711.94/21781/18
Memorandum of a Conversation
Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt, who were later joined by Mr. Hamilton, called at the apartment of Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa by arrangement51a following an intimation … that the Japanese would like to meet us for further discussion. Mr. Wikawa said that he understood … it was desirable that we go on with the conversations and asked if we had read the recent report of the interview which Prime Minister Konoe had given a representative of the American press. The Prime Minister, he said, had intended this interview to be in response to the position taken by the Secretary in his oral statement of June 21; and had therefore emphasized that Japan had no intention to participate in or to assist any German program of world conquest, and had further emphasized that he could foresee no reason for war between the United States and Japan. Mr. Ballantine remarked that according to our information this interview had been granted by Prince Konoe to a Paramount Newsreel representative in Japan who had in turn passed on the remarks of the Prime Minister to the United Press correspondent who cabled a report to the United States. Our information further indicated that the Prime Minister’s remarks were not published in Japan; and as reported in this country, contained statements differing only very slightly from those which had been made previously by Japanese statesmen. Mr. Schmidt, referring to the Secretary’s oral statement of June 21, added that there had been published so many remarks by leading Japanese emphasizing Japan’s commitments and intentions under the Tripartite Alliance, in addition to accumulating evidence from other sources, that the people of the United States could not but believe that certain elements in the Japanese Government wholeheartedly supported Nazi Germany in its policies of conquest and those elements could therefore hardly be expected to support an understanding with the United States which would prevent Japan’s fighting on the side of Hitler should the United States, in defense of its security, be forced to take up arms against Germany. Mr. Wikawa replied that we should give attention only to statements of the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary, and said that he believed that we were under some misapprehension regarding the unanimity of the Japanese Government in supporting the instructions given to Admiral Nomura. Mr. Wikawa was supported by Colonel Iwakuro in the assertion that officials of the Japanese Army, Navy and Foreign Office are united in their support of Admiral Nomura in this instance.
[Page 496]Mr. Ballantine emphasized that we were not raising any question of the unanimity of the Japanese Government in the matter of the proposal which had been presented to us, but that we felt we should have some clearer indication than the Japanese Government has yet given us of its peaceful intentions in order to counteract the effect of previous manifestations of Japanese policy; and that we were not undertaking to suggest the method by which the Japanese Government might present such concrete evidence.
In a plea for mutual confidence, Mr. Wikawa stated that he had learned recently that the banking firm of Morgan and Company in New York, which had control of a Japanese sinking fund to purchase Japanese Government bonds at a price favorable to Japan, had learned from sources within the State Department that these conversations had been very politely but firmly and on technical grounds closed by the United States and that the freezing of Japanese funds in the United States could be expected in the near future. Morgan and Company had accordingly begun the purchase of Japanese Government bonds indiscriminately and had forced the price of those bonds to rise considerably to the detriment of the Japanese Government’s sinking fund. Mr. Wikawa said they were embarrassed by an implication in the Secretary’s oral statement of June 21 of division within the Japanese Government.
Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa both contended, as Colonel Iwakuro had done earlier in the discussion, that once an agreement had been reached with the United States, it would be easier for Japan to give evidence, such as we sought, of Japan’s intentions; and there would then be forthcoming in succession indications showing that Japan’s purposes were in harmony with the spirit of the agreement. In the meantime, however, the Japanese Government was obliged to act with caution. Colonel Iwakuro suggested that present world conditions were such as to call for quick action, and that for this reason we should avoid taking up in detail all matters at issue. The unanimity of the Japanese Government in support of the proposal was again stressed by both Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa.
Mr. Ballantine once more pointed out that we did not wish to question the united support of the Japanese Government of the proposal which Admiral Nomura made on May 12; but that the evidence which we had indicated a desire on the part of at least certain elements in Japan to support Nazi Germany and its program of world conquest and domination; and that we merely sought some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese Government as a whole desires to pursue courses of peace. In an effort to discount political differences in Japan, Colonel Iwakuro said that there are naturally in all countries various political groups and referred to the groups within [Page 497] the United States favoring opposing programs in foreign relations. In reply, Mr. Schmidt pointed out that the United States is unanimous in its desire for strong defense against aggressors and that the position of the people and of the Government of the United States repeatedly has been made clear. There has been no intimation of any threat to any nation in that position but only the clearest evidence of support for defense against aggression.
The Japanese again returned to their argument that it was difficult at this time to make a clear-cut statement, and that the understanding should be reached first. Mr. Ballantine repeated that what we had in mind was not a matter of a statement or of particular words but rather some practical evidence of Japan’s peaceful intentions. Mr. Ballantine emphasized that Secretary Hull desired to be helpful in any way possible. After further statements of the desirability of reaching an understanding promptly, Mr. Wikawa suggested that the “concept of the character of nations” as contained in the draft agreement clearly portrayed Japan’s desire to pursue peaceful courses.
Mr. Wikawa said these conversations were being kept very secret in Japan owing to the opposition which could be expected from third countries and from certain groups in Japan. Mr. Matsuoka’s statements and the statements of other individuals were of ten largely for home consumption.
Mr. Hamilton replied that these conversations were also kept very secret here; and brought to Mr. Wikawa’s attention the fact that the President and the Secretary of State in the administration of matters of policy were able at times judiciously “to apply the brakes”. It seems to us, Mr. Hamilton said, the Japanese Government, if it so desired, could pursue a similar course to indicate more clearly that Japan is now committed to a peaceful policy. He added that we do not expect the impossible, of course, and do not ask Japan to repudiate contractual obligations. Colonel Iwakuro again observed that in view of Japan’s political agreement with Germany and Italy, it would be difficult to take such steps until after an understanding had been reached with the United States. Speaking frankly, the Colonel suggested that the delay in these conversations was contributing to a feeling in both Japan and the United States that each country was “insincere” and was “playing with the other”. Colonel Iwakuro urged the fundamental consideration was to dispose of any possibility of hostilities between the United States and Japan. He said he felt strongly that it would be most foolish for the United States and Japan to go to war and suggested with considerable emphasis that first an agreement be reached to preclude that possibility, and then that all other problems between the United States and Japan be settled in the favorable atmosphere created by such an agreement. [Page 498] Mr. Ballantine pointed out that essential points in that fundamental consideration were the questions of the attitude of Japan toward the European war and of Japan’s desire to pursue courses of peace.
Colonel Iwakuro made the suggestion that mutual and reciprocal recognition of the right of self-defense might satisfactorily obviate any necessity we might feel for an exchange of letters such as contained in our draft of June 21. Colonel Iwakuro followed this suggestion by reference again to the desirability of reaching promptly an understanding with the United States in order that a favorable atmosphere might be created for the later settlement of all other questions.
In replying to those remarks Mr. Hamilton pointed out that if the Japanese Government intends to move toward courses which, in the opinion of this Government, furnish a sound basis for relations between nations there need arise no question of war between Japan and the United States. He agreed with Colonel Iwakuro that if we can reach an agreement on fundamentals, the solution of other problems will be facilitated. Mr. Hamilton then went on to say that the Secretary had given his personal attention and had devoted considerable time and effort to this question; but that as a responsible statesman, the Secretary could not ignore the evidence from Japan, Europe and other sources which indicates that important elements in Japan desire to go in other directions than along the lines of peaceful courses which we have been discussing. Mr. Hamilton said that Mr. Hull is both an idealist and a practical man and therefore a statesman. He added that before a responsible statesman may take action there must be some evidence that the desired results of that action will have at least a fair chance to materialize. Colonel Iwakuro made a brief plea for mutual confidence, and then merely returned to his original contention that it was difficult for Japan to go any further until an understanding with the United States had been reached.
After remarking that the offer of assistance to Russia by the United States was not pleasing to Japan, Colonel Iwakuro suggested as his personal opinion and without knowing the views of his Government, that the question of China and dealing with the “China incident” might be dropped altogether until after the United States and Japan had reached an agreement for peace in the Pacific.
Mr. Hamilton brought out the fact that “peace in the Pacific” is not just a question involving only the United States and Japan, but that many other countries are concerned; and that there could be no peace in the Pacific should certain elements in Japan be able to force an attack on the United States at some future stage in the development of the hostilities in Europe. There followed further discussion of the same character, in which the Japanese urged that an understanding [Page 499] be reached and that questions of a detailed character be set aside in order to assure, if possible, that war between Japan and the United States would be avoided; and in reply to which Mr. Hamilton said that should Japan follow courses of peace there was no danger of war.
After expressing our appreciation of the sincere statements which had been made, Mr. Hamilton brought the discussion to a close by stating our desire to be helpful in any way possible and by asking the Japanese once more to study the Secretary’s most recent oral statement to see whether there were any ideas or suggestions which might occur to them in the light of today’s conversation.
- Mr. Matsudaira was also present.↩