893.00P.R./18

The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

No. 2049

Sir: In accordance with the Department’s instruction No. 78, of October 9, 1925,35 I have the honor to submit the following summary, with index, of events and conditions in China during March, 1929:

The disturbances of February, resulting in some cases from a disregard of the specific orders of the Nanking authorities and in others from avowed attempts to disrupt the unity of the country, brought into question the degree of real authority of the Central Government and suggested the possibility of an impending realignment of political forces whereby the group in power in Nanking would be replaced by a rival faction—presumably either by one of more liberal tendencies, under the leadership of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, or by the Kwangsi militarists. Realizing the danger confronting him and accepting the necessity of military action to consolidate his position General Chiang Kai-shek decided, during the period under review, to force the issue with the Kwangsi faction as the most immediately aggressive of his actual or potential rivals. “Under the Kuomintang Government there shall be no place for the Kwangsi Government,” General Chiang stated in a public announcement. The three Kwangsi leaders, Generals Li Tsung-jen, Li Chai-sum, and Pai Chung-hsi, were expelled from the Kuomintang; and at the end of the month a punitive expedition, the despatch of which was approved by the Third National Congress of the party, was launched against Hankow under the personal direction of General Chiang Kai-shek. Concentrations of troops to the reported number of 100,000 by Nanking and 60,000 by Hankow had taken place by the end of March, but no decisive engagement was fought. Kwangsi’s short-lived resistance collapsed early in April, the sudden debacle being caused by the defection of adherents and by poor leadership.

The Third National Congress was in session from March 15th to 28th inclusive. In spite of the fact that it was not truly representative of the country, being packed by delegates of the government’s selection, [Page 148] it would ordinarily have been the outstanding event of the month. As it was, the Congress was overshadowed in importance by the campaign of the Central Government allegedly for the purpose of coping with the disaffection at Hankow and perpetuating itself as a dominant political entity.

The impression prevailed during the month that the characteristic indeterminateness of Feng Yu-hsiang’s reaction to the crisis faced by a government to which he owed nominal allegiance resulted from his realization of the fact that serious fighting between Nanking and the Kwangsi faction would make him the dominant force in China. Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, General Yen Hsi-shan, and Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, however, are all reported to have informed Nanking that they would support the central authorities.

On March 20th the influence of the Nanking Government was at least ostensibly strengthened in North China when Kwangsi faction troops in Hopei, to the number of 50,000, formerly under the command of General Pai Chung-hsi, shifted their allegiance to General Tang Sheng-chih who now professes to support Chiang Kai-shek. It will be recalled that General Tang was ousted from the control of Hankow in the fall of 1927 by General Li Tsung-jen, then acting under the orders of General Chiang Kai-shek.

The struggle between Generals Liu Chen-nien and Chang Tsungchang in eastern Shantung continued intermittently throughout the month, the former as the alleged champion of the authority of the Central Government in that area and the latter in the franker role of independent Northern militarist. Chang Tsung-chang’s troops entered Chefoo on March 27th, and it was evident at the end of March that Liu Chen-nien, who was then surrounded at Ninghai, had been defeated.

General Li Chai-sum, perhaps the most influential of the Kwangsi leaders, decided, on receiving guarantees of protection from certain elder statesmen, to attend the Third National Congress, being actuated apparently by a desire to avert the menacing consequences of the February coup in Hunan. Following the March 27th session of the Congress, during which the motion was passed dismissing the three Kwangsi leaders, Li Chai-sum was placed under custody and became a prisoner at Tangshan, near Nanking. Considerable interest was aroused by the report that he even had been executed, but this was not confirmed during the period under review.

In Sino-Japanese relations the period was marked by the signature of notes in settlement of the Tsinan incident.36 Intelligence [Page 149] of the adjustment of the matter was very favorably received, editorial opinion in China being in general to the effect that the settlement constituted the most important occurrence in the country’s foreign affairs since the conclusion of the Sino-American Tariff Treaty of July 25, 1928.37

As previously reported by the Consul at Nanking, the ceremony for Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s interment, which had been scheduled to take place on March 12th, was postponed to June 1st, next, principally because the Chungshan Avenue, which connects the water-front with the tomb on the slope of Purple Mountain, had not yet been completed.

In a telegram of March 30th the Vice Consul in chargé at Yunnanfu informed the Legation that a resumption of fighting in southwestern China in sympathy with the disturbances on the Yangtze appeared to be likely. Mr. Chamberlain stated that Yunnan apparently would support the Nanking Government, opposing the provinces of Kwangsi and Kweichow which were affiliated with Hankow.

The period was marked in South China by a number of communist uprisings involving, in Kiangsi, the destruction of mission property. It was reported, in this relation, that two towns in Fukien had been captured and partially burned by a communist force from Kiangsi, said to have had five Russian advisers and to have numbered 6,000. The Consul in chargé at Foochow suggested that the occurrence might have been an opportunist adventure based on the hope of disturbances in the Yangtze valley incident to the Nanking-Hankow controversy. The places were later reported to have been retaken by government forces.

Relations Between Nanking and Hankow

The following account of the Nanking-Kwangsi conflict, as far as it had progressed during the period under review, is taken from a report by the Legation’s Military Attaché.

“…the preparations of General Chiang Kai-shek to effect a military show-down with the Kwangsi leaders began almost immediately after the affair at Changsha on February 21st and were continuous and expeditious. Despite the propaganda from Nanking designed to prove the Wuhan commanders to be the aggressors and despite the pretense of negotiating for a peaceful settlement with Li Tsungjen and Li Chi-sen, Chiang proceeded rapidly with his mobilization. The Kwangsi faction leaders undoubtedly had been truculent with Nanking in many instances. They withheld all revenues and did not even pretend to carry out Nanking’s mandates. They drove out Nanking’s appointees because the latter were engaged in intrigues [Page 150] to undermine Kwangsi influence in Hunan. Technically they were rebels against Nanking. From a practical Chinese political point of view they were a rival faction to Chiang Kai-shek and the Canton clique and were attempting to enlarge their control so as to challenge Chiang’s position in the government.

Having mobilized twelve divisions in the zone of operations with an absence of confusion indicating a degree of staff organization unusual in China, Chiang obtained authority from the party congress on March 23rd to handle the situation as the government saw fit. On March 27th, the order for the attack was issued. Six divisions under Liu Hsih made the main effort, advancing on Hankow along the north bank of the Yangtze. Chu Pei-teh with six divisions widely distributed along the western border of Kiangsi, moved into Hupeh and Hunan and guarded the south flank against possible Kwangsi reinforcements from Kwangtung and Kwangsi. As always, Feng Yu-hsiang’s attitude was in doubt. Nevertheless, his subordinate, Han Fu-chu, was ordered to advance on Hankow by the Kin-Han railway. Feng mobilized about five (and later seven) divisions in southern Honan under Han Fu-chu’s command, and declared his adherence to the Central Government.

The national navy, employing about 18 gunboats, operated in conjunction with the main effort. Chiang Kai-shek personally proceeded to the front on March 29th. The advance was a mere march. The Wuhan forces consisted of about five divisions on the north bank of the Yangtze. Everywhere they withdrew without fighting. A defensive line was constructed extending from Yanglo on the river northwest to the Kin-Han railway near Hwangpei, and for a while it seemed that a fight was expected here. By April 1st this line had been reached at Yanglo and the government forces were conducting a wide enveloping movement from the north.”

The Third National Congress of the Kuomintang

The following notes on the Third National Congress of Kuomintang Representatives in the main are based on a detailed report on the Congress by the Consul at Nanking:

The Second National Congress was convened in January, 1926, and according to the terms of the original constitution of the Party the third meeting should have been held in January of the following year. Military activity and political vicissitudes contributed toward making postponement inevitable and the Third National Congress did not meet until March 15, 1929. The closing ceremony took place on March 28th.

No major changes occurred in the high authorities of the Central Kuomintang as a result of the Congress and it was thought probable that there would be but slight modifications in the staffs of the various departments. In so far as could be ascertained, it appeared likely that few changes would be made in the National Government, the chief consequence of the Congress in that respect being a strengthening [Page 151] and consolidation of the government organization through the recognition accorded it by the Congress.

There is reason to believe that one of the chief causes for the Government’s postponing the holding of the Congress was that it was feared that a Left Wing victory would result therefrom. In order to minimize the possibility of such a contingency, the distribution of delegates to the Congress was arranged according to the following methods and in the following percentages:

Elected by Party members 25 per cent.
Selected by the Central Kuomintang after election by Party members 32½ per cent.
Appointed by the Central Kuomintang 42½ per cent.

It thus is apparent that of the total of 356 delegates the Organization Department of the Central Party Headquarters appointed or designated 294.

The following is a translation of an extract from the lengthy Manifesto passed by the Congress:

“The present Congress is coincident with the attainment of national unity and the inauguration of the Period of Political Tutelage. As Party members we must realize from our past painful experiences that it is absolutely necessary to follow the teachings of our late Leader and strive to mitigate the people’s sufferings. Otherwise how can we face our late comrades who made the supreme sacrifice? Judging from present circumstances we must admit that unless we carry out the Three Principles of the People in their entirety, we cannot hope to combat the imperialistic foreign powers and the revival of feudalism.

We hope that all Party members will take an optimistic view of the future, take counsels from the people, and obey the teachings of our late Leader. We further hope that our brethren throughout the whole country will give us their loyal and wholehearted support, at the same time impressing upon us the duty of exerting ourselves in the service of the Party and the Nation and courageously proceeding with the program of Revolution.”

A foreign critic of the work of the Congress expressed himself as follows in regard to it:

“Since 1927 the people and party members waited for the convening of this Congress to right their wrongs. The Congress met and faded away.”

Conditions in Eastern Shantung

The following summary of the situation in eastern Shantung during March is based on a despatch of April 3rd from the Consul at Chefoo:

There was no change in the local situation until March 23rd. The negotiations entered into at the end of February between General [Page 152] Liu Chen-nien, then in control of the Chefoo and Muping (Ninghai) area, and General Chang Tsung-ch’ang, the head of the attacking forces outside of that area, presumably were satisfactorily concluded on March 14th. The terms of settlement, however, were not carried out. It seemed that a sham battle for “face saving” was first planned, but the scheme evidently miscarried owing to the lack of faith of the opponents in each other. It is known that, the day before Liu Chen-nien retreated, a Chinese vessel which he had commandeered left Chefoo for Tengchowfu with two officers on board empowered to arrange for General Liu’s turnover, but that they arrived too late—Chang Tsung-ch’ang and his staff having already departed for the Fushan battle front, leaving no person of authority with whom to deal.

Liu Chen-nien’s eventual defeat was apparently due to the defection of a regiment under a Colonel Liang, a subordinate of General Ho I-san. These troops retreated instead of advancing as ordered and opened the front at Fushan for General Chang’s forces. On March 27th Chang Tsung-ch’ang’s troops captured Chefoo and hoisted the five-barred flag. There was no looting either on the part of the retreating or the victorious forces.

The month ended with Chefoo quiet and with telegraph, telephone and motor road communications once again restored. The only military operations were those involving the surrounding of the remnants of Liu Chen-nien’s forces in the walled city of Muping. General Liu was evidently desirous of surrendering, but up to April 3rd Chang Tsung-ch’ang had refused to entertain his overtures. To avoid the destruction of lives and property (Muping having a population of about 100,000), the Chinese Chamber of Commerce there was endeavoring to arrange the terms of surrender.

In a despatch of April 10th dealing with political conditions in his district during March, the Consul at Tsingtao reported that interest there in General Chang Tsung-ch’ang’s adventure was on the wane, it being felt that his chance for serious accomplishment and mischief had passed with the settlement of the Tsinan incident and with the success of General Chiang Kai-shek’s expedition against Hankow and the failure of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang to interfere therewith. Mr. Dorsey stated further that it grew increasingly probable that Feng Yu-hsiang would succeed to the control of Shantung, including Tsingtao.

Chang Tsung-ch’ang in the mean time was profiting from his occupation of Chefoo in raising for his own needs all the revenue that the district would yield.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I have [etc.]

J. V. A. MacMurray
  1. Not printed.
  2. For documents relating to the Tsinan incident, see Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. ii, pp. 136159, passim, and 219221. For text of the settlement of March 28, 1929, see The China Year Book, 1929–30, p. 892.
  3. Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. ii, p. 475.