893.0146/120: Telegram
The Minister in China ( MacMurray ) to the Secretary of State
341. My No. 322, April 26, 7 p.m.19 The following received from American Consul General,20 Shanghai: [Page 541]
“May 1, noon. Referring to the Legation’s 72, of April 25, 6 p.m. The marines are here to protect American lives against possible emergency. Six months ago the moral effect of their presence was adequate to prevent an emergency but today I am not convinced that only moral effect is adequate. The Kuomintang and its agencies—antiforeign—are better organized today than ever before and therefore more self-confident. Consequently any conceived antiforeign or anti-Shanghai Municipal Settlement movement would be more dangerous than previously because of the unity of larger forces. This unity of organization has been evidenced in many ways, notably by the movement against the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce because out of necessity it was compelled to close the doors of its building to the National Salvation Association and Merchants Cooperative Society as well as to small organization[s] with the result that the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce at the instance of purely Kuomintang organization was ordered to be placed under arrest. Difficulties arising out of the rending or revision of the Provisional Court agreement after December 31st21 may easily precipitate a disturbance that would jeopardize the existence of the Settlement and American lives. The unsettled state of the extra-Settlement of the [sic] road question which the Chinese now refuse to consider in a reasonable manner furnishes another dangerous element that might prove to be a cause of disturbance with danger to American lives. The Chinese authorities do not show any greater tendency to observe existing agreements and established precedents than formerly and seemingly prefer to secure modifications in these agreements by devious methods calculated to create friction between Chinese and foreigners. Official support of anti-Japanese boycott is an outstanding but not isolated example.
This attitude of Chinese officialdom confident of their greater unity with the Kuo[mintang] and other organizations does not inspire confidence as long as a decidedly antiforeign policy is part of the program and the withdrawal or even material reduction of marine forces is viewed by me with great concern, especially since it might be misinterpreted by Chinese as an endorsement of their methods and policies. Pending a more reasonable attitude on the part of Chinese towards a settlement of local questions which are causing friction, the removal of the marines would be attended by an emergency threatening American lives which might easily be averted by retention of the marines until a settlement of these questions has been reached. There are too many lives and too much property at stake to hastily remove marines before a greater desire and ability are shown by Chinese to protect them. … In addition the present National Government is not by any means in control of all China so that any ebullition between these rival factions are bound to have their repercussions here. The above are what I believe to be controlling reasons for continuance of marines in Shanghai.”