711.94/216212/14
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called on the Secretary at the Secretary’s apartment by appointment made at the Ambassador’s request.
The Ambassador said that he was communicating to his Government the oral statement given him by the Secretary on the previous day. The Ambassador said, since presenting the proposed understanding to the Secretary, that he had been acting all along in accordance [Page 493] with instructions from his Government, in whose decisions the Foreign Office, the Army and Navy had participated. He said that he was at a loss to account for the existence in Japan of any disagreement over policy in regard to this matter, such as was referred to in our oral statement.
The Secretary inquired whether it might be possible that Matsuoka’s intention was on the one hand to have us subject China to pressure to come to an agreement with Japan and on the other hand to leave Japan free to take action with reference to the European war as indicated in Matsuoka’s message to Mussolini. The Ambassador replied as he had on previous occasions that Japan did not want war with the United States, but that Japan did not wish to bind itself in advance with regard to some future eventuality.
The Ambassador then handed the Secretary an oral statement51 which he asked Mr. Ballantine to read to the Secretary. In the oral statement the suggestion was made that, as the proposed exchanges of letters attached to the draft presented by the Secretary on June 21 contained points which the Ambassador found difficult to recommend to his Government for approval, the letters either be omitted or modified.
The Secretary said that he did not wish to cause embarrassment to the Japanese Government, and he hoped that at the same time the Japanese Government would not want to cause this Government embarrassment. He remarked that he might have difficulty here over the proposed understanding unless the Japanese Government could find some way of clarifying its attitude in view of the public statements that had been made in Japan. The Secretary asked whether Germany’s declaration of war against the Soviet Union might not affect the situation in such a way as to render it more easy for the Japanese Government to find some way along the lines indicated.
The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government did not wish to be placed in the position of repudiating its obligations under the Tripartite Pact. He said, however, that he would refer the matter to his Government with a view to its studying what might be done.
Mr. Ballantine asked whether the Ambassador objected also to the draft letter in regard to the application to Japan’s economic cooperation with China of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative, stating that he felt that it would take too long for the purposes of the present understanding to go into all the details involved, and he suggested that this matter be taken up at a later time.
The Secretary referred to the Japanese proposal that the question of the stationing of Japanese troops for defense against communism [Page 494] be left for negotiation between Japan and China. He pointed out that if Japan and the United States should reach an agreement and if then China and Japan should not come to an agreement and the matter of a settlement between China and Japan be thus left hanging in the air, we would be placed in an embarrassing position.
The Ambassador said that insistence upon the stationing of Japanese troops in China for the purpose indicated was a long-established policy of the Japanese Government, that the matter had been one of the provisions in the Wang Ching-wei treaty, approved by the Throne, and that he was not able to say whether the Japanese Government could reconsider this matter. The Ambassador said he would, however, inform his Government in regard to what the Secretary had said and ask it to give further study to this matter.
The Secretary said nothing to indicate that we would withdraw the exchanges of letters, but the sense of what was said was that the Japanese Ambassador would refer to his Government the points involved in the letters, and the door was thus left open for us to consider any alternative or modified suggestion that the Japanese Ambassador might offer.
The Secretary said that in view of the importance of the proposed understanding he hoped that the Ambassador and his associates would keep in touch with the Secretary’s associates, who in turn would keep the Secretary informed of developments.
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