711.94/213315/18
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary’s apartment at 8:30 by appointment made at the Ambassador’s request.
The Secretary said that he had gathered … that the Japanese Ambassador was under an impression that the Secretary had said something to someone of a nature indicative that in the Secretary’s opinion Mr. Matsuoka did not carry much weight in the Japanese Government. The Secretary stated that he had not said anything of this kind to anyone.
The Ambassador commented that under the Japanese constitutional system other ministers in addition to the Foreign Minister are consulted in matters relating to foreign policy.
The Secretary said that in his consideration of the matters we have been exploring a difficulty has been presented by questions involving the relations of our respective countries toward the European war. Mr. Matsuoka since his return from Europe, according to reports widely published in the press, has been making declarations on every occasion in regard to Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the matter of supporting Germany in the event of American entry into the war. He said that, if we went into an agreement with Japan, critics would assert, unless the Japanese Government could clarify its attitude toward its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the event that the United States should be drawn into the European war through action in the line of self-defense, that there was no assurance as to Japan’s position. The Secretary referred to the President’s speech of the previous evening35 and reviewed what the Secretary had previously said publicly and also to the Ambassador in regard to the attitude of this country toward maintaining the freedom of the seas against Hitler as an essential measure of self-defense.
The Ambassador replied that he had known Mr. Matsuoka for many years, that Matsuoka was given to talking a great deal for domestic consumption in Japan, but that the Ambassador was convinced that Matsuoka desired only friendly relations with the United [Page 441] States. The Ambassador said that in his personal opinion there would be no war between Japan and the United States, as he felt that once the proposed agreement was concluded it would have a profound effect upon Japanese psychology which would cause a weakening in the influence of the jingoes. He added that the Japanese people were heartily sick of the idea of an economic bloc and desired to return to the spirit of the Meiji restoration in which their horizon had been broadened to intercourse and trade with the whole world. He said that the American embargoes had made the Japanese feel that there was no alternative at present to seeking an economic bloc, but they were feeling the pinch of a restricted economy and would welcome a resumption of normal trade.
The Secretary said he felt sure that the Ambassador and many of his associates were sincere in their desire to have friendly relations, but he suggested that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could offer something by way of clarification on the points which the Secretary had raised.
The Ambassador replied that he doubted very much whether the Japanese Government would be willing to add anything to what it already proposed saying, as the Japanese Government would be placed in a very difficult position vis-à-vis Germany and Italy and there would also be domestic difficulties from the pro-Axis group in Japan. The Ambassador added, however, that the Japanese Government would make its own independent decision and would not be dictated to by Germany and Italy in the matter of interpreting Japan’s obligations under the Alliance.
The Secretary then brought up the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and asked the Ambassador to indicate what the Japanese Government had in mind.
The Ambassador said that this was a matter concerning which he could not say precisely what the Japanese army had in mind but would be dealt with in direct negotiations between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments. The Ambassador said he was of the personal opinion that negotiations over this matter might be protracted—say, over a period of six months—and that after that a period of two years would be required before complete evacuation would be effected.
The Ambassador indicated, in reply to specific questions, that such evacuation would not include troops retained in China under the provision of cooperative defense against communistic activities. He contemplated an arrangement being negotiated with China similar to the Boxer Protocol36 under which Japanese troops would be stationed for an indefinite period in north China and Inner Mongolia. The Ambassador said he could not indicate approximately how many [Page 442] troops it was proposed to station in China under such an arrangement or define precisely the areas in which the arrangement would be operative.
The Secretary commented that it seemed to him important that relations between China and Japan should be adjusted on a basis which would offer permanent promise of friendship between the two countries; that the continued presence of Japanese troops in China would be a factor operating against such friendship, as the presence of these troops tended to produce incidents and friction; and that we had found from our experience in our relations with Latin American countries that a policy of sending troops to settle claims did not pay. The Secretary then outlined briefly the arrangements which have been set up for the adjustment through peaceful means of claims and disputes among the American countries to replace former practices. He said he thought that Japan would find that similar arrangements as between Japan and China would be a progressive step, as the sending to and stationing in China of Japanese troops would not be profitable in the long run to Japan or China. He asked whether the Japanese Government would not consider some other means of dealing with the problems under reference than by arrangements such as seemed to be under contemplation for the stationing of troops.
The Ambassador said that he personally agreed with the Secretary’s view that the stationing of troops was productive of incidents and difficulties, but that he did not think that the Far East had progressed to a point where it would be feasible at present to carry out a program such as the Secretary suggested. He said that when Prince Konoe came out with his statement of principles two years ago he was bitterly criticized in Japan for such moderation in the face of the sacrifices that Japan had made. Now, however, the Japanese public after four years of fighting had come to accept Prince Konoe’s plan, and a suggestion of further modification in the direction of moderation would present difficulties to the Japanese Government.
The Secretary said that in connection with the question of a possible approach by this Government to the Chinese Government he had it in mind, before entering into any negotiations, talking over in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals under discussion. In the meantime, our conversations would continue, as they had so far on a purely unofficial and informal basis. He explained that he was raising this question in regard to the question of Japanese troops only because our conversations were in this unofficial and informal exploratory stage and that he would not have otherwise brought the question up.
[Page 443]The Ambassador said that he did not expect that the American Government would negotiate this question with the Chinese Government but would merely serve as a bridge to bring the Chinese and Japanese together into direct negotiations. He cited as examples of such action American good offices in connection with the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations of 1895 and the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations of 1905.
In reply to the Secretary’s question as to how the Chinese Government would be likely to react to such a proposal as the one in regard to stationing of troops for cooperative defense against communistic activities, the Ambassador said that in his opinion the Chinese Government had become very much weakened as a result of the continued hostilities, that they had lost so much equipment that a Japanese force was a match for a Chinese force twenty times as numerous. He thought that Russian aid was now practically limited to that accorded the Chinese Communists; that British aid was negligible; that the only thing that was now sustaining Chiang Kai-shek was reliance upon American aid; and that, if the United States should discontinue its aid, China would be forced to come to terms with Japan on this matter. The Ambassador added further that Chiang Kai-shek was riding on two horses—the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang; that the only factor which kept the two horses together was Japanese pressure; and that in this situation Chiang Kai-shek would find it very difficult to continue the conflict.
The Secretary repeated that these two points which he had brought out presented difficulties to us and he asked whether the Japanese Government could not give them further consideration. The Ambassador replied that, if he should ask his Government for further instructions in regard to the point about relations of Japan and the United States to the European war, the Japanese Government would probably be unwilling to give any further clarification. He made no definite statement as to further consideration by the Japanese Government of the other point in regard to the question of Japanese troops in China, but said that he would consult further with Colonel Iwakuro. The Secretary said that he also would give further thought to these matters.
As the Japanese Ambassador was leaving the Secretary reiterated the points mentioned by him above that before entering into any negotiations he had in mind to talk over the China matter with the Chinese Government and that in the meantime our conversations would continue on ah entirely informal and unofficial basis. He repeated also that it was only because these conversations were of an informal and unofficial character that he had discussed in this way the question of Japanese troops in China.
- Radio address of President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, printed in Department of State, Bulletin, May 31, 1941 (vol. iv, No. 101), p. 647.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1901, appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.↩