893.0146/702
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Ambassador of Japan called at his own request. He said that he had had a number of dispatches from his Government since our conference a week ago yesterday, at which time we discussed the reported [Page 16] plans or threats of Japan to push the British and French guards or troops out of Shanghai, thus leaving the British and French sectors unguarded. The Ambassador prefaced his statement by bringing into the scope of our discussion the guards or troops located at Tientsin and Peking. I interrupted to say that, while our conversation of last week related primarily to the International Settlement situation at Shanghai, I had also in mind the Tientsin and Peking situations but assumed that no discussion of them was necessary for the reason that the rights of all foreign governments, including those of Japan and the United States, were definitely and firmly fixed by the Boxer Protocol;16 that I further assumed that this international agreement would not be violated, and, hence, no particular reference to those two situations appeared to be as urgent as the Shanghai question. The Ambassador told me his Government had instructed him to elaborate on what he had said to me last week in our conference.
He then proceeded to relate, more or less in the way of repetition, in fact, that the British and French troops in China were more or less of a menace to peace and might involve Japan in the European war situation; that if Italy should enter the war, the Italian troops at Shanghai might clash with the British and French troops; that German nationals in Shanghai might easily be attacked by British troops or at least a clash might occur between them; that Japan was very desirous of remaining neutral in the European war situation, and that these steps, in the way of friendly advice, to get the British and French to withdraw their troops would clarify the peace situation and remove possible dangers of clashes and military complications, as already stated. The Ambassador finally added that, of course, his Government had no idea or purpose to invite the guards or troops of my Government to leave Shanghai. This was the substance of his comment, which was chiefly a repetition of what he had said last week. It was all in a friendly tone and conveyed nothing resembling threats on the part of his Government towards this Government, but, on the contrary, he indicated that our two governments would or might be in key positions to promote peace when and if the psychological occasion should present itself.
I said that I desired first to draw the attention of his Government to what my Government considers a definite, clean-cut distinction between regular military forces and the guards or troops of my Government, the Japanese and other governments which were first installed in China in connection with the Boxer Rebellion and also in connection with the International Settlement at Shanghai. I said [Page 17] that the primary function of these armed guards is to protect their respective nationals against mob violence or violence from other uncontrolled forces in those areas of China which the regular police protection could not cope with; that these are really guards and not forces intended to perform the regular functions of military forces; that, therefore, I thought the Government of Japan was not now in a position to justify a proposal, apparently serious, to induce these British and French guards to retire, on the theory that their functions are those of regular military forces; that I would request the Government of Japan to give this point further consideration and also to keep in mind the fact that these local questions pertaining to guards of my Government and the Japanese and other governments in China are not legitimately related, certainly to any major or serious extent, to whatever plan or program Japan has in China at present, whether it be a program of preserving order or of absolute subjugation; that, therefore, I considered it to the interest of both my Government and that of Japan as well to take the position that these questions have no legitimate relationship to the controversy between Japan and China for the reason that they are essentially international in their nature and separate from Japanese-Chinese controversies, just as they have been considered as separate from purely Chinese governmental affairs in the past. I emphasized the view of this Government that should the Japanese get the British and French guards out of Shanghai, it would have the effect of disrupting the whole government situation, would seriously affect the rights and interests of Americans there, and would be calculated to create the impression among the people of the United States that there was basis to reports already rife, to the effect that Japan’s purpose is to sweep all foreigners out of China; that, furthermore, compared to any trivial advantage a change in the Shanghai situation might be to Japan, the misunderstanding and the feeling aroused among the American people against Japan would result in an immense net loss to his country. I said that I need not remind the Ambassador that this Government had publicly announced that its policy was to remove its guards from China as soon as the Chinese authorities became able to preserve order and to afford protection to our nationals and their interests; that this Government was virtually reaching the stage when this step would be deemed feasible at the precise time that Japan moved her military forces into China, and that, of course, we had not been in a position since that time to bring our guards out. I said that so far as the Shanghai situation was concerned, while the armed forces which my Government and other governments have there are for guard purposes primarily, yet when it came to removing them by any threat of force or undue insistence bordering on duress, [Page 18] they would become a symbol of their respective nations, which, in the psychological effect is of immeasurably greater importance than any small benefits Japan might acquire by forcing the moving out of these guards.
The Ambassador remarked that the Japanese were undertaking by amicable discussion to settle all these matters. I expressed my gratification at this assurance, and emphasized the definite policy of this Government to settle all matters with other governments by amicable and friendly discussion and not to cease until ways were found to that end. I then said to the Ambassador, as he kept repeating his foregoing statement, that he, of course was aware of the reports, already referred to, to the effect that his Government seeks to clear out all foreigners from China, and I then said that I would like to bring his attention especially to this fact, namely, that on yesterday when Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, was in the act of leaving for the Pan American Conference at Panama, which would deal with phases of commerce and finance, the President and I gave special instructions that in any resolutions we presented, absolute equality of industrial rights and opportunities should be preserved and kept open as heretofore to Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France, and all other nations of the world alike, and I then said, “Why is it that your Government does not pursue this spirit as well as this policy and make it known to all so there can be no misunderstanding?” The Ambassador straightened up in his chair but offered no particular reply except to say that of course he understood the idea I was undertaking to emphasize. He then said that, of course, his Government had no idea of inviting this Government to take its guards out of Shanghai, much less of threatening force for that purpose; that his Government would expect to confer with this Government about the policing situation in so far as the guards were concerned, and he indicated that that would be its policy with respect to the guards in other places. I again came back to the proposition that in my profound belief the ideas I had expressed for this Government were virtually of the same interest to the Government of Japan; that I was satisfied the Japanese proposal to oust guards of the British and French would have the definite result of breaking down and destroying the International Settlement with the resultant serious practical difficulties which would arise between our two countries and that I simply could not follow the reasoning of his Government in its efforts to link these almost purely international phases with whatever program the Japanese Government might have in China from a military standpoint. I again requested the Ambassador to bring up these differing and opposing viewpoints with his Government and to urge it to give them further consideration. The Ambassador [Page 19] spoke about his Government acting without special relations with other governments, and I replied that I was speaking only for my Government, which at all times maintains the fullest freedom of action, and I added that, of course, there were instances where there were common interests and common purposes, etc., when parallel action with other governments would be natural. When the Ambassador said that his Government would expect to confer with this Government in regard to the policing situation at Shanghai, I made no comment. I then added that, of course, taking the genesis of the entire situation there and considering all of its phases, past and present, my Government could not bring out its guards on the basis of an unwarranted suggestion or threat by another government. The Ambassador made no comment on this. He left with the promise that he would take the matters up further as I had requested.
- Final protocol between China and other powers, signed September 7, 1901, Foreign Relations, 1901, appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.↩