Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/1395

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[Tokyo,] December 6, 1939.

Mr. Yoshizawa asked whether I would be interested in hearing the report of the Japanese Ambassador at Washington on his last conversation, that of November 24, with the Secretary of State. Upon my reply that I would, Mr. Yoshizawa read the telegraphic report, which followed that of the report received by us from the Department. The former was, however, much longer and gave a more detailed account of the conversation. It was interesting to note that Mr. Horinouchi completely missed the Secretary’s observation with regard to the lack of surprise which would attend any treaty arrangement between Japan and the Soviet Union: he understood the Secretary to say that the United States would be more surprised by such an arrangement than it was by the non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany.

Mr. Yoshizawa then referred to the desire expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the course of his conversation on December 4 with the Ambassador, that members of the Foreign Office and of the Embassy meet at frequent intervals to discuss China problems and that they constitute themselves into an informal standing committee. With that statement in mind, Mr. Yoshizawa had asked me to call so that we might informally talk over matters of procedure.

He said that the Foreign Office had closely studied the list of “cases” presented by the Ambassador to Admiral Nomura on November 4, and that the position was somewhat more favorable than that indicated by our list. This could be explained largely by the fact that a number of cases had been settled “on the spot”, as he put it, that is, following negotiations in China, without such settlements having been recorded in correspondence between the Embassy and the Foreign Office. The number of cases of bombings, including cases of machinegunning by Japanese airplanes, stands now at 144, and the number of cases of occupation of American properties, destruction, looting, et cetera, at 73. He regarded these two groups of cases as constituting one category.

There were then a number of cases and problems with a politico-economic complexion. They involved in varying degrees high policy and did not, therefore, lend themselves readily to solution. They were:

1. Shanghai International Settlement.

2. Customs and currency.

3. The maintenance of the Salt Gabelle and the servicing of loans secured by the salt tax.

4. Chefoo Harbor Improvement Committee.

5. Navigation of the Yangtze River.

6. Moneys due for goods sold on credit to the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway.

7. Taxes imposed at Kaifeng and Tatung on oil brought in by the Standard Oil Company.

8. Prohibition on exports from North China on hides and skins.

9. Control of trade at Chefoo.

10. Purchases of leaf tobacco in Central China and Shantung by the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company.

These were admittedly difficult questions, as military operations, the suppression of financial and other forms of assistance to the Chinese Government, et cetera, had to be considered with a view to terminating the hostilities in China as soon as possible. Given goodwill on both sides, however, he thought that discussions could be carried on in a constructive spirit and that substantial progress could be made.

There were finally the basic and fundamental problems. Obviously there was little that could be done now in the way of examining principles of policy, such as the territorial and administrative integrity of China, but Mr. Yoshizawa hoped that we could put forward our respective views for purposes of clarification. Such clarification would be helpful against the time when conditions would make possible a search for definitive adjustment of views.

Having classified the various problems, Mr. Yoshizawa proceeded to discuss measures which might be taken by Japan to meet the American position. He divided these into two categories: negative and positive. The negative measures covered the stopping of action on the part of the Japanese directly injurious to American lives and property, such as bombings, looting, forcible occupation of mission premises, et cetera, and compensation in some form for damage already done. He said that the committee set up to examine claims had completed investigation of 39 cases which occurred in the area between Shanghai and Nanking. Mr. Yoshizawa had his assistant bring in the documents, and he showed me the stack of papers about a foot high as evidence of the work which the committee had already done. The committee had recommended the payment in a number of instances of moneys as ex gratia donations, scaled according to the strength of the evidence of Japanese responsibility for the damage done. These cases would be shortly taken up with the American Consul General at Shanghai with a view to settlement.

Mr. Yoshizawa said that the plan which he presented about two weeks ago to Admiral Nomura for the conversation with Mr. Grew which eventually took place on December 4 contemplated that the conversation cover only the “negative” measures which Japan could take, but that Admiral Nomura was insistent that indication be given at the same time of the “positive” measures which the Japanese Government was prepared to take to improve or ameliorate conditions in China affecting the exercise by Americans of their rights. He had, however, represented to Admiral Nomura that it was necessary for the Japanese Government to keep its feet on the ground and to await developments which would make possible the implementation of promises to take positive action calculated to improve conditions. The first of these developments must be the setting up of the new central regime under Wang Ching-wei, and that was to take place in the near future. It was his intention, then, to propose a further conversation between Admiral Nomura and Mr. Grew in order that the plan of the Japanese Government for the further meeting of the American position could be presented. Such measures as could be taken would touch largely on the cases of a politico-economic character above listed as the second category of outstanding questions.

Mr. Yoshizawa then expressed disappointment over the unfavorable publicity in the United States with regard to the steps already taken by the Japanese to improve the situation. It was a fact that bombings had practically stopped, that American properties had been evacuated, and that some claims had been settled, and he thought that it might be advisable for the Foreign Office to give out some facts. I said to Mr. Yoshizawa that, in my opinion, the giving out of publicity at this time would be a mistake, as it would be difficult for the Japanese to make any correct statement which could have any beneficial result. I referred to the large number of replies that we had recently received from the Foreign Office on bombing cases, and I pointed out that mere mention of the fact that replies had been recently made in 59 cases of bombing would probably give the public the impression that progress was being made, whereas in point of fact the replies contained in every instance disclaimer of Japanese responsibility. Every statement given out by the Foreign Office would, I felt certain, require further counter publicity to put it in accurate perspective. Mr. Yoshizawa said that there was no pretense that the replies which I mentioned were conclusive and final. The Foreign Office had failed thus far to take cognizance of our various notes, and the replies which had been sent were intended to discharge the obligation of the Foreign Office to indicate that it was seized of these matters. So far as the question of publicity was concerned, the last thing he wished to do was to start a controversy in the press of both countries.

In concluding the conversation I said that I would report to the Ambassador the general line of procedure proposed. Mr. Yoshizawa suggested that we meet again early next week.