711.933/72: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Paraphrase]
541. Reference your 213, June 25, 2 p.m.
- (1)
- I have no doubt that the Chinese do plan to force the extraterritoriality issue by January 1, 1930. They are emboldened to try this because they are convinced that the principal powers concerned (namely, the United States, Great Britain, and, in lesser degree, France, Japan, and the Netherlands) will not be able to agree on common action to maintain their rights and separately will yield the substance of their position in order to placate the Nationalist Government of China, thereby avoiding the sort of agitation which the Chinese Government can bring to bear against them. Should the Chinese be correct in this estimate, the fact may as well be faced that American and other foreign interests will be subjected in China to such treatment as will tend to drive them out and also to create ever-increasing tension in relations with China.
- (2)
- However, should the principal powers interested be resolutely determined to do what they can in retaining rights they still need, [Page 579] instead of the preservation of normal politico-economic relations with a country which is not yet in a position, as regards the administration of justice, to exercise the responsibilities of sovereignty, my firm belief is that it is quite possible for these powers successfully to resist the present Chinese effort to deprive them of their existing rights. Knowing the will of the powers is the fundamental matter involved, and I do not believe the Chinese would risk proceeding against that will if they were convinced it was shared by the four mentioned Governments or even by three of them, the United States, Great Britain, and France, with a sympathetic Japan. In fact, I am of the belief that the Chinese would not even try to force the issue if it were realized beyond peradventure by them that this step would antagonize the United States Government and jeopardize both the moral support now given them and the financial support they hope our people will give them. … Therefore, I feel it is entirely feasible for the United States, particularly in cooperation with Great Britain, France, and Japan, to prevent this issue being forced upon us by the Chinese.
- (3)
- The first step to that end would be to dispatch notes along the lines suggested in my 368, May 9, 5 p.m. However, it is, of course, to be anticipated that the Chinese will doubt whether we mean what the notes say or whether we are merely, for the sake of the record, entering pro forma protests pending readiness to yield our position. For our intention to be convincing, it would be necessary for the United States, in regard to the concrete case of the Provisional Court at Shanghai (see my 520, June 29, noon),74 to make unequivocally clear that repudiation of the 1926 rendition agreement would be regarded by us as restoring the status quo ante, thus forcing the reestablishment and maintenance by us of the Mixed Court as it existed prior to the Provisional Court’s institution. Further, it would be of the utmost value if the Secretary of State should impress upon the Chinese Minister that the continual presumption upon American goodwill and evading of obligations to the United States Government and people are not merely remote incidents (concerning which our interest is exhausted by routine representations of the Legation in China) but fundamentally concern our Government in determination of its attitude to the régime now seeking to be established as the Government of China. Should we make known, with sufficient firmness and definiteness, our unwillingness to tolerate any further disregard of our rights, I am certain in my own mind that we may expect not only to avert a premature forcing of the extraterritoriality issue, but also to find a greater Chinese disposition to respect American rights in other matters. I would make one proviso, [Page 580] namely, that the manifestation of our intention should occur soon enough to obviate the initiation and publicity for plans by the Chinese which would commit them to such an extent that a graceful withdrawal would not be possible.
- (4)
- …
- (5)
- From the indications I have received from my colleagues representing Great Britain, France, Japan, and the Netherlands, their Governments would appear to be disposed toward cooperation with the United States in making a stand upon extraterritoriality as a fundamental issue. My earnest hope is that the Secretary of State may see fit to assume the leadership and, supported by the other interested powers, to take a definite and prompt position in what seems to me to be the vital point in our China relations.
MacMurray