740.0011Pacific War/545
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
At the request of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs I called on him for a second interview at 9:30 this evening. He said that at noon tomorrow the Japanese Government would issue an official statement of the agreement reached with the Vichy Government concerning Japan’s proposed movement into Indochina but that in view of the concern of the United States he wished to explain to me in advance the reasons and intentions of such movement. Admiral Toyoda thereupon handed to me a document in Japanese accompanied by an unofficial English translation the text of which was transmitted to the Department in the Embassy’s telegram No. 1088, July 26, 2 a.m.26
After reading the document I said that I would transmit it promptly to my Government but that in the meantime I could best reply to certain points contained therein by conveying to the Minister the statement issued to the press by the Acting Secretary of State yesterday. I thereupon read to the Minister such portions of the Acting Secretary’s statement as were picked up on the radio today and said that I would send to him tomorrow the complete text when finally received tonight.
In further discussion I emphasized and elaborated certain pertinent points in Mr. Welles’ statement. I spoke of the utter fallacy of the charge of “encirclement” and of the concept that Japan was acting for the “safety and protection of Indochina”. I said that I was glad to take note of the phrase in the Japanese statement that “Japan has no intention at all of making the southern part of Indochina a base of armed advancement against adjoining areas” but that my Government and I myself had met with so many bitter disappointments during the past several years in the illusory nature of promises and assurances conveyed to me by former Japanese Ministers that we were now unavoidably obliged to rely on facts and actions rather than upon words. The Minister did not attempt to refute this statement but he earnestly begged me to believe him.
[Page 318]As the conversation continued I spoke in detail of the successive steps of the Japanese southward advance culminating for the present in the proposed occupation of bases in southern Indochina and the consequent endangering of the safety of other areas in the Pacific including the Philippine Islands and I elaborated the practical and logical reasons for our concern in the safety of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies which were definitely threatened by this advance.
The Minister did not try to refute my argument except to repeat the peaceful intentions of the proposed Japanese move into Indochina and to take issue with our use of the term “occupation” in connection therewith since Japan had no territorial ambitions. I replied that the term “occupation” connoted no question of time.
In closing our conversation the Minister earnestly appealed to me to use my best efforts to convey to my Government Japan’s peaceful intentions and the great importance of avoiding at this critical moment measures which would provoke the Japanese people and render difficult the efforts to improve the relations between Japan and the United States. He said that he would convey to Admiral Nomura the substance of our conversation.
- Telegram No. 1088 not printed; translation of the Japanese document is printed infra.↩