11.94/217816/18
Memorandum of a Conversation
Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine called on the Japanese Ambassador by appointment made at their request.
Mr. Hamilton said that he had been directed by the Secretary to call and to make communication to the Ambassador, as from the Secretary, on three points. First, he desired to express regret that no reply had been made to the oral statement which the Secretary handed the Japanese Ambassador on June 21.
The Ambassador replied that the letter which he addressed to the Secretary on July 4 was intended by the Japanese Government to meet our oral statement of June 21. He explained that he had taken the oral statement as having been addressed to himself but that nevertheless he had referred it to his Government, and his Government had [Page 507] instructed him that this Government was not warranted in raising questions as to the attitude of any particular individuals in the Japanese Government, for although there were discussions on policy within the Japanese Government the Japanese Government was acting as a unit. The Ambassador also said in Japanese that his Government had considered that our oral statement contained an import amounting to interference in Japan’s internal affairs in that it raised the question of a reconstruction of the Japanese Cabinet. Subsequently, the Ambassador repeated substantially the same statement in English. Mr. Hamilton expressed the view that the Japanese Government had misinterpreted the import of our oral statement; that it was not directed at inquiring into the attitudes of individuals or groups within the Japanese Government; but that it raised the question, in view of the fact that the purpose underlying the proposed understanding was based upon a policy of peace, of the statements made by the Ambassador that he was committed to such a policy, and of the evidence which this Government had received that certain leaders desired to support Nazi Germany in its movement of world conquest, whether the Japanese Government as a whole intended to support a policy of peace such as constituted the purpose of the proposed understanding. Mr. Hamilton disclaimed any idea on our part of interfering in Japan’s internal affairs, and commented that non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries was a basic policy of the United States.
The Ambassador maintained that, while it was true that the Japanese Government was in an alliance with Germany and Italy and was bound to remain faithful to it, the Japanese Government desired to pursue courses of peace. He said that the Japanese Government had unquestionably misinterpreted the import of our oral statement.
Mr. Hamilton asked whether the Ambassador had interpreted our oral statement in the way his Government had. Mr. Hamilton also explained that in referring to peace in the Pacific area we had in mind not only peace between Japan and the United States but peace among all countries in the Pacific area. He also adverted in this connection to what he had said on July 5 to the Ambassador, at the direction of the Secretary, in regard to our view that the Ambassador’s letter of July 4 to the Secretary was too narrow in scope and that we thought it would be helpful if a full and comprehensive reply could be made covering the broad points set forth in the oral statement.
The Ambassador replied that the intent of the oral statement in his opinion was to seek clarification of the Japanese Government’s broad intentions in regard to peace. The Ambassador explained that he had had seventeen conferences with the Secretary as a result of which the Ambassador had clearly in mind the Secretary’s aims on [Page 508] peace. Mr. Hamilton suggested that the Ambassador might care to explain the situation to his Government with a view to clearing away all misunderstanding.
Mr. Hamilton said that in the second place he had been directed to inquire specifically as to any basis in fact for recurrent rumors and press reports to the effect that Japan is planning to acquire naval and air bases in French Indochina.
The Ambassador replied that he was without information from his Government in regard to its intentions on this point, but that he would refer our inquiry to his Government. Judging from Japanese news reports and from considerations of the general situation, involving the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands East Indies, China and the Soviet Union, the Ambassador said he believed that Japan might have intentions such as press reports indicated. He explained that Japan was concerned over possible encirclement, and that the Japanese people had been especially alarmed over reports of an alliance between China and Great Britain. He referred also to increased aid by the United States to the Chungking Government and to reported plans for strengthening the Burma road. He affirmed that Japan was obliged to take appropriate precautionary measures, and he referred to our military occupation of Iceland57 and to reports that we might take Dakar and the Azores.
Mr. Hamilton observed that in our opinion no country was menacing Japan and that it was difficult for us to reconcile the reports to which he had referred with the professed desire of Japan to pursue courses of peace. Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine elaborated on this point at some length.
The Ambassador expressed the view that if the United States were in Japan’s place we might be quicker to take action than Japan has been. He said he personally failed to understand why so many Americans felt their security threatened by Germany, as he felt that no country could be more secure than we were.
Mr. Hamilton said that the concern of the American people for their security was based upon the judgment of our highest authorities, both civil and military, and upon the actual record of Hitler’s movement of conquest.
The conversation having turned to the friendly relations between the United States and the other American Republics, the Ambassador expressed his admiration for the way we managed our relations with our neighbors. He voiced the hope that Japan might be able to conduct its relations with its neighbors in a similar way.
Mr. Hamilton said that, lastly, he had been directed by the Secretary to inquire whether the Japanese Government regards itself as [Page 509] definitely obligated under the Tripartite Treaty or otherwise to take any specific courses of action on behalf of Germany or Italy, and whether the Japanese Government is under any pledge, in case the United States should become involved in the European war through acts of self-defense, to take any hostile action against the United States.
The Ambassador said that he believed that Japan retained freedom of action under the Tripartite Pact and was under no commitment which would call for Japan’s taking up arms against the United States in the event of the involvement of the United States in the European war, except as provided in Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. He asserted that thus, while the obligations of that article do not arise if the United States should become involved in the European war through acts of self-defense, Japan could not give a blank check for anything that we might call self-defense but in case the provisions of Article 3 of the Pact should be invoked Japan would have to reach its own judgment in the light of the actual circumstances whether the provisions of that article were applicable. He said that, of course, Japan hoped that the United States would not enter the European war, but that nevertheless he felt sure that there was nothing incompatible between Japan’s obligations under the alliance and friendly relations with the United States. The Ambassador expressed his belief that no useful purpose would be served by referring this inquiry to his Government.
Although we questioned the Ambassador further on the subject of this inquiry he did not go beyond his first answer. He repeated again and again his view that in this critical world situation when things were moving rapidly the conclusion of the proposed understanding between our two Governments would tend to arrest the deterioration of the situation.
As we were leaving, we expressed our appreciation of the Ambassador’s giving us so much of his time. The Ambassador showed no irritation or impatience with our inquiries, and the atmosphere throughout the conversation was cordial and amicable.
- See Department of State, Bulletin, July 12, 1941 (vol. v, No. 107), p. 15.↩