762.9411/48: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
916. The signing of the Japanese-German-Italian alliance is obviously a tremendous Japanese gamble on the defeat of Britain by Germany. [Page 170] In an off-the-record talk with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Grew informally expressed his opinion that Japan by tying herself to the Reich would become merely a satellite of Germany, however the war in Europe turned out. Mr. Grew said that in his opinion the present Japanese course must throw Japan on the rocks; that Germany is not and will not be in any position really to support Japan, no matter what intentions along that line Germany may have expressed. Japan, by tying herself to an economic bloc in East Asia which is economically unsound and sacrificing the flow of free commerce with the world, is putting her financial and economic future in a hopeless position. Matsuoka commented only that these things were matters of opinion. Mr. Grew has heard but is without confirmation that an outright alliance was opposed by the Foreign Minister himself.
Although the alliance with the Axis has of course been a potentiality from the inception of the present government8a and its trend of policy, few observers expected it to materialize so rapidly. There was of course considerable speculation prompted by the secretiveness of all the proceedings. However, right up to the last moment some members of the diplomatic corps failed to believe that the pact had actually evolved. Two hours before the pact was to be signed in Berlin a usually well-informed American newspaper correspondent in Tokyo was completely unaware of the development. Stahmer8b is believed to have been responsible for actual negotiations in Japan.
The value of the alliance to the European side of the Axis is obvious, but the value of it to Japan is certainly less clear. Obviously the primary aim of the pact is the United States, and the German-Italian hope is naturally that the pact will increase American fears of developments in the Pacific. The proportionate gain to Japan seems to be much less. There may of course be secret provisions to the treaty. Such provisions might be: (1) The agreement of the U. S. S. R. to an arrangement freeing Japan of anxiety on the Russian front, (2) intervention by Germany looking to mediation between China and Japan, (3) Axis support for Japan in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina. With regard to the first point, although there is wide talk of the conclusion of a U. S. S. R.-Japan nonaggression agreement there is no real information available as to Russia’s stand. The Ambassador of the U. S. S. R. told a member of the diplomatic corps in Tokyo on September 28 that he had not had any knowledge before the alliance of its terms. With regard to German mediation in the China conflict, it is not seen that that is possible, barring Soviet pressure on the Chiang Kai-shek government. In Indochina the German-controlled government at Vichy is probably [Page 171] able to guarantee Japan’s freedom to carry out her plans in Indochina. What is possibly one of the most dangerous potential consequences of the alliance is a possible ruthless application of power by Germany in Holland to bring about changes in the situation in the Dutch East Indies.
Yesterday Mr. Grew was told in confidence by an officer of the Gaimusho who is sympathetic to the United States and Britain that if the British were to make a public offer of the use of the Singapore base to America, or if an American squadron were to visit Singapore, this would be the most effective possible counter to the alliance, and, the official believed, would give pause to the extremists in Japan.