711.94/21621/14

Memorandum of a Conversation

In pursuance of an arrangement made by the Japanese Ambassador with the Secretary on June 3, Mr. Wakasugi,37a Colonel Iwakuro, Mr. Wikawa, and Mr. Matsudaira38 met with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine at the Wardman Park Hotel at three o’clock. Mr. Wakasugi said that it was their desire that we should discuss unofficially and tentatively various points arising in connection with the Japanese proposal and the revision of that proposal which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador on May 31.

Our discussion was made on the basis of the draft of May 31.

With reference to the Preamble, Mr. Wakasugi raised the question whether by the reference to “a joint declaration” in the first paragraph it was intended that there was to be another instrument in addition to the draft now before us. Mr. Hamilton said that it was our understanding that this draft itself constituted the joint declaration. No objection was raised to this explanation. Mr. Wakasugi then asked whether the principle of the alternat (rotation in precedence in naming the two countries in the document) would be observed in drawing up the Japanese and the American texts of the understanding. Mr. Hamilton said that he perceived no difficulty in this but that it was his thought that there would be but one document. He added that we would take note of that point which they had raised for further consideration.

[Page 456]

Mr. Wakasugi indicated that the Japanese desired to substitute in the fifth line of the second paragraph the word “arrest” for “corrected”, as there was an implication in the word “corrected” of censure of the conduct of one or both of the two countries. In the first line of the third paragraph they desired to alter the word “present” to “earnest” or to omit the word “present” altogether, as the implications of the word “present” were not clear. In the fifth paragraph of the Preamble they desired to delete the words appearing in the last line “at a conference” and to substitute the word “later”, as they felt that reference to a conference might be interpreted as committing them to a conference.

Mr. Hamilton observed that all of these words which they desired to change were taken over from the Japanese draft, but that we would note their desire to have these changes made.

Mr. Wakasugi said that with reference to the wording of caption five they would like to have a change made which they would take up when we came to a discussion of Section V.

With reference to Section I, relating to the general concepts of Japan and of the United States, Mr. Wakasugi said that they would like to insert after “one household” in line three of paragraph two the phrase “under the ideal of universal concord, justice and equity”. Mr. Hamilton raised question whether the Japanese were thinking of some vague idealistic concept or of something which had present-day, practical application. Mr. Wakasugi explained that the purpose of the Japanese suggested addition was to define Japan’s ethical concept of a household in the sense used in this document. In the last line of the same paragraph they desired to substitute “peoples” for “nations”, as you could, for example, speak of a Malayan people but not of a Malayan nation.

In Section II, relating to the European war, Mr. Wakasugi asked that there be deleted the second sentence of the first paragraph, reading as follows: “Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense.” Mr. Wakasugi said that Japan does not want to be bound by our interpretation of self-defense and that Japan cannot commit itself in advance to what action it might take in respect to the acts of some other countries. Mr. Hamilton commented that it might be helpful to us toward gaining an understanding of what the Japanese had in mind in reference to this whole section if they would disregard the text of the proposed section and explain to us in their own words their underlying thought. After some inconclusive statements by Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Hamilton commented that we had been given to understand by certain persons that the Japanese Government desired gradually to move away from its affiliations with the Axis powers and that one purpose of the proposed understanding between the Japanese and the American [Page 457] Governments was to create an atmosphere which would facilitate such action on the part of Japan. Mr. Hamilton asked Mr. Wakasugi to comment on this and, if Mr. Wakasugi confirmed the impressions conveyed to us by some other people, to explain how the proposed understanding would accomplish such purpose. Mr. Wakasugi stated categorically that if we had received any such impressions they were not in accord with fact. He said that Japan had no intention of not discharging its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance and that Japan must be left free to make its own decision whether any action by the United States in reference to the European situation would cause Japan to fulfill her obligations under the Pact. Mr. Hamilton then said that he would be interested in hearing Colonel Iwakuro’s comment. Colonel Iwakuro explained that it was entirely incorrect to assume that the purpose of the understanding was to enable Japan to drift away from the Tripartite Pact and that, if the United States should become involved in the European war under circumstances such as would call for Japan to act under its interpretation of its obligations, Japan would feel obliged to discharge those obligations, much as Japan would regret taking up arms against the United States. Colonel Iwakuro explained, however, that the situation as he saw it was this: For ten years relations between Japan and the United States had been deteriorating; at the present time there were two sources of possible conflict between the two countries. One source was matters affecting the Pacific region and the other source was through circumstances under which the United States might become involved in the European war. The proposed understanding was designed to take care of the first source. It did not provide freedom from anxiety from the second source. When world affairs are developing as rapidly as they are now it is difficult to tell what contingencies might arise in the future and it is impossible to cover in the text of any agreement all possible contingencies that might arise. The best that we can hope for is that the proposed agreement will improve the atmosphere between the two countries and in this way the two countries might be expected to collaborate toward contributing toward the restoration of world peace.

Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of the Japanese desire to have deleted the second sentence of the first paragraph of our draft, as the Japanese had already indicated.

Mr. Wakasugi next said that the Japanese would like to have withdrawn our annex containing excerpts from the Secretary’s address of April 24, 1941, in elaboration of our Government’s position in regard to self-defense. Colonel Iwakuro said that they had no objections to the speech itself, but that if it were placed in the annex Mr. Matsuoka would be likely to ask to have his statements in regard to Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact included in an annex [Page 458] on the part of the Japanese Government. Mr. Wakasugi said that it would be difficult for Mr. Matsuoka to accept the Secretary’s statement as an integral part of the agreement. When Mr. Hamilton said that it was our desire to avoid any possible misunderstanding on the part of Japan as to our position, Colonel Iwakuro proposed that the Embassy might communicate the Secretary’s statement separately to the Japanese Government as indicating the position of our Government. Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of this point.

Mr. Wakasugi then proposed the inclusion of an annex on the part of the Government of the United States reading as follows:

Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of the United States

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of the United States declares that, so far as its attitude toward the European war is concerned, it does not and will not resort to any aggression aimed to assist any one nation against another.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese would be quite prepared to drop the foregoing suggestion if we on our part would be prepared to drop our proposed sentence in the first paragraph reading, “Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense.”

Mr. Wakasugi said that they desired to have inserted at the beginning of Section II a new paragraph reading as follows:

“It being the common aim of both Governments of Japan and the United States to establish world peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European war and restoring peace.”

Mr. Hamilton raised for consideration the question of whether the idea underlying the proposed paragraph could not be incorporated in the first section. He pointed out that an express reference of this kind under Section II, which deals with the attitude of the two countries to the European war, might be regarded as inconsistent with the President’s declared attitude in regard to the question of a present American effort to bring about peace in Europe. He suggested also for consideration whether it might not serve the purpose desired to change the word “our” to “all” in the first paragraph of Section I, which in our draft reads as follows:

“Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed to [toward] the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples.”

[Page 459]

Mr. Wakasugi said that they would leave this point for further consideration and that we might also consider whether the words could not be incorporated in some other section or in a section by itself.

With reference to Section III, Mr. Wakasugi proposed an entirely different formula. The formula in our draft and the formula he proposed are shown in parallel columns as follows:

Formula in Our Draft of May 31 Formula Proposed by Japanese
The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations. The President of the United States will suggest to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek that it will enter as soon as possible into a negotiation with Japan on the basis of the Konoe three principles and the practical application of these principles for a termination of hostilities and the resumption of peaceful relations.

The reason adduced by Mr. Wakasugi for this change was that it was desired to avoid giving any impression to the Japanese people that there was involved any question of an American mediation between China and Japan.

The Japanese then offered an alternative formula, concerning which they wished to make reservations on minor points, reading as follows:

“The Government of Japan having announced the general terms within the framework of which the Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the China conflict, which terms are declared by the Government of Japan to be in harmony with the Konoe principles and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States, relying upon the policy of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to the Chinese Government at Chungking that that Government and [Page 460] the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.”

Mr. Hamilton then asked Colonel Iwakuro whether it was his conception that upon the conclusion of this agreement it would be the Wang Ching-wei regime or the Government at Chungking which would constitute the Government of China.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese now recognized the Wang Ching-wei regime as the Government of China and regarded the Government at Chungking as a local regime. The proposed understanding contemplated negotiations by the Japanese Government with Chungking. As regards the outcome of the negotiations, there were three possibilities, which he charted on a piece of paper, attached:39 (a) that the Chungking Government might become absorbed into the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei, (b) that the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei might become absorbed into the Chungking Government, and (c) that both the Nanking Government and the Chungking Government might be coalesced into a new government. The Japanese Government proposed to leave this matter to be decided by the Chinese themselves.

Mr. Wakasugi then offered an amended annex on the part of the Japanese Government in connection with Section III. The formulae in the draft of May 31 and in the Japanese redraft are shown in parallel columns:

Formula in Our Draft of May 31 Formula Proposed by Japanese
The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:
1.
Neighborly friendship.
2.
(Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3.
Economic cooperation—by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4.
Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5.
Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.
6.
Withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7.
No annexation.
8.
No indemnities.
9.
Amicable negotiation in regard to “Manchoukuo.”
The basic terms as implied in the Konoe three principles and the practical application of those principles are as follows:
1.
Neighborly friendship.
2.
Cooperative defense against communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in the Inner Mongolia and certain areas of the North China.
3.
Economic cooperation.
4.
Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5.
Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an Eastern Asia nucleus contributing to world peace.
6.
Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with agreement between Japan and China.
7.
No annexation.
8.
No indemnities.
9.
Recognition of “Manchoukuo.”

Mr. Wakasugi explained that, with reference to caption three of the foregoing annex, the Japanese did not wish to expand the wording in the caption beyond the mere statement “economic cooperation”, as they wished to leave the matter to be dealt with by negotiations between Japan and China. Mr. Hamilton observed that in the Japanese Oral Explanation of May 12 this point had been expanded by the statement “by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interests of Third Powers” and that we had substituted the phraseology “by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations” in the interest of clarity. Mr. Hamilton here emphasized the importance which this Government attached to the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

Mr. Hamilton noted that in caption six where we had suggested the wording “military and naval forces” the Japanese in their new draft had restored the term “troops”. He asked whether it was not intended by Japan to withdraw their naval forces. Colonel Iwakuro said that in normal international intercourse war vessels visited ports of other countries, and, moreover, at Shanghai foreign powers, including the United States, normally maintained marines or corresponding naval units. They had used the English word “troops” as translation of the Japanese term “guntai” which was not restricted to army forces. He said that it was Japan’s clear intention to withdraw all armed forces whether of the army or the navy engaged in the present hostilities, and he had no objection to the use of the term “armed forces” if that would cover better what was meant. He added that it was his understanding that “Chinese territory” included Chinese territorial waters.

[Page 462]

Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of all the points made in connection with Section III and the annex pertaining thereto.

Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese had no changes to offer with respect to the text of Section IV, but that they desired the withdrawal of our annex relating to restrictions upon trade during the present international emergency. He stated that such an annex would weaken the force of the stipulation in Section IV. He said that they thought that the word “available” in section IV would cover what we had in mind. Mr. Hamilton said that we would make note of the point.

Mr. Wakasugi said that they wished to offer an alternative wording for Section V. The formulae of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows:

Formula in Our Draft of May 31 Formula Proposed by Japanese
V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area. V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy. Noting that Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

Asked what were the reasons for the proposed changes, Colonel Iwakuro explained that Japan had no suspicion that the United States would engage in activities other than peaceful in the Southwest Pacific area, and he felt that the United States should accept Japanese declarations in regard to the peaceful character of their aims. The reason for restricting the application of this section to the Southwestern Pacific area, which we had broadened to include [Page 463] the whole Pacific area, was that it was the Japanese desire to devote this section specifically to the Southwestern Pacific area on account of the special interest which the Japanese people had developed therein. He pointed out that Section VI covered the whole Pacific area. Mr. Hamilton raised the question whether the pledge in regard to peace might be incorporated in Section VI, retaining, however, in Section V a statement pledging both countries to the application of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. He emphasized the importance which this Government attached to such statements. He pointed out in reference to commercial relations that in an earlier draft we had proposed the wording “on the basis of equality of opportunity”; that the Japanese had objected to that phraseology on the ground that Japanese had no clear concept of the implications of the term; and that, as we had been given to understand that the Japanese would not object if we used phraseology contained in a recent speech by the Secretary, we had in our draft of May 31 substituted such phraseology. Mr. Hamilton said that we would make note of the question of a possible change in the draft.

With reference to Section VI, Mr. Wakasugi offered an alternate draft, which includes an additional paragraph. The formulae of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows:

Formula in Our Draft of May 31 Formula Proposed by Japanese
The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned. The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.
The Government of Japan declares that it has no intention to establish military bases within the area of the Western Hemisphere nor to entertain any political designs therein. Similarly, the Government of the United States declares that it has no intention to establish military [Page 464] bases in East Asia or in the Southwestern Pacific area; nor to entertain any political designs therein. The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States mutually recognize the defensive position each maintains respectively in the East Asia area and in the Western Hemisphere.

Their objections to the wording of our draft were that they thought the phraseology somewhat redundant and that they did not understand what we meant by the word “controlling”. They indicated a willingness to accept the word “basic” for “controlling” after Mr. Hamilton had endeavored to explain. There was no discussion of the second paragraph other than a statement by the Japanese that they would be willing to have the contents embodied in an annex. Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of the proposal.

Mr. Wakasugi said that they desired to offer no changes with respect to Section VII, but they desired the inclusion of an annex on the part of the Government of Japan reading as follows:

Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Japanese Government

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of the United States will accord in the Philippine Islands to the Japanese subjects a non-discriminatory treatment.

Mr. Matsudaira said that what they had in mind in this point was to provide for non-discrimination in matters both of Japanese immigration and establishment. Mr. Hamilton observed that the quota system in the Philippine Immigration Law was on a non-discriminatory basis. Mr. Matsudaira admitted this, but indicated a desire for a larger quota.

There was no further discussion. Mr. Hamilton said that we would report to the Secretary and it was agreed that Mr. Matsudaira and Mr. Ballantine would keep in touch as to the next step.

J[oseph] W. B[allantine]
[Annex]

Addendum to Memorandum of Conversation of June 4, 1941

The texts of Japanese proposed revisions as given in the memorandum of conversation of June 4 were copied from papers which were handed to Mr. Ballantine. In most cases Mr. Ballantine was allowed to keep the paper, but in a few cases the paper was returned after copy had been made. The papers which were left with Mr. Ballantine are attached.39a

  1. Kaname Wakasugi, Japanese Minister-Counselor.
  2. Koto Matsudaira, Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Not printed.