894.00/856: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
235. 1. Before departing tonight on leave and confiding the Embassy to the effective hands of Dooman in whose judgment and analytical [Page 2] ability I have full confidence and whose views on policy and procedure coincide very closely with mine, I wish to submit the following analysis of the political situation in Japan as I estimate it up to date.
2. In a long farewell conversation this morning with the Foreign Minister and in a talk which he had with Dooman yesterday, Arita said that the new agreement now under discussion with Germany and Italy2 will contain no military or political commitments except such as may apply directly to combating communistic activities. Japan desires to avoid European entanglements. Nevertheless, Japan regards the Soviet Government and the Comintern as identical and if Soviet Russia should become involved in a European war Japan herself might find it impossible to avoid involvement. If Great Britain and France conclude an alliance with Soviet Russia, Japan may be obliged to reconsider her position vis-à-vis the totalitarian states. Apart from the specific field of combating communistic activities, it will be the careful aim of Japan in every other field to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian states.
Arita spoke with some bitterness of the efforts of Great Britain to draw Russia into a military alliance. It was all very well to say, as Craigie3 had said to him, that the proposed British plan would not be applicable in the Far East, but the fact is that Russia straddles both Europe and Asia; even if the British plan were specifically to exclude the Far East, the close association which it would bring about among Great Britain, France, and Russia would inevitably lead to the closest collaboration in the pursuit of their policies in the Far East. Japan, as before stated, has every desire to avoid involvement in every instance and to maintain a neutral position between the two groups, but if the British plan goes through and thus prepares a basis for concerted action in the Far East by the democracies, Japan would necessarily have to reconsider her position vis-à-vis Germany and Italy. In this connection, he went on to say that if war were to break out in Europe—and he believes that there is no immediate danger—and the United States becomes involved, the position which Russia might take might conceivably decide whether peace could be maintained between the United States and Japan.
3. The Minister made to me the following confidential oral statement:
“Japan is bound to Germany and Italy by the tie of anti-communism and as we deem it necessary, further strengthening of [Page 3] this bond is being seriously considered. But if any one should regard Japan, because she had taken such a measure, as joining into the camp of totalitarian nations in opposition to the democratic nations, he would surely be misunderstanding the true intention of the Japanese Government. Japan is not a totalitarian, no more than a democratic, state. She has an original constitution of her own which is centered around the Imperial family, and is based on the spirit of levying [allowing?] everything to have its own proper place, surpassing all ideas of antagonism. In joining hands with Germany and Italy we have no other purposes than to combat the destructive activities of Comintern. If the United States, not understanding the true intention of Japan on this point, should base her future policies on such misunderstanding, it would bring about a deplorable situation not only respecting the relations between the United States and Japan but also in respect of the peace of the world.”
4. Arita said to me, and I believe his statement to be accurate, that there is now no substantial opposition in the Government to the proposed arrangement with Germany and Italy as now formulated. At the present moment the Cabinet appears to have weathered the recent storm and to be momentarily secure. I do not, however, believe that this present security can be regarded as permanent because [of] many divergent forces active within the country.
5. In my conversation with the Foreign Minister I then turned to the question of America’s legitimate rights and interests in China which are now subject to serious interference by Japan and I stated that Japanese-American relations could not be expected to improve until these interferences were removed. I also emphasized the deplorable effects of the bombing operations.4 What might I tell my Government on these points?
6. The Minister’s reply was ambiguous and vague. He said that most of the interferences of which we complained were temporary and would disappear as military necessity permitted but that certain measures, such as exchange control in North China, might be permanent. There is no intention, he said, to limit American trade beyond the requirements of military necessity or to discriminate against American commerce.5 There is also no intention to take over the International Settlements in Shanghai6 or Kulangsu but greater cooperation on the part of the Settlement authorities is hoped for. In connection with the general question of economic rights and interests in China, he said that the feeling of resentment in this country against Great Britain is so strong that it was hopeless to try to improve relations with that country. He would be satisfied if his efforts were successful to prevent these relations from becoming worse than [Page 4] they now are. The position with regard to relations with the United States was an entirely different one, as there is a general call for improvement. He was making a strong effort along those lines and hoped to be able to show concrete results before long.
7. The Minister then made to me the following confidential oral statement:
“I have previously stated frankly my opinion regarding the new order in East Asia and we have had occasions of exchanging views on this question. However, I regret to say that Japan’s position does not seem to have been fully understood.
I wish to take this opportunity to emphasize once again that the Japanese Government in establishing the new order have no intention of excluding trade and other legitimate economic activities in China of the countries of Europe and America. The establishment of a new order is not exclusive in character as is thought in some quarters, but is the means by which trade and other economic relations between East Asia and the European and American countries will eventually prosper on a sound basis.
As Japan is now carrying on large-scale military operations, and has only recently embarked upon the undertaking of realizing the ideal of the establishment of a new order, the military or economic necessity require some measures which may cause inconveniences to nationals of the third powers and affect their rights and interests. But, since such measures are, as a rule, exceptional and temporary in character, any judgment formed on the basis of the present abnormal conditions is apt to lead to misunderstanding of the real intention of Japan. Such an outcome is much to be regretted as being likely to disturb the foundation of the relations between Japan and the United States, the two countries which should always remain friendly to each other. Therefore it is earnestly desired that, in dealing with various questions arising between our two countries with regard to China, the United States will understand that large-scale military operations are in progress over an extremely wide area and will at the same time consider the new situation in East Asia on a broader perspective so that she will arrive at a balanced judgment.”
He amplified this statement by reverting to one of his favorite themes: National defense has an economic as well as a military aspect. The United States is well equipped in both respects; however, while Japan has an army and navy strong enough to meet any military threat, her economic defense is inadequate; and she cannot enjoy a sense of security until the deficiencies in the latter respect have been made good.
8. The Minister on his own initiative then turned to the subject of the so-called “South Sea advance” and made to me the following confidential oral statement:
“We understand that, since the military occupation of Hainan Island by Japan and the placing of the Sinnan Gunto (Spratly Islands) under the jurisdiction of the Formosan Government General,6a [Page 5] rumors have spread, giving the impression as though Japan entertained some territorial designs toward the South Seas; that as a result certain interested countries are apprehensive, and that even some Americans have a similar apprehension with regard to the Philippines. The Japanese Government consider it regrettable from the standpoint of Japanese-American friendship that such apprehension has been aroused. They are, therefore prepared, if the United States Government should desire that some step be taken by the Japanese Government for the purpose of dispelling such apprehension, to enter into conversation with the United States Government.”
Cipher texts by mail to Shanghai, Chungking, Peiping.
- Telegram in six sections.↩
- For documents concerning the relations of Japan with the European Axis Powers, see pp. 153 ff.↩
- British Ambassador in Japan.↩
- See vol. i, pp. 487 ff.↩
- See ibid., pp. 757 ff.↩
- See ibid., pp. 838–848.↩
- See pp. 277 ff.↩