711.94/21782/18
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Secretary having directed that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine endeavor to see the associates of the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine ascertained that Mr. Wikawa was out of town, and, as Colonel Iwakuro does not speak English, after consulting Mr. Welles,53 made an appointment to see the Japanese Ambassador. Through some misunderstanding on the part of the Ambassador’s Secretary, Colonel Iwakuro was not asked by the Ambassador to be present and could not be reached when we arrived.
Mr. Hamilton said that the Ambassador’s letter of July 4 addressed to the Secretary was communicated to the Secretary this morning and that the Secretary had asked us to make a number of comments [Page 500] to the Ambassador. In the first place, the Department, under directions from the President, had telegraphed to Ambassador Grew asking him to communicate to the Prime Minister a message in which reference was made to various reports which we had received to the effect that Japan had decided to attack the Soviet Union, to our efforts to see peace maintained in the Pacific, and to the encouragement which statements by Japanese leaders and by the Japanese Ambassador had given us to hope that Japan shares our desire that the peace of the Pacific might be preserved. The message to Mr. Grew contained the statement that we found it difficult to credit these reports which were so entirely inconsistent with the statements mentioned and that we would appreciate assurances that the reports were without foundation.53a
The Ambassador listened attentively but made no comment.
Mr. Hamilton went on to say that the foregoing telegram was sent before the receipt by us of the Ambassador’s letter of July 4. He then observed that we were always gratified to receive assurances of friendliness from another government, but, presuming that the Ambassador’s letter of July 4 was intended to be responsive to the Secretary’s oral statement of June 21, which dealt with fundamentals affecting the peace of the Pacific, it was felt that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government should wish to respond in some way that might suggest itself as appropriate to the Japanese Government by way of meeting the fundamental points brought out in the Secretary’s oral statement. Mr. Hamilton added that in the oral statement we had not intended to imply that there was any divergence of views in the Japanese Government in regard to the matter of the proposal; but what we adverted to was evidence which had reached us that certain elements of the Japanese Government favored courses of support of Hitler in his movement of world conquest and not courses of peace such as was the spirit of the proposed understanding.
The Ambassador replied that the Japanese Government recognized from a comparison of the Japanese proposal and our revision that there were material differences in our respective views and that it was the Japanese Government’s purpose to convey in the letter the Japanese Government’s desire to continue conversations until we had ironed out these differences on a mutually satisfactory basis. He added that the question of China was a matter of much more vital importance to Japan than to the United States and that in view of the effects upon public opinion in Japan of decisions on China policy it was necessary for the Japanese Government to move very cautiously in this matter. He said, however, that he would refer our observations on these points to his Government for its consideration.
[Page 501]Mr. Hamilton said that a third point which he wished to bring up related to press reports to the effect that Japan was planning to acquire naval and air bases in French Indochina and Thailand to enable Japan to threaten the Burma Road, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. Mr. Hamilton read to the Ambassador a press clipping from the New York Times of this morning containing a press despatch from Shanghai on the subject (attached).54 He asked the Ambassador how does the Japanese Government expect to go forward with a peace settlement for the Pacific area while reports indicated that Japan is moving in exactly the opposite direction? Mr. Hamilton suggested that it would be advantageous at this juncture to have either a prompt denial or frank confirmation of those reports.
The Ambassador replied that the Japanese Government was faced with the necessity of preparing itself against possible eventualities. He observed that one had only to take up the paper to read suggestions by commentators in the United States on plans for the encirclement of Japan; that America was aiding Chiang Kai-shek in various ways, including the despatch of American pilots to Chungking; that American supplies were being sent to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies; that there were visits of American squadrons to Australia which to a naval man like himself were of greater significance than mere courtesy visits; and that commentators were discussing the prospects of American aid to the Russian Far East and of the acquisition of American air bases in Siberia. He alluded also to the possibility of an executive order being issued stopping the shipment from the United States of petroleum products to Japan, and he remarked that, if Japan should thus be shut off from American sources of oil, Japan must obtain them elsewhere and that, under the circumstances, it was necessary for Japan to take appropriate preparatory measures.
Mr. Hamilton observed that he had seen no statement from any authoritative source indicating that this Government was preparing to acquire bases in Siberia. He suggested also that there was a considerable difference between a government’s taking preparatory defense measures in its own country and acquiring bases by pressure methods in some other country.
The Ambassador declared that there was no doubt in his mind that the Japanese Government desired peace; he said casually that he did not think that the Japanese Government had any intention at the present juncture to embark upon military movements against Russia or to the southward. He pointed out that in the present state of relations between the United States and Japan action by one country led to counteraction by the other; and it was with this idea in [Page 502] view that he felt that we should conclude the present understanding as speedily as possible, as this would tend to set currents in motion away from aggravation of the present tension.
Mr. Hamilton commented that the view just expressed by the Ambassador in regard to the desirability of arresting trends which lead to an aggravation of international friction was very statesmanlike.
Mr. Hamilton then said that we had been orally informed that the associates of the Japanese Ambassador had mentioned … something about Japan’s being now willing to withdraw all their troops from China within two years.
The Ambassador replied that he was not conversant with the details of this matter. He observed, however, that Japan’s treaty with Wang Ching-wei provided for the retention of Japanese troops in China for defense against Communism during the period of the validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which he said might last only two years, but perhaps much longer.
Mr. Hamilton in conclusion said that we regretted the arising of difficulties in the course of our conversations, but that we thought it desirable when such difficulties arise to discuss them frankly with the Japanese Ambassador and his associates who throughout these conversations have been animated by a sincere desire to bring about better relations with the United States. We also said that we appreciated the frankness which they in turn had consistently manifested in talking with us.
In response to a question by the Ambassador, Mr. Hamilton said that our telegram to Mr. Grew related only to the question of a Japanese attack on Siberia and that we expected a reply. The Ambassador said that he would inform his Government of what we had said.
Note: Throughout the conversation, Mr. Hamilton made clear that he was speaking under express authorization from the Secretary.