at which time the Ambassador had told us that the Oral Statement had been misunderstood by the Japanese Government as indicative of an attempt on the part of the American Government to cause a change in the Japanese cabinet and of interference by the American Government in the internal affairs of Japan. Mr. Wakasugi said that he understood what the Secretary of State had in mind in the statements made in the Oral Statement but that in as much as his Government had misunderstood the statement and in as much as a governmental crisis had now occurred in Japan, the Ambassador had asked Mr. Wakasugi to call and to leave with me the Oral Statement handed to the Ambassador by the Secretary on June 21. Mr. Wakasugi said that the Ambassador, in view of the circumstances, wished to dispose of this matter in this simple, informal way and to continue with his informal exploratory talks with the Secretary. Mr. Wakasugi then took from his pocket a document which I assume was the original copy of the Oral Statement of June 21.

I commented that in as much as the Secretary of State had handed the Oral Statement in person to the Japanese Ambassador, I did not feel at liberty to accept it from Mr. Wakasugi without first reporting the matter to the Secretary and obtaining his instructions. I said that I would of course be glad to refer the matter to the Secretary. I said that last evening we had explained to the Japanese Ambassador the real meaning and purpose of the Oral Statement; that we had been told that some Japanese leaders earnestly desire to follow courses of peace; that concurrently we saw manifestations in various quarters of attitudes of other Japanese officials which we could not regard as representing a desire on the part of those officials to follow courses of peace; that in view of the fact that the fundamental purpose of the proposed understanding between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States was to make manifest the desires of the two Governments to follow courses of peace, we had raised the question whether the Japanese Government as a whole wished to follow courses of peace and, if so, whether the Japanese Government could not make manifest in some way its desire to follow such courses. I said that I was positive that there had been no thought whatsoever on the part of the Secretary of State or anyone here that this Government should interfere or was in the Oral Statement endeavoring to interfere in the internal affairs of Japan. I called for a copy of the Secretary’s statement of July 16, 1937 (copy attached).⁵⁸ I took a copy of that statement and underlined the words “We advocate abstinence by all nations … from interference in the internal affairs of other nations”. I said that the principle represented in the quoted statement was one of the fundamental principles followed by this Government and by Mr. Hull. I said that this Government had made very clear in its relations with the countries of this hemisphere as well as in its relations with other countries the fact that it supported wholeheartedly and with entire consistency the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. I gave Mr. Wakasugi the marked copy of the July 16, 1937 statement and I told him that I felt warranted in saying that the Ambassador could without any question whatsoever report to his Government that this Government was definitely and fundamentally committed to support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and that this Government would not have included in the Oral Statement anything which would be inconsistent with that fundamental principle.

I suggested that in as much as Mr. Wakasugi had said that the Ambassador interpreted the Oral Statement in substantially the same way as we did the simplest way of disposing of the matter would be for the Ambassador to make report of his conception to his own Government. Mr. Wakasugi said that the Ambassador had already done this. He asked whether he might take with him the marked copy of the July 16, 1937 statement. I replied emphatically in the affirmative.

In reply to Mr. Wakasugi’s further request, I told Mr. Wakasugi that I would report the matter to the Secretary and would expect thereafter to get in touch with him. He said that the Ambassador might send the Oral Statement to the Secretary under cover of a letter. I asked that the Ambassador not do this until I had had an opportunity to report to the Secretary and I told Mr. Wakasugi that after making such report I would expect to get in touch with him.

Several times during the course of his call, Mr. Wakasugi indicated that the matter was urgent.^58a

M[axwell] M. H[amilton]

58. See vol. i, p. 325.
59. The Konoye cabinet resigned July 16, 1941. On July 18 Prince Konoye formed a new cabinet, with Admiral Teijiro Toyoda replacing Minister Matsuoka.