Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/2651½

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[Washington,] May 19, 1942.

ACCOUNT OF INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, 1941

Introductory

As the year 1941 opened, a vast movement of political forces throughout the world was intensely active. The Axis grouping among Germany, Italy and Japan had been formalized in September 1940 by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.¹ The anti-Axis grouping was not organized. In all countries not at the moment engaged in the hostilities in Europe, there was great rivalry and struggle between opposing groups which in some countries sought to escape, if possible, involvement in that war and which in other countries sought to cast their national fortunes with one side or the other of the conflict in Europe.

The Soviet Union was not at that time actively engaged in the European war on either side. It had, on August 23, 1939, concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany and, on the basis of an exchange of letters between the respective Foreign Ministers on September 28, 1939, had subsequently entered into close economic relations with Germany, whereby in addition to a substantial exchange of supplies carried on between Germany and the Soviet Union there was a considerable transit trade both ways through Russian territory between Germany and the Far East. In this transit trade supplies destined for Germany were assembled by a large German purchasing organization functioning throughout the Far East with at least benevolent Japanese acquiescence. Despite these political and economic arrangements, basic elements of enmity on the part of Germany toward the Soviet Union remained unaffected.

The Soviet Union was also talking with Japan. A political treaty to ease tension between those countries had long been under negotiation and was still under consideration. Russian railways continued carrying German machines and supplies to Manchuria—much of this cargo being en route to Japan—and Manchurian and Japanese products to Germany.

Italy was suffering severe military losses in Albania and Libya. Germany was vigorously engaged in preparing for a new offensive. These preparations were partly devoted to intensive political and diplomatic activity in the Balkans. Bulgaria and Rumania were brought into the Nazi fold. Germany’s efforts to increase its influence in Turkey and particularly in Japan continued at an accelerating pace.

Germany’s vast military machine, which included powerful land and air forces built up over a period of years, was intact after riding rough-shod over the greater part of the continent of Europe.

The entire Japanese nation was aware of what its leaders called a “golden opportunity” (resulting from inadequate preparation for defense, confusion and preoccupation on the part of the western “democracies” with the war in Europe and with domestic issues) to fulfill the nation’s desire for expansion. Japan was however, faced with a great internal struggle in regard to methods for taking advantage of the opportunities presented—some groups were insisting that Japan keep out of the war in Europe and gather all possible benefits obtainable by trade and by negotiations and threats short of participation in that war; other groups were determined to strike with force if necessary even at the risk of throwing together the war in China and the war in Europe. The Japanese people were psychologically tired after three and one-half years of war in China. They were being continually told that the Japanese Cabinet had as its primary objective the termination of the “China incident” and the prevention of the spread of the European war to the Far East. Despite diplomatic conversations with Russia, large Japanese forces were maintained in Manchuria. Long lines of communication made further penetration into China by Japanese forces costly. Japan was also faced by growing American aid to China. (On November 30, 1940 it was announced at Washington that the Export-Import Bank would loan $50,000,000 to the Chinese Government and that a fund of $50,000,000 to stabilize Chinese currency was under contemplation.) Although Japan’s long efforts had succeeded in rationalizing Japan’s heavy industry and in expanding tremendously the output of munitions, Japan’s economy was feeling the pinch of restrictions on exports from the United States and other countries. By the early part of 1941, shipments from the United States to Japan of iron, steel, most important metals, machinery, high quality gasoline and blending agents, and plants and plans for the production of high quality gasoline had practically ceased. The tension between the United States and Japan was growing and was affording fuel to the arguments between opposing groups in Japan. Japanese diplomats were beginning attempts to follow in the Far East Germany’s pattern in the Balkans and to “Bulgarize” Indochina, Thailand, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The British Empire was desperately engaged in efforts (political, diplomatic, and military) to prepare to meet new military offensives which threatened to break out in any one or several of a number of areas stretching from the British Isles around the world to Australia. At the same time the British Empire was struggling with the momentous problem of bringing to maximum effectiveness its organization of a war economy and expansion of war industries while Great Britain was digging out of the wreckage of German bombing raids on British cities.

China, weakened by the ravages of three and one-half years of military invasion and depredation, was continuing heroically to hold off Japan. China however was confronted with mounting problems of supply and the difficulties of growing inflation. China had been robbed of its great cities and cut off from all normal communication routes with the rest of the world. The prospects of additional aid from Russia were not encouraging, and, after the Japanese move into northern Indochina in the summer of 1940, the Burma Road remained practically the only route available for bringing in sea-borne supplies (except for a precarious smuggling traffic between the occupied and unoccupied areas of China). The amounts of supplies which could be transported by the Burma Road were limited. Moreover, the Burma Road was exposed to Japanese air attack, and there was also the danger that in case Germany should break through in the Near East Japan might take advantage of the situation to advance southward to make contact with the Germans by way of the Indian Ocean and to close the Burma route into China altogether.

The Netherlands East Indies were feeling increasing pressure from Japanese diplomacy to force the Indies to “cooperate” with Japan as Indochina, following negotiations between Japan and Vichy, had agreed to do.

The potential threat from Japan which had continued to grow was forcing all other powers interested in the Pacific to undertake to whatever degree possible reinforcement of their defensive strength in that area. The Netherlands, British Malaya, Burma, India, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, all were feeling keenly the need for more airplanes, more ships, more guns, more ammunition and more of every kind of supplies necessary for defense. The vast scope of this need, combined with other factors, made it necessary to spread dangerously thin the military forces and supplies which those countries were able to provide or obtain. At the same time the heavy need for supplies for Great Britain, for Near Eastern and Mediterranean areas, and for countries of this hemisphere, continued to place greater demands upon the industrial facilities of the United States than could then be met.

The world picture at the opening of 1941 would not be complete without reference to the theater of war in the north Atlantic, where the Germans with a large fleet of submarines and long-range bombers were taking a toll of ships and materials which at the moment were almost impossible to replace. There was at that time a noticeable inadequacy of available shipping to bridge the gap between American factories and the European front.

Another of the important factors in the situation was the information which early in 1941 had come to the knowledge of the Government from reliable and confidential sources that Germany had decided to attack Russia. This Government communicated this information confidentially to the Soviet Ambassador.

The United States had passed through a Presidential election in connection with which both of the great political parties wrote into their respective platforms unequivocal resolutions against involving the United States in foreign wars. The nation was only beginning to put into effect an expanding program of national defense and of aid to the democracies. Industrial plants were continuing to make peacetime goods, although construction of new defense industries and expansion of existing defense plants were under way. Labor disputes were on the increase. The problem of national security, however, was beginning to emerge as a major preoccupation of the United States and there were signs of a growing feeling that our security was inseparable from the security of all free peoples.

The acuteness of the situation in Europe, the constantly growing danger in the Far East, the vast expanse of territory to be defended, the necessity of supplying materials for defense of this hemisphere, of the British Isles, of the Near East and of the Far East, the need for expanding tremendously our output of materials necessary for defense for ourselves and for our friends, the generally divided attitude of the American public toward the world situation, the inadequacy of American production, and growing realization of the far-reaching consequences to the whole world which would follow the extension of the European war and of the hostilities in China to the entire Pacific area and of the importance of averting if possible such a development—all these constituted significant and inescapable factors in the situation which confronted the United States in January 1941.

I. Preliminary Phase

1. Late in January 1941, through the medium of private Americans and Japanese, there was informally brought to the attention of the President and the Secretary of State a suggestion that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward China. It was represented that if an agreement could be achieved with the United States which would offer Japan security this would enable the moderate elements in Japan to gain control of the domestic political situation in Japan. It was further represented that there was adequate support in the Japanese Government for an agreement with the United States which would provide inter alia for practical nullification of Japan’s alliance with the Axis and for a settlement of the conflict between China and Japan on terms which would give complete recognition by Japan of the “open door” in China provided that Japan received similar treatment elsewhere in the Far East. It was also represented that the Japanese people were weary of the hostilities with China and that most elements in Japan were prepared for a recasting of Japan’s policies along liberal and peaceful lines.

2. Under any circumstances it would have been necessary before entertaining representations of such a character to proceed with caution and to examine with deliberate care the sponsorship and contents of a proposal advanced in this way. Such a procedure was at that time especially essential in view of Japan’s record during the preceding ten years. In connection with this record, it will be recalled that on January 15, 1941, the Secretary of State, in a statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, said:

“… The equilibrium in the Far East which had been established by the Washington Conference treaties of 1921–1922² became seriously disturbed by the setting up by forceful means in a part of China of a regime under Japanese control under the name of ‘Manchukuo’. This control over Manchuria has been marked by the carrying out of a policy of discrimination which has resulted in forcing out American and other foreign interests.

“During the years that followed, Japan went steadily forward in her preparations for expansion by force of arms. In December 1934,³ she gave notice of her intention to terminate the naval treaty of February 6, 1922.⁴ She then proceeded with intensified construction of military and naval armaments, at the same time undertaking, from time to time, limited actions directed toward an extension of her domination over China and involving disregard and destruction of the lawful rights and interests of other countries, including the United States.

“In July, 1937, the armed forces of Japan embarked upon large-scale military operations against China. Invading forces of more than a million men occupied large areas along the seaboard and in the central provinces. In these areas there were set up puppet regimes which instituted systems of controls and monopolies discriminatory in favor of the interests of the invading country.

“It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region.

“Previous experience and current developments indicate that the proposed ‘new order’ in the Pacific area means, politically, domination by one country. It means, economically, employment of the resources of the area concerned for the benefit of that country and to the ultimate impoverishment of other parts of the area and exclusion of the interests of other countries. It means, socially, the destruction of personal liberties and the reduction of the conquered peoples to the role of inferiors.

“It should be manifest to every person that such a program for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country of nearly one-half of the population of the world is a matter of immense significance, importance and concern to every other nation wherever located.

“Notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, this Government has made repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that her best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We have at no time made any threats.”

3. The trend of contemporary developments in the Far East was such as to discourage belief that the time was opportune for acting upon the suggestion which had been brought to the attention of this Government. For example, in his address before the Japanese Diet on January 21, Mr. Matsuoka, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made clear, in effect, that he sought from the United States realization of the vital concern to Japan of the establishment of an East Asia “co-prosperity sphere”, assent to Japan’s supremacy in the western Pacific, and cessation of economic restrictions against Japan. He and other Japanese spokesmen were to an increasing extent openly stressing the point that the Tripartite Alliance was the pivot of Japan’s foreign policy. Other evidence of growing Japanese intransigence was discernible in their increasing pressure upon Indochina to grant Japan military and naval bases and other new privileges, and in reports of extensive political intrigue by Japanese agents in Thailand. In the light of this situation and of Japan’s long previous record of aggression, the initial reaction in this Government to the suggestion that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward China was one of caution. At the same time, the sponsors of the suggestion insistently represented that the proposal was acceptable to high Japanese official circles and could be made effective in Japan.

It was felt that before coming to any decision regarding the approach which had been made it would be desirable to await the arrival of the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura. He presented his credentials to the President on February 14, and on March 8 the Secretary of State had his first extended conversation with the Ambassador. On that occasion the Secretary pointed out that the efforts of this Government to bring about organization of the world along liberal commercial lines had been impeded by movements of military conquest in various parts of the world and—having in mind press reports that had contained hints—he expressed the hope that the Ambassador might have something definite in mind that would offer a practical approach to dealing with the present course of his Government.

The Ambassador expressed his wholehearted approval of this Government’s efforts to liberalize international commercial relations and affirmed the desire of the Japanese Government to reach a peaceful settlement with China and to reestablish friendly relations with the United States. He offered no concrete suggestions for dealing with the Chinese question or for conducting discussions with this Government in regard to matters calling for settlement. Nor did he indicate what his Government was prepared to do to clarify its attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance to which the Secretary called attention. With regard to his Government’s present course he said he had nothing to offer other than to disclaim that Japan was committed to courses of conquest.

4. On April 9 there was received by the Secretary of State from the private persons referred to above a document containing a draft of a proposal for a general settlement in the Pacific area. This proposal, although reflecting an attitude less liberal in some respects than the earlier representations had forecast, contained many suggestions with which this Government could readily agree and other suggestions which would require modification or elimination to meet this Government’s point of view. On April 14 the Secretary, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, referred to reports which had been coming to the Secretary that certain Japanese had been formulating proposals for improving relations between the United States and Japan and that the Ambassador had been participating in the formulating of those proposals, and said that he did not know whether those reports were accurate but that it would of course be understood that in considering problems outstanding between our two Governments we could deal only with the Ambassador. The Ambassador promptly replied that he had known about the proposals in question and stated that he had collaborated in the later stages of their preparation. He emphasized his desire to preserve peace between the two countries and his belief that his Government did not intend to invade the southwest Pacific area.

5. On April 16 the Secretary of State, in a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, after referring to the proposals of April 9, said that the one paramount preliminary question about which this Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to go forward along the lines of the proposal, to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force, and to adopt four principles which this Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest and which the Secretary of State enumerated as follows:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;

(2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(3) Support of the principle of equally including equality of commercial opportunity;

(4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

The Secretary of State expressed to the Japanese Ambassador the willingness of this Government to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with the principles which the Secretary of State had enumerated. He also expressed the view that if the Japanese Government should earnestly intend to change its course there should be no reason why a reasonably satisfactory settlement of the problems presented might not be reached.

During this conversation the Ambassador replied to the effect that he believed that his Government desired peace, that he wished to discuss the questions raised by the Secretary of State, and that he would proceed to consult his Government in regard to the four points which the Secretary of State had laid before him.

II. Consideration of the Japanese proposal of May 12 and Interruption of Conversations Following the Movement of Japanese Troops Into Indochina

6. The presentation on May 12 by the Japanese Ambassador, as under instruction from his Government, of a document containing a proposal for a general setttlement between the two Governments served to reveal authoritatively for the first time what the Japanese Government had in mind as a basis for an agreement. The Ambassador introduced at this time as his associates Colonel Hideo Iwakuro, a representative of the Japanese Army, and Mr. Tadao Wikawa, an officer of the Cooperative Bank of Japan, who was spoken of as being close to the most influential civilian group in the Japanese Government. These two advisers took part in the subsequent conversations until those conversations were interrupted in July.

The document which the Japanese Ambassador presented on May 12 appeared to carry out a concept of a joint overlordship by Japan and the United States of the Pacific area, with apparently little thought for the rights and interests of countries other than Japan and the United States. The first two sections of the document, which were introductory and general in character, contained affirmations in abstract terms of peaceful intent and of a purpose to promote international cooperation. In reference to Japan’s position with regard to its alliance with the Axis, the proposal contained a statement, which, in no way indicating any purpose on Japan’s part of loosening its ties with the Axis, was a restatement of Japan’s previously proclaimed position that its alliance with the Axis powers was designed to prevent the nations which were not then directly affected by the European war from engaging in that war (thus clearly implying a concept of coercing the United States for Axis purposes).

The proposal also included an undertaking on the part of the United States to request that the Government of China negotiate with Japan a settlement of the hostilities in China; a mutual undertaking by the United States and Japan that each would supply so far as possible commodities which the other required; a mutual undertaking that steps would be taken to bring about resumption of normal trade relations between the United States and Japan; and an undertaking by the United States that, Japan’s expansion in the southwestern Pacific being declared to be of a peaceful nature, the United States would cooperate in facilitating the production and procurement by Japan of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) which Japan needed. In connection with the undertaking on the part of the United States to request that China negotiate with Japan it was explained separately by the Japanese that the United States would be expected also to agree to discontinue aid to the National Government of the Republic of China in case the latter should decline to enter into such negotiations. The terms which Japan intended to propose to China were indicated only through reference to the “Konoe principles”.

(It was separately explained that the “Konoe principles” included “neighborly friendship”, “joint defense against Communism” and “economic cooperation”; and those principles were said to imply also mutual respect for sovereignty and territories, withdrawal of Japanese troops from China in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China, acceptance of the principles of no annexation and no indemnities, and recognition of the independence of “Manchukuo”.)⁵

In as much as the “Konoe principles” had been made the basis of a so-called treaty between Japan and the Wang Ching-wei régime in November 1940⁶ which had placed Japan clearly in a position of overlordship with respect to the Wang régime, the Secretary of State sought to induce the Japanese to state precisely the terms which they had in mind as a basis of Japan’s negotiations with China, but the Japanese Ambassador and his associates consistently avoided making definite commitments by constant resort to vague generalities. (In the course of conversations with officers of the Department, the special military adviser of the Japanese Ambassador explained that the areas where stationing of Japanese troops in China was contemplated under the provision for “defense against communistic activities through collaboration of the two countries [China and Japan]” included Inner Mongolia and the adjacent regions of China proper, comprehending lines of communication to the sea as far south as Tsingtao, which thus meant Japanese military domination of the five northern provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan with an aggregate area of more than 400,000 square miles and an estimated population of more than 80,000,000. The military adviser declared that this stationing of Japanese troops in China was an absolute condition of any settlement with China.)

Notwithstanding the features in the Japanese draft above noted which presented difficulties for this Government, the Japanese proposal appeared to offer possibilities as a basis for informal and exploratory discussions looking to a broad-gauge settlement of Pacific problems along the lines envisaged by this Government. Moreover, many highly placed Japanese, including the Prime Minister, in conversations with the American Ambassador at Tokyo, professed a belief that Japan’s best interests lay in adopting courses of peace and of cooperation with this country. It was represented that an agreement with the United States would give such a psychological “lift” to the Japanese people that there would be an assurance of popular support in Japan of programs of peace.

7. This Government’s attitude toward these representations was influenced by considerations of the world situation, as already summarized in the opening pages of this review, and of the defensive strategical position of this country and other similarly-minded countries. Great Britain, hard pressed by Germany, was in need of all the assistance that the United States could render in the Atlantic and Near Eastern theaters of war. With Great Britain and the United States thus preoccupied, and with the Netherlands Indies, Australia, and other British territories in East Asia, including Malaya, Burma, and North Borneo, extremely vulnerable to Japanese attack, it was obviously desirable to avert, or at least to delay as long as possible, any Japanese move which would result in a war on two oceans. It was of course realized that Japanese armed attack on British and Dutch territories in the Far East would immediately and tremendously increase the problems confronting the British, the Dutch, the Chinese and ourselves. In fact, the British, the Australian, and the Netherlands Governments continued to urge upon this Government their unpreparedness for resisting successfully a Japanese thrust in the Pacific. This Government was impressed not only by these representations but also by the consideration that the hope of defeating Hitlerism in Europe would be greatly enhanced if the more conservative elements in Japan should succeed in what was represented as their effort to divert Japan from courses of conquest and to cause Japan to withdraw—even though gradually—from the Axis camp and align itself with the United States. Accordingly, this Government decided to explore thoroughly every possible means, starting with the Japanese proposals, of coming to an agreement. In reaching this decision this Government, while realizing that the prospects of success were slender, was actuated by a sincere desire to reach an agreement if possible and thus act in accordance with the traditional desire of the American people that all peaceful means for settling differences be employed.

The Secretary of State on numerous occasions emphasized to the Japanese Ambassador that this Government was aware of the difficult internal situation which the Japanese Government faced and was prepared to be patient and to give the Japanese Government ample time to bring Japanese public opinion into line in support of a liberal broad-gauge program such as the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador had been discussing in their conversations. The Secretary of State realized thoroughly that Japan’s record since 1931 made it clear that there was only a slight chance that Japan would or could change its course so as to make possible an agreement. After weighing all factors in the world situation, however, it seemed wise fully to explore that chance, at the same time adhering firmly to the attitude which this Government was taking of opposition to the course of aggression which Japan was pursuing.

8. On May 20, 1941, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, the Secretary of State stated that there were two points in regard to the section of the Japanese proposal dealing with China to which he would like to call attention. One was in regard to the joint defense against communism and the other was in regard to the stationing of Japanese troops in certain parts of Chinese territory. He said that he was not discussing the merits of the two points to which he referred but he felt that if and when this Government should approach Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the matter of negotiating with Japan the Secretary of State would have to tell Generalissimo Chiang the basis on which Japan would propose to negotiate; and that this basis should be one on which Generalissimo Chiang could carry his country with him. He therefore wished to ask whether it would not be possible to cover these two points under some broader provision, such as a provision which would call for special measures of protection for Japanese nationals and property interests against lawlessness in areas where special measures for safeguarding the rights and interests of nationals of third powers might be necessary.

The Japanese in reply expressed surprise that these points should have been mentioned in as much as they regarded the settlement of the China affair as a matter which concerned only China and Japan.

The Secretary of State pointed out in this and other conversations that a peaceful settlement between Japan and China was an essential element in furthering the objective which the United States and Japan had in mind, namely, the peace of the Pacific. He added that if the United States should suggest that China enter into negotiations with Japan this Government could not divest itself of a certain degree of responsibility with regard to the basis of the proposed negotiations and the general conformity of Japan’s proposed terms with principles which this Government supports.

9. On May 28 in response to questions asked by the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador indicated that withdrawal of Japanese troops from China would not include Japanese troops retained in China for “cooperative defense against Communism”, and that he was unable to state how many troops Japan would propose retaining or to define the precise areas in which the troops would be stationed. The Secretary thereupon commented that it seemed to him important that relations between China and Japan should be adjusted on a basis which would offer permanent promise of friendship between the two countries; and that the continued presence of Japanese troops in China would be a factor operating against such friendship. He asked whether the Japanese Government would not consider some other means of dealing with the problem than by arrangements such as Japan appeared to be contemplating. The Japanese Ambassador said that he did not believe that the Far East had progressed to a point where other arrangements would be feasible.

In this conversation of May 28, the Secretary of State mentioned that in connection with the question of a possible approach by this Government to the Chinese Government he had it in mind, before entering into any negotiations with Japan, to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals under discussion. He added that in the meantime conversations between the United States and Japan would continue on a purely informal and exploratory basis. This Government’s attitude in regard to this subject was repeatedly presented to the Japanese Government on subsequent occasions.

The Secretary of State also on May 28 made it clear that the Japanese proposed formula with reference to Japanese relations to the Axis did not adequately clarify Japan’s peaceful intention toward the United States should the United States through acts of self-defense become involved in war with Germany. He emphasized that such clarification was needed especially to offset statements being made by Japanese officials in defense or justification of Japan’s Axis obligations. He said that the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka, since his return from Europe, had, according to widely published press reports, been making declarations on all occasions in regard to Japan’s obligation under the Tripartite Alliance to support Germany in the event of American entry into the war in Europe. He said that, if we made an agreement with Japan, critics would, unless the Japanese Government had clarified its attitude toward its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance, assert that there was no assurance as to Japan’s position vis-à-vis the United States.

10. In a conversation on June 2 the Secretary of State asked the Japanese Ambassador whether Japan seriously and earnestly desired to enter into a settlement for peace and non-discriminatory commercial relations and friendship in the Pacific area. When the Ambassador replied in the affirmative, the Secretary remarked that, in the light of the statements which Mr. Matsuoka and others were constantly making, one was forced to inquire whether Japan really was seeking this sort of settlement or was only seeking a way to extricate itself from the hostilities with China while otherwise going forward with methods and practices entirely contrary to the principles which would have to underlie any settlement establishing peace, non-discriminatory treatment of commerce and fair and friendly relations in the Pacific area.

The Ambassador reiterated his view that a fair settlement was desired. In reply to an inquiry from the Secretary of State about the Japanese policy with regard to the stationing of troops in China indefinitely, the Ambassador offered no encouraging comment.

The question of what Japan meant by “economic cooperation” between China and Japan was also discussed. Japan at first disclaimed any intention to maintain for itself an economic monopoly in China, but as the informal conversations proceeded it was evident that Japan intended to retain a preferred economic position for itself in China while at the same time trying to obtain for itself in the southwestern Pacific area economic rights such as it was unwilling that third powers should enjoy in China. The Secretary of State made it clear that retention by Japan of a preferred position in China would be inconsistent with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to which this Government was committed, which it believed to be essential for a lasting peace in the Pacific, and which the Japanese had said they approved.

11. Throughout the conversations this Government’s attitude was repeatedly set forth with regard to these points—the necessity of Japan’s making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of non-discrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific; and assurance of Japan’s peaceful intent in the Pacific. The Secretary of State emphasized that what he was seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace and that he was not interested in an agreement of a temporizing character which would not contain promise for future stability along sound progressive lines.

12. Following a conference on June 4 between officers of the Department and associates of the Japanese Ambassador which revealed on the part of Japan an even more grudging attitude than had heretofore been manifested toward clear-cut commitments on courses of peace, the Secretary of State on June 6 informed the Japanese Ambassador that he had received an impression, from the successive Japanese revisions of their proposal and from recent manifestations of the Japanese Government’s attitude, that the Japanese Government was disposed (1) to stress Japan’s alignment with the Axis; (2) to avoid giving a clear indication of an intention to place Japan’s relations with China on a basis which, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, would contribute to a lasting peace and thus to future stability in the Far East; and (3) to veer away from clear-cut commitments in regard to policies of peace and of nondiscriminatory treatment which were the fundamentals of a sound basis for peace in the Pacific.

13. The Japanese Ambassador continued to insist that the Japanese Government really desired peace and kept urging the Secretary of State to make a complete reply to the Japanese proposals of May 12. Consequently, on June 21, the Secretary handed the Ambassador a document which would, he explained, serve to bring the current discussions up to date as regarded the American attitude. This draft of June 21 included the following important points:

(a) Mutual declarations of the peaceful intent of both countries and their subscription to fundamental principles long advocated by this Government as the only sound basis for relations between nations;

(b) A suggested formula making clear that Japan was under no commitment to take action against the United States in the event that this country should be drawn through measures of self-defense into the war in Europe;

(c) Subject to the proviso that Japan communicate to the United States the general terms which Japan contemplated proposing to China, and subject to a further proviso that there should be additional discussion between Japan and the United States of these general terms, an agreement that the United States would suggest to China that China and Japan enter into negotiations;

(d) Mutual assurances by the two countries that each would supply to the other such commodities as were required by either and were available and that steps would be taken to resume normal trade relations between the two countries;

(e) Provision for cooperation between the two countries toward obtaining non-discriminatory access to supplies of natural resources which each needed—such cooperation to be given on the basis of mutual pledges that the activities of the two countries in the Pacific would be carried on by peaceful means and on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations; and

(f) A mutual affirmation by the two countries that the basic policy of each was one of peace throughout the Pacific area and a mutual disclaimer of territorial designs there.

14. In the period immediately following June 21 several discussions were held by the Secretary of State or other officials of this Government with the Japanese representatives. The Japanese representatives, while indicating that they were seeking to meet the point of view of the United States upon certain issues, did not indicate a willingness, either through accepting this Government’s formulas or otherwise, to alter in any substantial manner the attitude to which they had previously given expression upon the main questions.

Following an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, in which, according to an official announcement, “the fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided” Japan proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, including the calling up of from one to two million reservists and conscripts. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were suddenly recalled, a step which an important maritime nation such as Japan would not be likely to take without exceptionally strong reasons. Restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan, strict censorship of mails and communications was carried out. Conditions approaching those usual only in anticipation of embarking upon a major war were imposed throughout the Empire.

During this period the Japanese press dwelt constantly on the theme that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never equalled in all Japanese history. It charged the United States with an intention to establish military bases in Kamchatka and with using the Philippine Islands as a “pistol aimed at Japan’s heart”. It warned that if the United States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would face a final crisis. (Later, on August 8 and again on August 15, an official Japanese spokesman declared that encirclement of Japan by the ABCD powers—the United States, Great Britain, China and the Netherlands—was an actual fact. The Japanese press, while affirming its approval of efforts by the Japanese Government to improve relations with the United States, stressed that the basis for any negotiations must be predicated upon there being under no circumstances any change in Japan’s policies, namely, the “settlement of the China Incident, the firm establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Axis Alliance”.)

15. In July this Government began receiving reports that a Japanese military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. This Government brought these reports to the attention of the Japanese representatives, pointed out the inconsistency between such a military movement and the discussions which were then proceeding looking toward the conclusion of an agreement for peace in the Pacific, and requested information as to the facts of the situation.

On July 23, the Japanese Ambassador, apparently after having received instructions from his Government, stated in explanation of the Japanese movement into southern as well as northern Indochina first that Japan feared that vital supplies including rice, foodstuffs and raw materials from Indochina might be cut off by de Gaullist French agents and Chinese agitators in southern Indochina,^* and second that Japan believed that certain foreign powers were determined to encircle Japan militarily and that for that reason occupation of southern Indochina was undertaken purely as a precautionary measure. The Acting Secretary replied that any agreement which might have been concluded between the French Government at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from pressure exerted on Vichy by Germany; therefore, it was our judgment that this agreement could only be looked upon as offering assistance to Germany’s policy of world domination and conquest. He pointed out that the conclusion of the agreement which had been under discussion by the Secretary of State and the Ambassador would bring about a far greater measure of economic security to Japan than she could gain by occupation of Indochina. He said further that the policy of the United States was the opposite of an encirclement policy or of any policy which would be a threat to Japan; that Japan was not menaced by the policy of Great Britain and if an agreement had been concluded, Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, and the Netherlands would have joined the United States and Japan in support of the underlying principles stood for by the United States; that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that Japan intended to pursue a policy of force and conquest, and, as there was no basis apparent calling for filling Indochina with Japanese military and other forces as a measure for defending Japan, the United States must assume that Japan was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary said that in these circumstances the Secretary of State—with whom he had talked a few minutes before—could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been engaged.

On the following day, July 24, the Acting Secretary of State made a statement to the press^6a in regard to the situation in which statement he characterized the Japanese action in Indochina substantially as he had done in his statement of the previous day to the Japanese Ambassador; he pointed out also that these Japanese actions endangered the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions tended to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense program; and that the steps which Japan was taking endangered the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

16. As it became increasingly clear that Japanese movement into southern Indochina was in progress, the President, on July 24, 1941, orally made to the Japanese Ambassador for transmission to the Japanese Government a proposal that if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying French Indochina and establishing bases there with its military and naval forces—or, in case such steps had already actually been begun, would withdraw such forces—the President would seek to obtain from the British, the Chinese and the Netherlands Governments—and the United States would itself give—a solemn and binding declaration to regard French Indochina as a “neutralized” country, provided the Japanese Government would give a similar commitment. Such a declaration would imply that none of the Governments making the declaration would undertake any military act of aggression against French Indochina and that each of these Governments would refrain from exercising any military control within or over French Indochina. The President’s proposal also contemplated that the Government of the United States would endeavor to obtain from the other interested powers a guarantee that so long as the present emergency continued the local French authorities in Indochina would remain undisturbed in control of the territory. If these steps were taken, the President said, Japan would be given binding proof that no other power had any hostile designs on Indochina and that Japan would be afforded the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which—according to Japan’s accounts—Japan was seeking to secure. (On July 31 the Acting Secretary of State informed the Japanese Ambassador that the President desired to extend his proposal with regard to French Indochina to include Thailand as well.)

17. Large Japanese forces, however, soon were moved into southern Indochina. Japan’s constant expansion of her military position in the southwest Pacific had already substantially imperiled the security of the United States along with that of other powers. By this further expansion in southern Indochina Japan virtually completed the encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces within striking distance of vital trade routes. This constituted an overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other powers that were at peace with Japan. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. No sooner were Japanese military forces moved into southern Indochina than there began to appear evidence that there was in progress a vigorous under-cover movement of Japanese infiltration into Thailand. With Japan’s armed forces poised for further attacks, the possibility of averting armed conflict lay only in the bare chance that there might be reached some agreement which would cause Japan to abandon her policy and procedure of aggression. Under those circumstances and in the light of those considerations, the Government of the United States decided at that point, as did certain other governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with Japan had become an appropriate, warranted and necessary step—as an open warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense.

Thereafter no conversations were held on the subject of an agreement until in August the Japanese Government took a new initiative. On or about July 25, Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa returned to Japan.

18. On July 26, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order freezing Japanese assets in the United States.⁷ This Order brought under control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests were involved, and the effect of this was to bring about very soon the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

19. Just before the Japanese went into French Indochina with large forces late in July, the Japanese Government effected a reconstruction of the Cabinet, under which Admiral Toyoda took over from Mr. Matsuoka the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Matsuoka was relieved of office because he had lost the confidence of Prince Konoe and the dominant elements in Japanese political circles. Prince Konoe remained Prime Minister.

20. Thereafter the Japanese Prime Minister, the new Japanese Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States (Admiral Nomura) emphatically and repeatedly, both in Tokyo and in Washington, made protestations of Japan’s desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific problems. Notwithstanding these protestations of peaceful intent, the Japanese Government went on with mobilization in Japan and stationing of more and more armed forces in Manchuria, in Indochina, and in south China, and with the bombing of American property in China, including bursts (apparently deliberate) which damaged the American Embassy and the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking.⁸

III. Renewed Insistence by the Japanese Government Upon Its Peaceful Purposes—Resumption of Conversations

21. The Japanese Government did not reply to the President’s proposal of July 24 until August 6. On the latter date the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which he said was intended to be responsive to the President’s proposal.

This Japanese proposal provided inter alia for removal of restrictions which the United States had imposed upon trade with Japan, for the “suspension” of “its [the United States’] military measures in the southwest Pacific area”, and for the exercise of good offices by the United States for the initiation of direct negotiations between Japan and China. It provided also for withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina after a settlement should be reached between Japan and China, and called for recognition by the United States of Japan’s special position in Indochina even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Throughout the conversations, it had been specified or implied that the Japanese would expect that the American Government in the proposed exercise of its good offices between China and Japan should discontinue aid to China.

This proposal of August 6 entirely disregarded the President’s suggestion for the neutralization of Indochina; it asked inter alia either expressly or by implication that the United States (1) remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; (2) suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; (3) discontinue furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their Far Eastern possessions; (4) discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and (5) assent to Japan’s assertion and exercise of a special military position and a permanent preferential political and economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was committed. In return the Japanese Government offered not to station Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area.

This Government patiently analyzed and discussed with the Japanese representatives this limited and one-sided offer but adhered to its position that an agreement must be based upon broad-gauge liberal principles fair to all nations.

22. The Secretary of State on August 8 informed the Japanese Ambassador that the Japanese Government’s proposal was lacking in responsiveness to the suggestion made by the President. The Japanese Ambassador then inquired whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the two Governments to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views between the two Governments. The Secretary, first reviewing briefly the steps which had led to a discontinuance of the informal conversations, said that it remained for the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines which would make possible an adjustment of views.

23. Between August 8 and September 6 there took place various developments in consequence of which there was revived in the mind of the American Government a hope that there might be a possibility that the Japanese Government might yet be willing to adopt and to apply in practice a liberal progressive program in relation to the entire Pacific area. Among these developments were assurances which were given by the Japanese Government, such as the assurances contained in the Japanese Prime Minister’s message to the President delivered on August 28 (described in paragraph numbered 25 below), and evidence that the trend of the war in the eastern European theater where Russia had demonstrated a capacity for successful resistance against Germany must have thoroughly upset Axis calculations.

24. On August 17, the President returned to Washington from the Atlantic Conference at which he and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, had discussed among other problems the situation in the Far East. Mr. Churchill stated that the British Government fully supported the proposal made on July 24 by the President to the Japanese Government in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Indochina and informed the President of the British Government’s view that it needed more time to prepare for resistance against any Japanese attack in the Far East. This consideration applied also to the state of our defensive preparations in the Philippine Islands. The President and Mr. Churchill agreed that the American and the British Governments should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression. The President and Mr. Churchill agreed also that this Government should be prepared to continue its conversations with the Japanese Government and by such means to offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which Japan was engaged. Accordingly, the President on the day of his return handed to the Japanese Ambassador two documents. In one of these documents it was pointed out that the principles and policies under discussion in conversations between the two Governments precluded expansion by force or threat of force and that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, this Government would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United States. In the second document reference was made to the desire expressed earlier in August by the Japanese Government to resume conversations and to the Ambassador’s suggestion, advanced on August 8, that President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime Minister meet with a view to discussing means for an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan; and reaffirmation was made of this Government’s intention not to consider any proposals affecting the rights of either country except as such proposals might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed and of its intention to continue to follow its policy of aiding nations resisting aggression. It was pointed out that informal discussions with the Japanese Government relative to a peaceful settlement would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program involving the application to the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and other essential commodities; and that such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill and economic leadership toward building up the economies of each country and toward increasing the purchasing power and raising the standards of living of the nations and peoples concerned. The opinion was expressed that if Japan was seeking what it affirmed to be its objectives the program outlined was one that could be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program. The statement was made that, in case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States was committed, the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July, and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views. It was also stated that, before renewal of the conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present attitude and plans. If the Japanese Government continued its movement of force and conquest, “we could not,” the President said to the Ambassador, “think of reopening the conversations”.

25. On August 18 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs gave to Ambassador Grew an oral statement in which inter alia it was affirmed that the only way to prevent the present strained relations between the two countries from further deteriorating into a critical situation would be through a direct meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister and it was proposed that such a meeting be held at Honolulu. The Minister for Foreign Affairs urged upon the Ambassador the need of holding the proposal in strict secrecy on the ground that premature leakage of the fact of the proposal would result in the project being torpedoed by certain elements in Japan.

On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador handed to the President a message from the Japanese Prime Minister urging that a meeting be arranged between the heads of the two Governments to discuss all important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area. Accompanying that message was a statement of the Japanese Government in which there were given assurances with several qualifications of Japan’s peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan was seeking a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United States had long been committed. The qualifications were to the following effect: the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina “as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia”; Japan would take no military action against the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and did “not menace Japan or Manchukuo or undertake any action contrary to the spirit of the said Treaty”; the Japanese Government had no intention of using “without provocation” military force against any neighboring nation.

26. On September 3 the President gave the Japanese Ambassador replies to the message and the statement received from the Ambassador on August 28. In formulating his replies, the President could not overlook the attendant circumstances and developments, which have already been described. Because of these circumstances and developments, the President and his consultants felt that, to ensure any hope of the success of a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister, achievement of a prior meeting of minds on basic principles was a necessary condition precedent. Hence, the President in replying expressed a desire to collaborate with the Japanese Prime Minister to see whether there could be made effective in practice the program referred to by the Japanese Government in its message of August 28 and whether there could be reached a meeting of minds on fundamental principles which would make practicable a meeting such as the Japanese Prime Minister had proposed. It was pointed out that cognizance had to be taken of evidence of the existence in Japan of concepts which if dominant in that country would raise serious obstacles to successful collaboration between the heads of the two Governments. It was therefore suggested that it would seem highly desirable for precaution to be taken toward insuring that the proposed meeting if held, would prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussions of the fundamental and essential questions on which agreement was sought. It was further explained that the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would be inconsistent with the principles in which the American people—and the people of all nations which prefer peaceful methods to methods of force—believe. At no time, then or later, did the Government of the United States reject the Japanese proposal for a meeting; it strove hard to bring about a situation which would make the holding of such a meeting beneficial.

27. On September 4 the Chinese Ambassador called upon the Secretary of State and made inquiry about the reported conversations between this Government and the Japanese Government. The Secretary informed the Ambassador that exploratory conversations with the Japanese were taking place but that no common basis for negotiations had as yet been revealed. The Secretary repeated what he had told the Ambassador previously in May, namely, that this Government before considering negotiations with Japan affecting the situation in China would expect to discuss the entire subject with the Chinese Government and, he added, with the British, the Dutch and the Australian Governments as well. Furthermore, a few days later the American Ambassador at Chungking, under authorization from the Secretary of State, informed the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs of what the Secretary had already informed the Chinese Ambassador, as indicated above. The American Ambassador also stated, under authorization, that in this Government’s conversations with the Japanese relating to a general settlement of Pacific problems no consideration had been given or would be given to any sort of arrangement allowing for continuance of aggression in China and that this Government in the course which it had been and was pursuing in its relations with both Japan and China had no intention of sacrificing the fundamental principles and policies which this Government had long believed constituted the only sound basis for stable relations between nations; that it was not to be expected that those measures which this Government had taken with respect to Japan would be altered or discontinued until the situation which had prompted them had been altered or done away with; and that similarly this Government would continue its policy of aiding any nation resisting aggression, as this policy was based upon fundamental principles including the principle of self-defense and had been fully endorsed by the Congress.

28. Following the making of the President’s interim reply of September 3, the Japanese Ambassador on September 6 handed the Secretary of State a new draft of proposals which the Ambassador said he was presenting in consequence of his representations to his Government in regard to the desirability of reaching an agreement in principle on the fundamental questions involved before making arrangements for the meeting between the heads of the two Governments. The provisions put forward in the new draft were much narrower than might warrantably have been expected from the comparatively liberal assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28.

The Japanese draft of September 6 included a statement of Japan’s position with regard to the Tripartite Pact, containing the evasive formula “in case the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided”. As only the United States could be the judge of its self-defense, such a formula offered no assurance that Japan would not interpret its obligations under the Tripartite Pact as impelling it to attack the United States in the event of American involvement through acts of self-defense in war with Germany. The Japanese draft of September 6 included among other points a qualified undertaking that Japan would not “make any advancement from French Indochina against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason [underscoring added] resort to military action against any region South of Japan”. (The limitation “South of Japan” was suggestive.)

The Japanese Ambassador said definitely that he believed that these formulas regarding these two points represented the maximum which Japan could offer at the time. He continued, however, to emphasize Japan’s desire for peace in the Pacific and said that there was more between the lines than could be openly stated. The Japanese endeavored to impress upon representatives of this Government the urgent need of quick action but did not give indication of any intention on Japan’s part to accept the fundamental principles and provisions of peace and equity which alone could have made rapid progress possible.

The provisions in the Japanese draft of September 6 contained no commitment in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; they contained no assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China’s internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula contained in that draft that “so long as the economic activities of the United States are carried out on an equitable basis [under scoring added], such activities will not be restricted” clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted was to be a matter for decision by Japan.

While in the Japanese draft of September 6 Japan’s peaceful intentions were reaffirmed, the ominously significant qualifications in regard to a general basic settlement remained unaltered.

In what was apparently an effort to make the Japanese proposals appear more attractive, the Japanese Prime Minister in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo on September 6 indicated that the Japanese Government fully and definitely subscribed to the four principles which the Secretary of State had previously set forth as a basis for the reconstruction of relations with Japan: respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means. However, a month later the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to Ambassador Grew that, while these four points had been accepted “in principle”, certain adjustments would be necessary in applying these principles to actual conditions.

The adjustments which the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated would be necessary to apply to these principles would require that the Secretary of State, in order fully to evaluate the importance of the adjustments, estimate how far the military element in Japan would go toward the adoption of courses which would make an agreement with the United States possible. It is obvious that this Government could not disregard the close relationship between the political ascendancy of the army in Japan and Japan’s past and current courses of expansion by force, together with the relationship between expansionist Japan and expansionist Germany as formalized in the Tripartite Alliance, as already described; nor, in gauging the prospects of Prince Konoe’s being able to influence the military in the direction of policies of peace, could this Government overlook the Prince’s close association with the policies of the military elements at various past stages in the unfolding of Japan’s program of conquest in China. The military element in Japan had been embarked upon a course of aggression since 1931 and had become steadily more and more dominant in charting the course of Japan’s high policy. Prince Konoe had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China; he had proclaimed the basic principles which the Japanese Government presumably would insist upon in any peace agreement with China; the Japanese Government had shown in the “treaty” which Japan had concluded in November 1940 with the Japanese puppet regime at Nanking how it proposed to apply these principles. This “treaty” contained provisions that Japan should, “in order to carry out the defence against communistic activities through collaboration of the two countries, station required forces in specified areas of Mengchiang and of North China for the necessary duration”; that China should “recognize that Japan may, in accordance with previous practices or in order to preserve the common interests of the two countries, station for a required duration its naval units and vessels in specified areas within the territory of the Republic of China”; that “while considering the requirements of China, the Government of the Republic of China shall afford positive and full facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects” with respect to the utilization of resources.

The Japanese had at no time budged from or relaxed their insistence that the Chinese Government would have to accept the preferential position and arrangements for interference in China which Japan had provided for itself in the “treaty” with Wang Ching-wei.

The Government of the United States was fully aware that the leaders of the Japanese armed forces, in causing the Japanese spokesmen to maintain in the exploratory conversations with this Government a rigid attitude and position, were acting in the light of their knowledge or estimate of the internal situation in this country, of the state of comparative military unpreparedness of the United States and of other powers friendly to the United States and possessed of important interests in the Pacific area, and of the commitments of the United States and its friends elsewhere.

As already stated, the Japanese Government had urged that its suggestion of a meeting between the President and Prince Konoe be kept strictly secret—on the ground that premature disclosure would result in the plan being frustrated by elements in Japan hostile to any such move. If this was the true reason for the importance which the Japanese Government attached to secrecy, it would indicate, despite Japanese affirmations to the contrary, that there existed in Japan a substantial opposition to the making of efforts to achieve an improvement in relations with the United States.

Account also had to be taken of the psychological factors and complications, and of relations with other countries.

The very fact of a meeting being held by the President and the Japanese Prime Minister, following on the heels of a meeting between the President and the British Prime Minister, would cause China extreme disquietude.

If the proposed meeting accomplished no more than to give endorsement to general principles, the Japanese would then have been in position to use such endorsement by the United States in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place upon those principles in their subsequent application. The United States had had experience of such a procedure in the aftermath of the agreement into which Viscount Ishii had drawn the United States Government in the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes in 1917.^8a

If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the leaders of the Japanese armed forces would then have been in position to convince the Japanese people that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting and to strengthen public support for a program of all-out aggression.

There was no indication that there was any material difference in views as to fundamentals of national objectives between Prince Konoe and the Japanese generals and the admirals who were to proceed with him to the proposed meeting. (From a report by Ambassador Grew of a statement made to him on September 6 by the Japanese Prime Minister this Government learned of Prince Konoe’s intention to have certain high army and navy officers accompany him to the proposed meeting with the President.) There was nothing tangible on which to base an expectation that, at such a meeting, Japan’s spokesman (Prince Konoe) would be able to commit his country to other than broadly generalized and extensively qualified provisions of agreement.

There were cogent reasons for belief that unless the Japanese could be brought either before such a meeting or at such a meeting to the making of specific and substantially detailed pledges the only real effect of such an agreement as might conceivably be concluded would be to facilitate operations by Japan’s military leaders toward achievement of their “New Order” program for eastern Asia and the Western Pacific Area.

These many considerations caused this Government to feel that it could not take so significant a step in reliance solely upon assurances given by the Japanese Premier and his Foreign Office that Prince Konoe would be prepared at the proposed meeting to give directly to the President commitments of a satisfactory character.

In the process of carefully analyzing and evaluating all of the information available to it and bearing on this and related questions, the Government of the United States was driven to the inescapable conclusion that the forces in Japan which were determined to carry on with the course of expansion were so strong that only an advance meeting of minds on the interpretation and to some degree at least the practical application of principles of peace to concrete problems of the Pacific area with respect to which fundamental differences of opinion between the two Governments had developed in the informal conversations would warrant entry upon a full-dress negotiation and reliance thereafter by the United States upon general pledges which might be given by Prince Konoe in the course of conversations and a negotiation between himself and the President.

Neither Prince Konoe nor any of Japan’s spokesmen were offering any convincing evidence in support of their affirmation that Japan’s leaders were prepared to revert to peaceful courses and would, were the proposed conference held, demonstrate with pledges and then or thereafter by acts that such was their intention.

Under those circumstances, although the President would, as he has said, “have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan”, it was felt by him and by the Secretary of State and by their consultants, including officers of the Department of State who are specialists in Far Eastern affairs, that the President could proceed to such a rendezvous only if there were first obtained tentative commitments in harmony with the principles and objectives of American policy and with Japan’s professed desire to pursue a peaceful course. Every effort to obtain such commitments proved vain.

After September 6, there followed a series of discussions between representatives of the two Governments, both in Washington and in Tokyo. These, however, did not result in any progress toward overcoming the divergences in the views of the two Governments. On September 27 the Japanese Ambassador presented to the Secretary of State a complete new redraft of the Japanese proposals (identical with the so-called “September 25th proposal” handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador at Tokyo) and urged that an early reply be made. The new redraft did not indicate any modification of the attitude of the Japanese Government on fundamental points.

29. On October 2 the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum of an “oral statement” reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining this Government’s attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which did not appear to this Government to be consistent with the principles to which this country was committed. In this it was stated that it was the President’s earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that a meeting between the heads of the two Governments could be held, and that it was likewise the President’s hope that the Japanese Government shared the conviction of this Government that, if the Governments of Japan and of the United States were resolved to give practical and comprehensive application to the principles upon which the conversations were based, the two Governments could work out a rehabilitation of their relations and contribute to the bringing about of a lasting peace in the Pacific area.

In formulating this Government’s reply of October 2 to the Japanese Government, outlined above, this Government reviewed the Japanese proposals as a whole and in the light of the surrounding circumstances. There were certain broad considerations which this Government had to take into account in regard to general questions involved and without reference to any one proposal among those that the Japanese Government had offered. These broad considerations also affected the possibilities of there being achieved by the two Governments a satisfactory agreement.

For years Japanese publicists and leaders had been preaching territorial aggrandizement on the ground that it was essential to Japan’s security that Japan have control of additional sources of war materials in order to ensure to Japan economic and military self-sufficiency. The Japanese military leaders were committed to this doctrine and so were many Japanese civilian leaders. Consequently, if, as a result of the increasing gravity of the Axis menace to the security of the United States, this country had become obliged, even though it might not actually be at war, to divert its principal strength to the Atlantic area, the plain logic of the situation was that the pressure in Japan upon the Government to take advantage of American preoccupation in the Atlantic area by seizing territories in the southwest Pacific region would have become so strong that it would have been practically impossible to deter Japan from embarking upon new activities of conquest.

It was clear that the commitments which the Japanese spokesmen had shown themselves in position to give, even if they were to be carried out to the letter, fell far short of constituting a general renunciation by Japan of courses of aggression, especially in reference to China, failed to clarify Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact in the contingency of involvement by the United States in a war with Germany, and thus failed to provide a sound and adequate basis for an agreement that could be relied upon to contribute to a lasting peace and therefore to stability and security in the Pacific area. The problem which confronted this Government for first consideration was that of eliciting from the Japanese Government clear-cut evidence that that Government really wished to abandon the course of aggression which it had been following and to revert to a peaceful program and peaceful methods. Not until that question had been satisfactorily disposed of would any useful purpose be served by this Government’s addressing itself to the problem of means of ensuring that the Japanese Government would implement new commitments to pursue a peaceful course.

In the course of the exploratory conversations this Government had previously given the Japanese Government a full exposition of its policy of self-defense against Germany’s movement of world conquest and had endeavored to elicit from the Japanese Government assurances that Japan would not be bound under the Tripartite Pact to attack the United States should the United States become involved in war with Germany through acts of self-defense. The Japanese Government could not be brought to give any assurance on this point but had insisted that it must be the judge in the event that the United States did become involved in war with Germany whether the circumstances were such that the United States could be regarded as having acted in self-defense. This Government repeatedly had pointed out to the Japanese Government the inconsistency between the Japanese Government’s position with regard to the Tripartite Pact and Japan’s professed desire for an agreement with the United States designed to ensure peace in the Pacific area. This Government also had pointed out to the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government was proposing to this Government an agreement under which Japan, a third country, would be the judge whether any action which this country might be impelled to take in relations with Germany constituted self-defense.

The Japanese spokesmen had made it clear that the Japanese Government would expect as a minimum in an agreement with the United States, among other terms, the removal forthwith by the United States of the restrictions which it had imposed upon trade with Japan, and that the maximum that the Japanese Government was prepared to offer in return was to shift elsewhere the Japanese troops in southern Indochina and to agree not to extend Japanese military moves beyond Indochina southward. As already stated, the Japanese Government had at no time budged from insistence upon an intention to station troops for an unlimited period in wide areas of China, upon retention of a preferential economic position in China and upon maintaining its alliance with the Axis. If the United States were to enter into an agreement with Japan on such terms, this Government at the outset would have to implement immediately a comprehensive concession in the economic field. There would be no method by which the American Government could remove economic pressure upon Japan merely step by step as and when Japan took successive steps away from courses of aggression and toward policies of peace.

This Government also had to consider whether such an agreement would be acceptable to the people of this country. It was evident that no agreement would be acceptable to the United States which would involve a sacrifice of those standards of fair play, integrity and honor which the Government and people of this country have long regarded as fundamental to sound international relationships or which would impair the moral influence exercised by the United States among the nations and peoples of the world.

Moreover, merely negative assurances by Japan of an absence of intention to continue the prosecution of its forward movement did not and could not adequately meet the needs of the situation; it was essential that Japan also give evidence of a positive intention to pursue policies in conformity with the liberal and constructive principles and programs which had been discussed in the conversations. The necessity for this was clearly demonstrated by the contemporary manifestations of Japanese policy and action which ran exactly to the contrary, as, for example, the movement of Japanese armed forces into southern Indochina, the augmentation and speeding up of Japanese military preparations at home, the continuing bombing by Japanese armed forces of Chinese civilian populations, the constant agitation in the inspired Japanese press in support of extremist policies, the un-conciliatory and bellicose public utterances of Japanese leaders, and the tactics of covert or overt threat which had become a constant feature of Japanese diplomatic procedure.

This Government fully realized that the Japanese Government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan’s current course of action. It realized that so much was involved in a reconstruction of Japan’s position that implementation to any substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would require a long time. This Government was therefore prepared to be patient and it had repeatedly so informed the Japanese Government. But there needed to be forthcoming, as an essential prerequisite to an agreement with the United States, evidence in Japan’s acts of a serious and sincere purpose on the part of the Japanese Government to desist from aggression and revert to a program of peace.

The Japanese soon after receiving this Government’s memorandum of October 2 redoubled their emphasis upon the need of haste. They offered new formulas for dealing with limited and specific problems, and they stated that Japan had now placed all its cards on the table and that they had gone as far as they could in the direction of making so-called “concessions”. This Government was unable to discern in their new formulas any evidence that the Japanese Government was moving even one step toward committing itself to courses of peace or that it contemplated receding even one step from insistence upon full attainment of its declared objectives—which were in effect, judging by the evidence of Japanese official utterances and acts, political, economic, and cultural domination of the entire western Pacific and China.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, upon his return to Washington after a two weeks’ visit in Japan, on October 13 called on the Under Secretary of State. The Minister said that during his stay in Japan he had conferred with the Prime Minister and with other close advisers of the Emperor as well as with high-ranking officers of the Army and Navy and of the Foreign Office. These persons, Mr. Wakasugi said, had unanimously expressed a desire to maintain peace between Japan and the United States and an earnest and sincere hope that the conversations between the two Governments would produce satisfactory results.

The Minister mentioned the existence of a small but very powerful group in Japan which placed its fortunes on the side of the Axis and which was determined to go to any length to prevent the reaching of any understanding between the United States and Japan and to bring Japan squarely into full activity on Germany’s side. He said frankly that German representatives and German agents in Japan, who were undoubtedly increasing their activities, were exceedingly powerful and most effective in their propaganda. He added that although the Japanese Government was backed by the majority of public opinion and by controlling elements in the Japanese Army and Navy, the Government would have to show some results and could not indefinitely continue conversations with the United States. Mr. Wakasugi said that no one could foretell the results which might come if the Japanese Government were to be changed through a coup d’état or because that Government could see no hope of reaching a satisfactory arrangement with the United States. Mr. Wakasugi said that in all probability the Government would be replaced by a cabinet of military representatives responsible only to German pressure and that in such an event hope of adjusting relations between Japan and the United States must vanish.

In response to the Minister’s inquiry, which he said was made under personal instructions from the Prime Minister, as to the reasons for the delay in reaching an agreement or on what points the Government of the United States still desired clarification, the Under Secretary of State said that it was impossible for him to believe that the Japanese Government did not in fact have a clear and specific understanding of the position of the Government of the United States. The Under Secretary went on to point out that the views of this Government had been fully set forth not only in innumerable conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador but also more specifically in the documents given the Japanese Ambassador on June 21. The Under Secretary added that this Government believed that the Japanese proposals of September 6 had served to restrict, to limit and to modify materially the broad principles upon which we had felt a basis for an understanding had already been reached. In making this observation the Under Secretary had reference to the assurances of the Japanese Government, already referred to, that Japan was seeking a program consistent with the principles to which the United States had long been committed. The Under Secretary added that the views of this Government with regard to the Japanese proposal of September 6 had once more been very clearly set forth in the statement given the Japanese Ambassador on October 2. He therefore felt that there was little that he could add in clarification of the position of this Government.

During the course of this conversation the Minister asked whether, if a basis for an understanding on all other major principles were reached, it would not be possible to leave the China question in abeyance. The Under Secretary replied that a question of this sort was like asking whether the play “Hamlet” could be given on the stage omitting the character of Hamlet.

In reply to the very insistent question of the Minister whether this Government had any other major desiderata which it had not yet submitted to the Japanese Government, the Under Secretary reiterated his statement that he believed the views of this Government had been fully set forth in the documents of June 21 and other documents subsequently given to the Japanese Ambassador. The Under Secretary said that it was not the policy of the Government of the United States to attempt to deceive or mislead the other party to a negotiation.

There were subsequent conversations with the Japanese Minister on October 16 and 17 in which the Secretary of State as well as the Under Secretary of State participated. No new points were developed in these conversations but the Secretary recorded his definite impression that there were no signs of any disposition on the part of the Japanese Government to revert even to a position approximating that which it had taken before the exploratory conversations were temporarily abandoned at the time when Japan in July went into Indochina. The Secretary, while prepared to afford the Japanese every opportunity to present their proposals, entertained increasingly serious doubt whether further conversations would be productive of an agreement.

IV. Advent of the Tojo Cabinet and Redoubling of Japanese Government’s Insistence Upon an Early Acceptance of its Proposals

30. On October 17 a new Japanese cabinet, headed by General Tojo, came into office. The new cabinet was even more insistent than the preceding cabinet had been in urging upon this Government a quick decision on the Japanese Government’s proposals. Soon after the new cabinet had come into office, the new Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo, and the Japanese Ambassador came forward with emphatic statements that the new cabinet desired to continue the exploratory conversations looking to peace in the Pacific and to an agreement with the United States. The assurances of peaceful intent given by the previous cabinet were reaffirmed both by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State and by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador at Tokyo as representing in general the position of General Tojo’s cabinet.

31. The Japanese Government while thus pressing this Government for a decision showed no willingness to effect any fundamental modification of the Japanese position and no desire to apply practically in actual situations the basic principles of justice and equity essential to the building of a lasting peace in the Pacific. At the same time, the Japanese Government was proceeding with its disquieting military disposals in Indochina and Manchuria, and the agitation in the Japanese press and among Japanese spokesmen for positive action became redoubled.

32. These military activities, the increasingly threatening tone of the Japanese press, and the pressure tactics employed by the Japanese Government toward forcing an acceptance by this Government of the Japanese proposals all combined to cause to grow fainter any hope that a satisfactory comprehensive agreement might be achieved. Nevertheless the general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. As long as the conversations continued there existed a possibility that Japan might be won over to courses of peace, although it was realized that such possibility was slight. On November 7 the Secretary of State acquainted the cabinet fully with these developments and emphasized that in his opinion a crisis was now imminent in the Far East. The awareness of the administration of the danger which confronted this nation in the general situation was reflected in the President’s Armistice Day Address at the Arlington National Cemetery, in the Secretary of the Navy’s Armistice Day Address before the Providence Chamber of Commerce, and in the Under Secretary of State’s address on the same day at the tomb of President Wilson in the Washington Cathedral.⁹ At frequent intervals during this period the Secretary of State had conferences with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and officers of their staffs. These conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to developments in the Pacific area, and the Secretary took occasion at these conferences to keep the high military and naval authorities of this Government currently informed of significant developments in the conversations with the Japanese.

33. During this period there were several conversations between officials of this Government, including the President and the Secretary of State, and the Japanese Ambassador and his associates. There were exchanged various memorandums and formulas designed to elaborate or clarify specific points which had arisen in the course of the conversations, as for example in regard to future economic policies of the United States and of Japan, the effect of Japan’s Axis alliance upon Japan’s future relationship to the United States in the event that the United States through acts of self-defense should become involved in the European war, and Japan’s intentions with respect to the future stationing of troops in China; but those steps did not lead to material progress toward reconciling basic differences between the respective viewpoints.

34. On November 15 the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy. The Secretary made it clear that this represented but one part of the general settlement envisaged, and that an agreement on this would be subject to arrival at agreement on a general settlement. This outline was prefaced by an introductory statement in which reference was made to the fact that the cornerstone of the commercial policy of the United States has for many years been the principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. Reference was made to the extensive program of commercial agreements upon which the United States has been engaged since 1934. It was further pointed out that the United States in its commercial agreements concluded under that program has sought consistently to further the application of that policy throughout the world and that third governments have benefited by the conclusion of those agreements between the United States and other powers. This program of the United States, it was stated, has given the widest possible effect to the reductions of trade barriers and has made the maximum contribution toward building up world trade for the benefit of all nations.

The tentative draft joint-declaration of economic policy was divided into three sections:

(1) The Governments of the United States and Japan were to cooperate in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, eliminate forms of discrimination and to work toward creation of conditions under which all nations would be given a reasonable opportunity, through peaceful trade processes, to secure the means of acquiring goods and commodities needed by each country.

(2) The Governments of the United States and Japan were to inaugurate as rapidly as practicable measures to restore normal commercial relationships between them; to begin discussions looking toward the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement; and to undertake that during the present emergency each would permit export to the other of desired commodities subject to necessary restrictions or limitations required by each for its security and self-defense.

(3) In the Pacific area both Governments were to agree that complete economic, financial, and monetary control would be restored to China; that neither Government would seek preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights in China; and that both would use their influence toward securing from China most-favored-nation treatment and full cooperation of China in the general commercial policy already outlined. Both Governments were to suggest to China the inauguration of a comprehensive program of economic development with most-favored-nation treatment to be given to each in participation in that program. Both Governments were to seek to establish with other Pacific countries relations on the basis of the fundamental principles already set forth and to urge other Pacific governments to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development and to accord to both the United States and Japan most-favored-nation treatment and full opportunity to participate in those programs when foreign participation might be required.

In the formulating of this draft declaration of economic policy it was envisaged that Japan would be accorded an opportunity of joining in a virtual moral partnership with the United States in leading the way toward a general application of economic practices which would give Japan much of what her leaders professed that Japan desired.

35. In the conversation on November 15 with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State said that if we were to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area, this could be achieved only by continuing the exploratory conversations until we reached a stage where we could go to the other governments concerned and say that the attitudes of Japan and the United States were such as to afford a basis for negotiation. He said that what we had in mind was to reach without delay a wholly satisfactory and broad agreement which would promote mutual trust between nations in the Pacific area and enable them to get away from the expansion of military preparations; that what he desired was a clear-cut unequivocal agreement which would preclude any reasonable suspicion that Japan was trying to face two ways at the same time.

Referring to the Tripartite Pact, the Secretary of State said that so long as Japan remained bound in an alliance with the most flagrant aggressor that has appeared on this planet in the last two thousand years it would be very difficult for him to make the people of the United States and the people of other peaceful nations believe that Japan was pursuing a peaceful course. He said that so long as Japan insisted upon its own interpretation of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact, it would be very difficult for the world to see that Japan’s clear intention was to follow a peaceful course in the event that the United States through self-defense became obliged to take up arms against Germany. The Secretary asked whether, if an agreement between the United States and Japan were concluded, Japan’s connection with the Tripartite Pact would automatically disappear.

In regard to this question the Japanese Ambassador said only that the question of peace in the entire Pacific was covered in the preamble of the Japanese suggested agreement, and that under the Tripartite Pact Japan had freedom of decision and would make its own interpretation of its obligations.

At no time throughout the course of the conversations did the Japanese give a satisfactory reply to this important question. The Ambassador did, however, on several occasions make vague statements to the effect that if an agreement were reached with the United States, the psychological effect in Japan would be such that there would be no possibility of Japan interpreting its obligations under the Tripartite Pact adversely to friendly relations with the United States. This Government of course had to evaluate such statements in the light of developments and deep-seated trends in the field of actual events with which such statements were inconsistent.

In the conversation of November 15 and in previous conversations the Japanese representatives pressed vigorously for a reply to the already delivered Japanese proposals—so vigorously that the Secretary on the latter occasion, after referring to the attitude which the new Government in Japan had taken in urging that this Government must reply at once and categorically on various points, stated to the Ambassador and the Japanese Minister, Mr. Wakasugi, who was also present on that occasion, that this Government did not feel that it should be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums, from a Government whose contemporary acts were such as were those of Japan.

36. Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo Kurusu to Washington to assist Ambassador Nomura in the conversations. In pursuance of the urgent request of the Japanese Government, this Government facilitated Mr. Kurusu’s journey by arranging that priority passage on a Pan American plane be given Mr. Kurusu and a Japanese Foreign Office secretary accompanying him and that the departure of the plane from Hong Kong be delayed until Mr. Kurusu and his secretary could reach Hong Kong from Tokyo. Mr. Kurusu reached Washington on November 15, and on November 17 he and the Japanese Ambassador called on the Secretary of State and were later on the same day received by the President. It became clear at the outset of the meetings in which Mr. Kurusu participated with the Japanese Ambassador that Mr. Kurusu had brought no new material or plans or proposals.

37. On November 17 the Japanese Ambassador handed the Secretary of State two documents. In one of these, the statement was made that the Japanese Government had no objection to confirming as expressing the general purport of Japanese policy certain statements which had been made on August 28 by the preceding Japanese Prime Minister and by his Government in documents which had been transmitted to the Government of the United States by the Japanese Ambassador. It was stated also that the various qualifying phrases which the Japanese Government had used in connection with statements of its peaceful intent as expressed in those earlier documents were employed only in order “to express the qualification which is due to and necessary for any sovereign state”, and that those phrases were not intended to limit in any way the peaceful intentions of the Japanese Government.

38. On this same date, November 17, the President and the Secretary of State held a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu. The President made clear the desire of the United States to avoid war between the two countries and to bring about a fair settlement assuring peace in the Pacific area. The Japanese Ambassador said that this was also the desire of Japan.

The Secretary of State made clear that so long as Japan was still clinging to the Tripartite Pact, no purported peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be taken seriously by anyone. He said that ever since Hitler had announced that he was out for unlimited objectives and had started on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and myriads of airplanes, the United States had been in danger, and that the danger had grown with each passing week. He said that the United States recognized this danger and was proceeding with measures of self-defense before it should be too late; that this country felt the danger so profoundly that it had committed itself to expenditure of many billions of dollars in self-defense.

Finally, the Secretary of State said the belief in this country was that the Japanese formula of a “new order in greater East Asia” is but another name for a program to dominate all of the Pacific area politically, economically, socially, and otherwise, by military force; that this would include the high seas, the islands and the continents and, if achieved, would place every other country at the mercy of arbitrary military rule just as the Hitler program does in Europe and the Japanese program does in China.

39. Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Prime Minister, General Tojo, although an Army man, was very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment. Mr. Kurusu constantly throughout the conversation with the President and the Secretary of State made the plea that there was no reason for serious differences between our two Governments and that ways must be found to resolve the situation. Some specious attempts were made to explain away the Tripartite Pact and efforts were made to defend the Japanese plan of not bringing Japanese troops out of China.

40. The Secretary of State conferred again with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 18. The Secretary expressed great doubt whether any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan had an alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people. He said that a difficult situation was created when, for example, telegrams of congratulation were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity, and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making clear our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He pointed out that we were trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world, based on law and order. He said that this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. He said that frankly he did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences

The Japanese Ambassador said that Japan was hard pressed and was therefore very desirous of reaching some agreement with the United States. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that what the two Governments should now do would be to achieve something to tide over the abnormal situation and that perhaps after the war it might be possible for Japan to adopt a more liberal policy. The Secretary asked whether Japan could not now agree in principle on commercial policy. Mr. Kurusu made no direct reply.

Turning to the question of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that while the Tripartite Pact could not be abrogated Japan might do something to “outshine” that pact. The Secretary emphasized the importance of establishing fundamental principles at this time in order to enable peaceful forces in the world, which are now demoralized, to assert a leadership. Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had in mind a concrete formula for dealing with Japan’s relations with the Axis. The Secretary made it clear that this was a matter for Japan to work out, but he asked whether Japan could not work this out in some way that would be convincing to the American people, as the public would be confused by the survival of a relationship between Japan and the Axis while Japan had an agreement with the United States. The Secretary said that he felt that the Tripartite Pact was inconsistent with the establishment of an understanding, and that Japan could not face two ways. Mr. Kurusu observed that a comprehensive solution could not be worked out immediately; that our freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while it still could. If we could come to some agreement now, he said, it would promote an atmosphere which would be conducive to discussing fundamentals. The Ambassador said that he desired to emphasize that Japan would not be a “cat’s paw” for Germany and that Japan had entered into the Tripartite Alliance because Japan had felt isolated. The Secretary commented that it would be difficult to get public opinion in this country to understand the situation as Mr. Kurusu had described it.

Having in mind the fact that the Japanese proposals had consistently envisaged keeping relatively large numbers of Japanese troops at key points in large areas of China in disregard of Japan’s professed intention to respect China’s sovereignty, the Secretary of State asked how many soldiers the Japanese wanted to retain in China. The Ambassador replied that possibly ninety percent of the present forces would be withdrawn. The Secretary asked how long the Japanese intended to keep the remaining ten percent in China. The Ambassador did not reply directly to this but invited attention to the fact that under the existing Boxer Protocol¹⁰ Japan was entitled to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area.

The Secretary pointed out that involved in the question of Japanese troops in China there were many elements of trouble; that American interests had suffered severely from the actions of the Japanese troops in China; that the present situation in the Far East was one of Japan’s own making which rendered it incumbent upon Japan to find some way of extricating itself from the difficulty. He pointed out also that the situation was now exceptionally favorable for Japan to put its factories to work in producing goods which were needed by peaceful countries, if only the Japanese people could get war and invasion out of mind.

Mr. Kurusu said that Japan would have to move gradually in China, that one step might lead to another, and that what was important now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. He suggested that it was felt in Japanese circles that we had been responsible for delay. The Secretary of State pointed out that he had on all occasions received the Japanese Ambassador promptly whenever the Ambassador had sought an appointment, that this Government had from the outset made clear its position, and that when Japan’s movement into Indochina in July took place this had caused an interruption of the conversations.

Mr. Kurusu asked whether we wanted the status quo ante to be restored or what we expected Japan to do. The Secretary replied that if the Japanese could not now do anything about these three points, namely, withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, the adoption of a liberal commercial policy, and the question of the Tripartite Pact, he could only leave to Japan what Japan could do. He asked to what extent it would enable Japan to adopt peaceful policies if there should be a relaxation of freezing; and he explained that what he had in mind was means of enabling the more conservative leaders in Japan to gain control of the situation there. The Ambassador said that the American position was unyielding and that it was Japan’s unyielding attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek which had stiffened Chinese resistance against Japan. He suggested as a small beginning toward realization of our high ideals the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the date in July when, following the Japanese move into southern Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect. The Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our freezing regulations we would not know whether Japanese troops withdrawn from Indochina would not be diverted to some equally objectionable locality and that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long way in removing freezing measures until this Government believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. He observed that it was when Japan’s movement into Indochina took place in July that he could no longer defend the continued shipment of petroleum products to Japan especially as he had been under severe criticism in this country for not having cut off those shipments. The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of fighting in China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first step. The Secretary said he would consult with the British and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered by the Ambassador.

V. Japanese Efforts To Extort an Agreement on a Narrow and One-sided Proposal

41. In the course of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 20, the Secretary of State said that Japan could at any moment put an end to the present situation by deciding upon an all-out peaceful course; and that Japan could similarly at any moment bring to an end what Japan chose to call “encirclement”. The Secretary further said the American people believed that the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as those underlying our aid to Great Britain; that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take control of one-half of the world and Japan the other half. The existence of the Tripartite Alliance and the continual harping of Japan’s leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type served to strengthen the public in this belief. What was needed, the Secretary pointed out, was a manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses. He said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in East Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people did not welcome the idea of a “new order” under military dictatorship; and that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China were not unlike Hitler’s methods.

The Japanese Ambassador in the course of this conversation presented a proposal which read as follows:

“1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

“2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

“In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

“3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

“4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

“The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

“5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.”

Mr. Kurusu said that adoption of a proposal such as the Japanese Government had just offered would help develop public opinion in Japan in favor of peaceful courses. He added that Japan was trying to show its peaceful purpose by offering to relieve, pressure on Thailand. The Japanese Ambassador said that there was no doubt of Japan’s desire for peace, as that desire for peace was made clear by the eagerness of the Japanese Government to reach a settlement with China. Mr. Kurusu asserted that Japan has never committed itself to a policy of expansion and that if the Japanese proposal just presented were adopted, we could then proceed to work out fundamentals.

The plan thus offered called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, suspension of freezing measures, and discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from Southern Indochina to Northern Indochina, but placing no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send to Indochina and making no provision for withdrawal of the said forces until after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an “equitable” peace in the Pacific area. It contained no provision for reversion by Japan to peaceful courses and, while there were stipulations against further extension of Japan’s armed force into southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina—for example, China and the Soviet Union.

42. During a conversation on November 22 and in other subsequent conversations the Secretary of State made clear to the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu the American attitude on three points with respect to the Japanese proposal of November 20. He emphasized that while we might consider helping Japan by supplying some oil for civilian requirements as soon as peacefully-minded Japanese could control the situation in Japan, we could not furnish oil to the Japanese for any military purpose; that the presence of large Japanese forces in any part of Indochina was a source of apprehension to neighboring countries, would lead to intensification of armaments, and would keep immobilized substantial armed forces of this country and of countries friendly to the United States, which forces might otherwise be used for resistance against Nazi Germany; and that the people of the United States considered that aid from this country to China rested on the same basis as the aid given to Great Britain and it was not reasonable for Japan to expect us to discontinue aid to China while Japan was assisting Germany.

The Secretary of State pointed out that moves by Japan, such as its move in Indochina, would give a further impetus to arming. Further, he said that one more such move on Japan’s part might extinguish our peace effort.

During this conversation of November 22 the Secretary of State also informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that he had called in representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Pacific area and there had been a discussion of the question whether there could be some relaxation of freezing. He said that those representatives were interested in the subject and there was a general feeling that the matter could be settled if the Japanese could give some concrete evidence that their intentions were peaceful. The Secretary said further that if the United States and other countries should see Japan pursuing a peaceful course, there would be no question about Japan’s obtaining all the materials she desired.

Throughout the conversation of November 22, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu sought to make much of the Japanese offer to transfer its troops from southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina. They gave no indication whatsoever that Japan wished to consider the broad questions and problems that had been under discussion, but merely devoted themselves to urging an immediate reply to their proposals.

Mr. Kurusu said that a great deal of persuasion had been necessary to induce the Japanese Army to agree to abandon its position in southern Indochina, that he and the Ambassador were pleasantly surprised and they considered the agreement by the Army to withdraw from southern Indochina an encouraging sign, but that nevertheless the situation was approaching an explosive point. The Ambassador said that he had not the slightest doubt that Japan desired peace. Mr. Kurusu added that Japan’s offer to remove its forces from southern Indochina would set in motion a reverse movement in Japan. He mentioned the abnormal emotional state of the Japanese people as a result of four years of war and the freezing measures of the United States. Mr. Kurusu said the denunciation by the United States of the commercial treaty with Japan had placed Japan in a difficult position. The Japanese Ambassador said that Japan needed a quick settlement, and that the psychological effect of such a settlement would be great.

43. On the day previous, that is to say, on November 21, Mr. Kurusu had called alone upon the Secretary of State and had handed the Secretary a draft of a formula which he offered, he explained, by way of clarification of Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Alliance. The formula was embodied in a draft letter, as follows:

“Mr. Secretary,

“Through several conversations I have had the honor of holding with Your Excellency, I was rather surprised to learn that a deep-seated misconception prevails among your people about the obligation which Japan assumed under the Tripartite Pact.

“As Your Excellency is fully aware I am the one who signed the said treaty under the instructions of my Government; and I am very happy to make the following statement which I trust will serve to eradicate the aforesaid false impression:

“It goes without saying that this treaty can not and does not infringe, in any way, upon the sovereign right of Japan as an independent state.

“Besides, as Article III of the Pact stands, Japan is in a position to interpret its obligation freely and independently and is not to be bound by the interpretation which the other high contracting parties may make of it. I should like to add that my Government is not obligated by the aforementioned treaty or any other international engagement to become a collaborator or cooperator in any aggression whatever by any third Power or Powers.

“My Government would never project the people of Japan into war at the behest of any foreign Power; it will accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of national life against active injustice.

“I hope that the above statement will assist you in removing entirely the popular suspicion which Your Excellency has repeatedly referred to. I have to add that, when a complete understanding is reached between us, Your Excellency may feel perfectly free to publish the present communication.

“I have the honor to be, Sir,

“Your Excellency’s obedient servant, …”

The Secretary of State read the draft letter and then asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more to offer on the subject of a peaceful settlement as a whole. Mr. Kurusu replied in the negative. The Secretary said that he did not think that the formula which Mr. Kurusu had just offered would be especially helpful.

44. In all of the various formulas which the Japanese Government offered in succession during the course of the conversations every statement of pacific intent was qualified and restricted. As each proposal was explored it became clear that Japan did not intend to budge one iota from the fundamental tenets of its military leaders. Japan manifested no disposition to renounce its association with Hitlerism. It insisted that its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance—a direct threat to this country—would be fulfilled by Japan. Japan was willing to affirm its adherence to the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, but refused to relinquish in practice the preferential position which it had arrogated to itself in all areas under Japanese occupation. Japan insisted upon obtaining through its use of force in China a victor’s peace and upon having our assent in advance to that procedure and that conclusion. It refused to make practical application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It insisted upon continuing to maintain its armed forces in large areas of China for an indefinite period—a clear indication of intention to effectuate a permanent control over that country. The Japanese Government made no response whatever to the Secretary of State’s proposal of November 15 in regard to economic policy.

It was thus apparent that the Japanese were attempting to maneuver the United States into either accepting the limited Japanese proposals or making some sort of an agreement which would serve no purposes except those of Japan, and that, without giving thought to the solving of basic questions they were intent on evading conclusion of an equitable broad-gauge settlement such as had been under discussion in the earlier stages of the conversations. The only question which remained for exploration was whether, by the conclusion of some temporary arrangement or modus vivendi to tide over the immediate crisis, Japan might be deterred from embarking immediately upon new steps of aggression. Delaying of the evil day might put that day off forever. It at least would give the intended victims more time in which to prepare to resist. Consideration was given by the Secretary and by the President to various projects envisaging such possible consummations. This Government felt it most important to exhaust every effort to avert or delay a resort to force, especially as the heads of this country’s armed services continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance to attacks that might be made upon us by way of our territories in the Pacific area. Hope of concluding any arrangement, however, became slender indeed in the light of clear indication given by the Japanese authorities that they had no intention of desisting from the menace which they were creating to the United States, to the British Empire, to the Netherlands East Indies, to Thailand, and to China, by the substantial increasing of their armed forces in Indochina and in adjacent waters. In view of that growing menace, of the continuation of the hostilities in China, of the mobilization of Japanese forces in Manchuria, and of the fact that the Japanese proposal of November 20 offered, as outlined above, no basis for a practical and reassuring settlement, it was obvious that the chance of meeting the crisis by measures of diplomacy had practically vanished. Yet, for the purpose of completely clarifying the issues and of possibly providing material and incentive for a renewed and final effort, it was believed desirable to submit to the Japanese a further draft, comprehensive in terms, which might serve as a basis for possible further discussion.

45. On November 26, the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador two documents, the first an outline in a tentative form of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan and the second an explanatory statement concerning and in regard thereto.

In those documents there was reviewed briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of reaching, if possible, an early settlement of questions relating to the entire Pacific area on the basis of the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations. Reference was made to proposals which had been communicated on November 20 by the Japanese Ambassador in regard to arranging temporary measures to be taken by the two Governments respectively and to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had stated that such a temporary arrangement would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the informal conversations which the Ambassador said the Japanese Government desired to continue. It was observed that while this Government was desirous of contributing to the promotion of peace in the Pacific area and of affording every opportunity for the continuance of the informal conversations, the Japanese proposals in question contained some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflicted with the fundamental principles underlying the general settlement under consideration; and that this Government believed that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives. It was therefore suggested that a further effort be made to resolve the divergences of views between the two Governments, and it was stated that, with this object in view, there was being offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program that could be worked out during further conversations.

46. The texts of the explanatory statement and of the outline of the proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan were as follows:

“The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

“It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

“The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

“With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

“The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.”

“Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan

“Section I—Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy.

“The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

• “(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
• “(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
• “(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
• “(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

“The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

• “(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
• “(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
• “(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
• “(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
• “(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

“Section II—Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan.

“The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

• “1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
• “2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.
• “3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
• “4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
• “5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
• “Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
• “6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
• “7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
• “8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
• “9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
• “10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.”

Mr. Kurusu, after reading these documents, offered various depreciatory comments in regard to their contents. He said that the Japanese Government would be likely to throw up its hands when it received this proposal. He said that he felt that the response which had thus been given to the Japanese proposal of November 20 could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end of the conversations and he asked whether the United States was not interested in consummating a modus vivendi. The Secretary replied that this Government had fully explored that matter.

47. The President and the Secretary of State received the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 27. The President expressed appreciation of the efforts of the peace element in Japan. Most people in the United States, he said, wanted a peaceful solution of all matters in the Pacific area; he himself had not given up yet, although the situation was serious. This Government, he said, had been very much disappointed by the continued expression of opposition by Japanese leaders to the fundamental principles of peace and order which had been discussed in the exploratory conversations with the Japanese representatives. This attitude, he continued, on the part of the Japanese leaders had created an atmosphere, both in the United States and abroad, which had added greatly to the difficulty of making satisfactory progress in the conversations.

The President then called attention to the fact that this Government had been very patient in dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation; that we were prepared to continue to be patient if Japan’s course of action would permit continuance of such an attitude on our part. He said that this country could not bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gave this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurred, we could take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation. This Government remained convinced, he added, that Japan’s own best interests would not be served by following Hitlerism in courses of aggression and that Japan’s own best interests lay along other courses which we had outlined in the conversations.

The Secretary said that everyone knew that the Japanese slogans of war propaganda such as those used in describing the “new order in East Asia” and the “controlling influence” in certain areas, were all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the policy of force and conquest by Japan, and domination by military agencies of the political, economic, social, and moral affairs of each of the populations conquered. As long as the Japanese moved in that direction and continued to increase their military and other relations with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern Pact¹¹ and the Tripartite Pact, no real progress could be made on a program of peaceful solution.

During this conversation the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu said very little. The Ambassador expressed disappointment that it had not been possible to reach an agreement regarding a modus vivendi. Mr. Kurusu said that the difficulty did not lie in the fundamentals so much as in the application of those fundamentals.

48. The Secretary of State next conferred with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on December 1. The Secretary said that in connection with the informal conversations we had to take into account the bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo. He referred to Japanese military moves in Indochina and emphasized that we did not intend to go into a partnership with Japan’s military leaders; that he had not heard one whisper of peace from them, only bluster and bloodcurdling threats. He said that this Government had no idea of trying to bluff Japan and he saw no occasion for Japan’s trying to bluff us; he emphasized that there is a limit beyond which we cannot go and that one of these days there might come a point beyond which the conversations could not be continued.

The Secretary of State said that this Government was anxious to help settle the China affair if the Japanese could reach a settlement in accordance with the basic principles which we had discussed in our conversations, and that under such circumstances we would be glad to offer our good offices. He said that under existing circumstances Japan might just as well ask us to cease aiding Great Britain as to cease aiding China. He said that the United States would supply Japan all the materials she wanted if Japan’s military leaders would only demonstrate that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course.

The Secretary of State observed that the stationing of Japanese troops in Indochina constituted a menace to surrounding areas, irrespective of where in Indochina the troops were stationed; that the stationing of these troops in Indochina was also making it necessary for the United States and its friends to keep large numbers of armed forces immobilized in East Asia; and that in this way Japan’s acts were having the effect of aiding Hitler. He called attention to reports of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and again stressed the point that, with a large Japanese army anywhere in Indochina, we had to give that situation more attention when Japanese statesmen were saying that they would drive us out of East Asia. In making this statement the Secretary had reference to the reported statement by the Japanese Premier on November 30 that Japan must “purge with a vengeance” the influence of the United States and Great Britain in East Asia.¹² The Secretary pointed out that we could not be sure what the Japanese military leaders were likely to do; we did not know where the Japanese army intended to land its forces. He said that we could not sit still while developments, such as Japanese military entrenchment in Indochina, were taking place; that we would not allow ourselves to be driven out of the Pacific.

In view of all the confusion, threats and pressure, the Secretary of State said, he felt that something must be done to clear the atmosphere; we must get back to fundamentals; and these fundamentals were embodied in the proposal presented by this Government to the Japanese on November 26. There was no reason for conflict between the United States and Japan. There was no real clash of essential interests. Japan did not have to use a sword to gain for itself a seat at the head table. In our opinion equality of opportunity was the key to the future peace and prosperity of all nations.

Mr. Kurusu said that the document handed to the Ambassador on November 26 had been communicated to the Japanese Government and a reply would be forthcoming in a few days. He added that the Japanese Government believed that its proposal of November 20 was equitable and gave full consideration to the points of view of both countries; that the Japanese Government had difficulty in understanding the position taken by the Government of the United States; and that the American proposal given to the Japanese representatives on November 26 seemed to fail to take into account the existing conditions in the Far East. He said that the Japanese offer to withdraw its troops from southern French Indochina remained standing and that Japan had shown its extreme desire to promote a peaceful settlement. He was directed, he continued, by the Japanese Government to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United States in the conversations and to ask the Government of the United States to “make deep reflection of this matter”.

49. On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, the Secretary of State emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: he stated at those meetings that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the question of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion the Secretary with due deference expressed his judgment that any plan for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

VI. Final Phase

50. During the final phase of these conversations, the Government of the United States learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and additional equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that under cover of negotiations such forces were being disposed for some attack on unspecified objectives. These disposals included moving into strategic positions in the Gulf of Thailand. That disposal was apparently designed not merely to intimidate or assault Thailand but also to set up bases for attack southward against Singapore and northward in the direction of the Burma Road.

51. On December 2 the President in a memorandum to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the reasons for the continued Japanese troop movements into Indochina. On the same date the Under Secretary of State, in compliance with the President’s instruction, informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu of the President’s inquiry.

52. On December 5 the Japanese Ambassador called and handed to the Secretary of State a reply to that inquiry, the substantive portion of which reply read as follows:

“As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-china bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-china. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.”

53. On this occasion the Secretary of State said to the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that he, the Secretary, had been under the impression that Japan had been moving forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there; and that he had never heard before that these troop movements were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. He added that it was the first time he had been given to understand that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina.

The Ambassador said that the United States blames Japan for its move into Indochina but that if Indochina were controlled by other powers it would be a menace to Japan.

The Secretary said that we could resolve the difficulties without delay if the Japanese Government would renounce courses of force and aggression. He added that we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time we were not running away from menaces.

Despite the completely unsatisfactory Japanese reply with respect to its operations in Indochina, the United States Government still felt that every possible effort for peace should be exhausted. President Roosevelt on December 6 telegraphed to Tokyo a personal message to the Emperor of Japan in which he stated that developments were occurring in the Pacific area which threatened to deprive the United States and Japan and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between the two countries, and that these developments contained “tragic possibilities”. The President said that we had hoped that the peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion, that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted, and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation. In seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States “should agree to eliminate any form of military threat”. The President said further that during recent weeks it had become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval, and air forces had been sent to southern Indochina in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt that this continued concentration in Indochina was defensive in its character; that the people of the Philippines, of the Netherlands Indies, of Malaya, and of Thailand were asking themselves whether these Japanese forces were preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions; that none of these peoples could sit either indefinitely or permanently “on a keg of dynamite”. Finally, the President said that he was addressing the Emperor in the fervent hope that the Emperor might give thought to ways of dispelling the darkening clouds; that both he and the Emperor had “a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world”.

54. On Sunday, December 7, at about 12:00 noon, the Secretary of State, in response to a telephoned request from the Japanese Ambassador, made an appointment to receive the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu at 1 p.m. Shortly after 1 p.m. the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu asked by telephone that the appointment be postponed until 1:45 p.m. They arrived at the Department of State at 2:05 p.m. and were received by the Secretary at 2:20 p.m. The Japanese Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his Government to deliver a paper at one p.m. but that difficulty in decoding the message had delayed him. He then handed the Secretary a document, the text of which read as follows:

“1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

“The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

“2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

“Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan’s true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

“However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan’s aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

“Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific Area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

“3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

“Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

• “(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
• “(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
• “(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
• “The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
• “(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
• “(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

“As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as ‘introducer’ of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

“The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called ‘introducer’ of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

“4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific Area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

“It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

“On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

• “1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another’s position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one’s selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
• “Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world’s actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
• “Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
• “2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states—‘Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.’ It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the War in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
• “The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.
• “3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.
• “4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.
• “The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.
• “5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan’s position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any régime other than the régime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking régime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

“5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan’s sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

“6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking régime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan’s position.

“7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

“The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.”

55. The Secretary of State read this paper, turned to the Japanese Ambassador, and said:

“I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined lentil today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.”

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without making any comment.

More than an hour before the delivery of this reply Japanese armed forces had struck without warning at American territory in the heart of the Pacific.

Several hours after the beginning of the Japanese attack Ambassador Grew was informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the above-described memorandum, which had been delivered at Washington, was desired by the Emperor to be regarded as the Emperor’s reply to the President’s message. At the same time, however, the Japanese Foreign Minister made an oral statement to the Ambassador also “as a reply” from the Emperor to the President to the effect that the establishment of peace “in the Pacific and consequently of the world has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made the Government to continue its earnest endeavors”.

56. In entering into the conversations with the Japanese Government in the spring of 1941 this Government had had in mind doing everything it could to bring about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific area. This course was in accordance with the traditional beliefs and attitude of the American people. It was also consistent with the need of having time to build up the preparations for defense vital not only to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Throughout the course of the conversations, the representatives of this Government had of necessity to consider whether the Japanese Government had the willingness and the power to enter into in good faith an agreement of a character which would be likely to contribute to the establishment of just and stable conditions of peace in the Pacific area. Even though from the outset of the conversations the prospects of success appeared at best to be but slight, the representatives of this Government felt that they must make every possible effort to preserve and promote peace. In this spirit they continued to try to obtain some reliable indication that there was or could be a meeting of the minds and that formal negotiations either at a meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments or through normal diplomatic channels would bring forth specific and dependable pledges. While considering it necessary, in the light of Japan’s past and contemporary record of aggression, to subject all Japanese proposals to most careful scrutiny and analysis, and to be constantly on guard against qualified and equivocal offers and declarations, the representatives of this Government had endeavored at all times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-mindedness, patience and good-will. At the same time this Government had consistently declined to compromise the principles in which the people of this country believe and to which they and this Government are committed.

The desire and effort of the United States to maintain peaceful relations with Japan and to improve and stabilize on a just basis the situation throughout the Pacific area were frustrated by the determination of Japan to continue its march on the pathway of conquest. Japan’s leaders had committed their country to a carefully formulated program for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation of at least one-half of the world’s population. The attack by Japan’s armed forces upon the United States on December 7 showed conclusively that the military element in Japan had gained complete control of the Japanese Government and was able to override all persons and groups desirous of restoring good relations with the United States and of diverting their country from courses of aggression to courses of peace. That attack brought to an unsuccessful end the intensive effort which the American Government had made to preserve peace.

1. See pp. 164 ff.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
3. See vol. i, pp. 249 ff.
4. Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247.
5. See statement of December 22, 1938, by the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, vol. i, p. 482.
6. Signed at Nanking, November 30, 1940; for text, see p. 117.
7. In an oral statement, however, given by the Japanese Foreign Minister to Ambassador Grew later, on August 18, the stationing of Japanese troops in Indochina was stated to be a measure adopted for the purpose of bringing to an end the hostilities in China.
8. Ante, p. 315.
7. Ante, p. 267.
8. See vol. i, pp. 715 ff.
9. See Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 264–265; ibid., 1922, vol. ii, pp. 591 ff.; and ibid., 1923, vol. ii, pp. 455 ff.
9. For text of address by the Under Secretary of State, see Department of State, Bulletin, November 15, 1941 (vol. v, No. 125), p. 391.
10. Foreign Relations, 1901, appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.
11. For text, see p. 153.
12. See telegram No. 1869, December 1, 1941, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 148.