893.00P.R./27
The Chargé in China (Perkins) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 13, 1930.]
Sir: In accordance with the Department’s instruction No. 78, of October 9, 1925,56 I have the honor to submit the following summary, with index, of events and conditions in China during November, 1929:
The meager and conflicting evidences of progress made during the month toward an adjustment of the problems confronting an harassed central Government revealed that, as a whole, conditions in November were as unsatisfactory as they were during the critical month of October.
On November 1st, Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang, in an interview with foreign newspaper correspondents at his headquarters near Taiyuanfu, assumed sixty per cent of the responsibility for the October Kuominchun revolt, allocating the remaining forty per cent of the responsibility to Marshal Yen Hsi-shan who characteristically gave no evidence either of accepting or refusing the burden. The Kuominchun revolt loomed ominously at that time but by November 20th the military situation in Honan seemed to have turned definitely in favor of the Government troops, and a settlement, generally accepted to be based largely on financial considerations, was in sight. This victory for Nanking was offset, however, by an intensification of the disturbances in Kwangsi and Kwangtung, incident to the uprising of the “Ironsides” under General Chang Fa-kwei who threatened Canton at the end of November and who, in cooperation with the old Kwangsi clique, seemed to envisage the establishment of an independent government in South China under the leadership of Mr. Wang Ching-wei.
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The Kuominchun Revolt
During the latter half of October and the first half of November, the Kuominchun stubbornly resisted the National Government forces massed in Honan and north Hupeh and at one time threatened to take Hankow. The following comment on the rather abrupt cessation of military operations in connection with the revolt is based on a report by the Consul General at Hankow:
The heartening presence of Chiang Kai-shek in the fighting zone near Hsuchong (Honan) on November 1st was most opportune, as it is very doubtful whether the military strength of the National forces [Page 181] otherwise would have been sufficient to withstand Feng Yü-hsiang’s attacks. General Chiang Kai-shek was at the front for about three weeks, the line being held substantially intact from his arrival until the time of the negotiations which brought the conflict to an end, at least temporarily. The collapse of the Kuominchun fighting front coincided with the arrival at Hsuchong of Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, for a conference with General Chiang, and it was generally felt in Hankow and in other ports along the Yangtze River that an arrangement had been made whereby, on the payment of a substantial sum of money, Feng Yü-hsiang’s troops would be withdrawn from Hupeh and Honan. A few days after the conference, the Kuominchun troops began to evacuate the territory which they had been occupying in the two provinces, and within ten days practically all the Northwest army had been withdrawn.
Kwangsi Disturbances
The month opened with a continuing heavy movement of Cantonese troops to the northern borders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi to repel the invasion of the “Ironsides”, under General Chang Fa-kwei. Canton was uneasy, with the Government taking every precaution against communist and other disorders. On November 20th the Consul General at Canton informed the Legation that the Cantonese authorities were feverishly preparing to defend the city against attack, that only military trains were running on the Samshui and the Canton-Hankow railways, and that rumors were rife that several of the larger ships in the Cantonese navy were doubtful in their allegiance and might turn against the local Government should opportunity occur. In the official notice of the closing of the West River, issued at the time, the Cantonese authorities announced that the Kwangsi leaders Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hung had returned to Kwangsi to operate with Chang Fa-kwei against Canton. The month closed with a general engagement expected within a few days. The Kwangsi-Ironside forces were reported to outnumber the Cantonese two to one, but the Cantonese authorities appeared to be confident that they could defend the city with the assistance of incoming northern troops and airplanes.
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Rendition of British Concession at Chinkiang
In notes of October 31st, exchanged between the British and Chinese Governments,57 was embodied an agreement “to return to the National Government of the Republic of China as from November 15th the area of land known as the British Concession at Chin-kiang”. [Page 182] The agreement provides (1) that documents of title to the lots of land in the concession are to be exchanged for Chinese deeds of perpetual lease; (2) that pending the promulgation by the National Government of a new law governing land taxation throughout China, and pending the actual application of that law throughout the Chinkiang district, the annual land tax to be paid by former holders of British Crown leases in the district is to remain at the old rate; and (3) that British firms at Chinkiang are to continue to enjoy the right of conveying goods, merchandise, and material across the Bund from godowns to pontoons or ships on the Yangtze and vice versa. A provision similar to point (2) was embodied in Annex 1 of the Agreement between Belgium and China for the Rendition of the Belgian Concession in Tientsin, signed on August 31st.58
In further notes, of November 9th, exchanged between the two countries,59 it is arranged to place the sum of $68,000, Chinese currency, at the disposal of two commissioners who are to scrutinize and settle claims for losses sustained by British subjects at Chinkiang in 1927.
As indicated in press comment at the time, Chinkiang, which is characterized as having “practically no prospects”, has been diminishing in importance, as the silting up of the south bank of the Yangtze causes the port to recede from navigable waters, so that the gain to China involved in its return is one of prestige rather than of “cold cash”.
I have [etc.]