711.94/1366
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The Japanese Ambassador called this afternoon to see me at his request and in view of the return of the Secretary of State the Ambassador was received by the Secretary in the latter’s office.
After the customary preliminary exchanges of courtesies the Secretary waited for the Ambassador to commence the conversation. The Ambassador stated that he was calling solely of his own initiative and not by instruction of his Government and that the purpose of his call was to undertake a general exchange of views in as much as the Ambassador believed that there was considerable, and perhaps increasing, misunderstanding on the part of public opinion in the United States of the course pursued by Japan in China and of the policy of the Japanese Government in its relations with China. The Ambassador stated that the two principles of Japanese policy towards China were, first, the desire of Japan to guard against the spirit of communism in China, and second, the need of Japan to assure herself of satisfactory economic relations between China and Japan. The Ambassador went on to say that the Government of Japan had made every effort to satisfy these two objectives through negotiations with the government of General Chiang Kai Shek, but that unfortunately negotiations had proved fruitless and there had arisen the major conflict now going on between Japan and China. As a result of this conflict many areas in China were under the occupation of the Japanese Army and as a result of this situation “inconvenience”, as the Ambassador phrased it, had resulted to American nationals and to American business interests. At the same time, the Japanese Government had given the most positive [Page 37] instructions to its military authorities in China that such impediments to American nationals and business interests should be avoided in so far as might be possible and it was the belief of the Government of Japan that as soon as hostilities ceased these obstacles to American nationals and commercial interests could be immediately lessened and eventually removed. The Ambassador stated that the Government of Japan abided by the principles of the Open Door in China and that the impediments and prejudices from which American nationals and business interests in China were now suffering should be regarded as only temporary in character.
The Ambassador said that he realized that relations between Japan and the United States were somewhat “strained” and that it was his earnest desire as Ambassador here to do everything that might be possible to improve relations, but that he did not feel that a satisfactory result in this sense could be obtained if the two governments devoted themselves to a discussion of “principles”. On the contrary he felt that an effort should be made to discuss a practical solution of the problems which had arisen. The Ambassador then went on to say that the liberal elements in Japan as well as the business interests in Japan were sincerely friendly to the people of the United States and earnestly desired an improvement in relations between the two countries, but that if no such improvement were forthcoming they would unquestionably become “disappointed”; and if no means of obtaining economic cooperation from the United States were found, these elements in Japan would possibly find it necessary to look elsewhere for these means of economic cooperation, and that arrangements between Japan and Soviet Russia for economic cooperation might consequently be the inevitable result.
When the Ambassador had concluded, the Secretary replied by saying that he, of course, was confident of the Ambassador’s individual desire to bring back relations between the two countries to that standard of friendship which the two peoples had enjoyed for a period of two generations. He said that he felt sure that the Japanese Government must appreciate that no country had pursued a policy of greater friendship towards Japan than the United States, and that while at times both Governments felt that developments had occurred which were not to their liking, he nevertheless believed that the Japanese people must appreciate the fact that the Government of the United States had no ambitions for territorial expansion in the Far East, nor was it pursuing any policy actuated by selfish motives which could be construed as prejudicial to Japan. He said that the innumerable incidents involving the infringement of the rights of the United States in China and the legitimate treaty interests of American nationals in China were a matter of legitimate concern to the American people [Page 38] and that this Government felt that this condition could not go on for an indefinite period. The Secretary stated that it was particularly disappointing to this Government, when it called attention to these infringements of its legitimate rights and of the interests of its nationals in China, to obtain the impression from the Japanese Government that such action on our part was likely to create a feeling on the part of the Japanese people that they wished to replace their relations with the United States by closer relations with another power. The Secretary added that whatever surprise might be created in the United States by the development of closer relations between Japan and another power, it would not be equivalent to the surprise which was created when Hitler entered into closer relations with that same foreign power.23b
The Ambassador was much taken aback with this remark, of which he undoubtedly gained the full significance.
The Secretary then inquired whether it was correct that Japan had some 800,000 troops now engaged in hostilities in China. The Ambassador replied that he was not precisely informed on that point, but that he thought that if the Secretary referred to the troops stationed in Manchuria as well as in China proper, that might be a correct estimate.
The Secretary then inquired what was the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to that number of troops in China. The Ambassador replied that after hostilities had ceased undoubtedly the major part of the troops would be removed. The Ambassador went on to say that after the kidnapping of General Chiang Kai Shek23c a deal had been made by his wife and other friends with the communist leaders in China so that General Chiang would no longer attack the communists and would attack Japan, and that it was for that reason that Japan found it impossible to negotiate with General Chiang’s government. He said, however, that the Japanese Government believed that a new Chinese Government would soon be installed with which the Japanese Government could undertake negotiations providing for settlement of all the matters at issue.
The Secretary inquired whether the retention of Japanese troops in China by Japan would be for the purpose of bolstering up that government and maintaining it in power. The Ambassador answered that undoubtedly Japanese troops would be maintained after the creation of this new Chinese government for a sufficient time in order to obtain assurance that order would be maintained, et cetera, but that eventually the number left would be very small.
[Page 39]The Secretary then inquired whether the retention of Japanese troops in China would mean that the same measures of discrimination against American trade, exchange control, et cetera, would likewise be kept in force because of the continued presence of Japanese troops in China. The Ambassador answered that while the war was being waged in China by Japan measures such as the imposition of exchange control, et cetera, were required in order to make it possible for the Japanese forces to obtain food supplies, clothing, et cetera, but that after hostilities had ceased these measures would be greatly relaxed and the “inconvenience” to American interests would be correspondingly diminished.
The Secretary then inquired whether this Government was to take as accurate the interpretations given to the “new order in the East” enunciated by Japanese statesmen in Japan. The Ambassador replied that he believed that the interpretation given by Prince Konoye was to be regarded as accurate, as were the bases for peace with China enunciated by Prince Konoye in December 1938. The Secretary stated that the implications of such interpretations of the new order in the East were necessarily of very great concern to the American public because of the impressions thereby created that the rights of the United States in China and the rights and interests of its nationals were to be determined as the Japanese Government saw fit and not as treaties and international law laid them down.
The Ambassador again referred to the belief he had expressed before that a satisfactory solution of these problems could be found in a practical way provided the two Governments did not limit themselves to a consideration of principles.
The Secretary then stated that if that was the case, it seemed to him that the first move must legitimately and logically come from the Japanese Government in order that this Government might be advised as to the practical manner in which the Japanese Government proposed to remove the obstacles to friendly relations between the two Governments in accordance with the Ambassador’s expressed desire. It was made very clear to the Ambassador that this Government expected the Japanese Government to present concrete evidence of the manner in which the legitimate grounds for complaint on the part of this Government were to be removed and that this Government did not feel called upon to take the initiative in making any suggestions of this character.
The Secretary concluded the conversation by telling the Ambassador that he should feel free to come in to see him at any time should he have any suggestions of this character to offer.