861.77 Chinese Eastern/58: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in China ( MacMurray )

237. My 236, July 18, 5 p.m. Following is the account of my conversation with the Chinese Minister on July 18: I told Dr. Wu that I had sent for him because I was troubled by the press reports regarding the trouble in Manchuria between China and Russia. After explaining that my information from diplomatic sources was extremely meager I remarked that the news reports indicated the possibility of an armed clash. I pointed out that we were on the point of celebrating on July 24 the coming into effect of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, and alluded to its terms. I said that if we took the statements of China and Russia as reported in the press, they indicated that the dispute was of an eminently justiciable nature and one which was peculiarly fitted for arbitration. According to the press reports China claimed that the origin of the trouble was the violation by Russia of her treaty obligation not to use propaganda and Russia claimed that it was unwarranted seizure of Russia’s railroad property by China. Both these reasons clearly were of a nature which should be settled by justiciable means and I said I should like to know how his Government felt about it. I referred to a press despatch quoting C. T. Wang to the effect that the reason for the Chinese action was the propaganda of Russian officials and pointed out to Dr. Wu that this was a question of a breach of a treaty which was clearly of a justiciable nature. Dr. Wu told me that he could well understand our interest in this matter as a sponsor of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. He said in substance that the matter arose out of the discovery among the papers taken at Harbin about two weeks ago, when the Chinese Government seized the Soviet Consulate, showing that the Russians were using the railway as a focus for Soviet propaganda against China. He recalled what had happened at Canton in December 1927 when the communists under the leadership of the Russians had seized the city and instituted a condition of terror. I told him I was familiar with that but there was a great difference between a country attempting to protect itself against actions of [Page 216] individuals within its borders by appropriate measures and taking action which seemed to be aimed at another country, Russia. I told Dr. Wu that one of the great difficulties was that China had acted so hurriedly; that the seizure of the railway whether rightly or wrongly was not interpreted by public opinion as an attempt to protect China against attacks of individual propagandists but as an attempt to seize property belonging to Russia and in which she had a joint right of management under the agreement of 1924. I stated that if neutral opinion took this view, probably Russia took the same view and believed that China’s action was an attack on her as a nation. Dr. Wu replied that he had not taken the matter seriously until Russia had severed diplomatic relations, withdrawn her people remaining in China and dismissed the Chinese representative in Russia. He asked me what steps I thought should be taken. I told him I was handicapped by a lack of information but I thought that in general the first thing to be done was to make clear the pacific character of China’s intention. He had previously said that China certainly did not intend war although it had taken steps, meaning evidently military movements, to protect itself against the reported Russian movements. I said that I believed China should make it clear from the beginning not only that she was only protecting herself against the acts of propagandists but that she had no intention of seizing Russian property. He said that China had offered to negotiate but that this was now blocked by the dismissal of the Chinese representatives. I replied that that being the case the offer to leave the matter to the arbitrament of outside neutral nations would be evidence of the truth of their disclaimer of any attempt to attack Russian property and said they must make clear that they had no such intention. I said, however, that I had no intention as yet of offering to mediate in a formal or technical way for I did not know enough about the situation. I said that as a friend I thought China should make clear its pacific intentions and readiness to do justice and that China’s haste had been one of the causes of the original misunderstanding and must now be offset or remedied in some such way.

The Chinese Minister telephoned me later in the day and gave me the substance of the Chinese note to Russia. I said that this note seemed to correspond to the public statement made by C. T. Wang through the press, a copy of which I had received from you. I said that China’s offer to give protection to Russians in return for Russia’s release of all Chinese would not seem adequately to cover their proposed attitude toward the railway; that the impression had been given to the world that they were seizing the railroad and that this offer did not cover that point. In reply to his inquiry whether we [Page 217] were in a position to offer our good offices, I said that we could never offer good offices except at the request of both parties and that I did not believe Russia would make such a request. I said again that China should make its position absolutely clear as not intending to go to war and as the first step make clear what was really done with the railway. Dr. Wu said that he would communicate this to his Government.

In my conversation with the Japanese Ambassador I went over such information as we have regarding the Russian-Chinese trouble and told him that I sent for him to ascertain how his Government felt about the matter for I knew not only was the Japanese Government interested in the Kellogg Pact but Japan was one of the four Powers (Japan, France, Great Britain and the United States) particularly interested in the situation in the Far East. The Ambassador said that information received from his Government was that probably there would be no fighting; that neither China nor the Soviet Government was in a position to make war. I pointed out that it was always important to put an end to a situation like this before actual fighting took place and he agreed with me. He said that his Government was keenly interested both on account of the Peace Pact and on account of their natural interests in Manchuria.

On the same day I made substantially the same introductory remarks to the British Ambassador. He asked me what steps we proposed to take. I told him I wished first to find out the facts and had sent for the Chinese Minister. I pointed out that my Government was not in diplomatic communication with Russia and I knew that the British Government was not but I thought the British Government would be interested in this situation and probably the Soviet Government would be interested in British good opinion. I told the British Ambassador that in view of the terms of the Kellogg Pact it seemed to me that no nation which was a party to it could resent being reminded of the importance of seeking a solution by arbitration. The Ambassador agreed and said he would cable his Government.

After similar introductory remarks to the French Ambassador he agreed with me that the questions apparently involved in the Russian-Chinese trouble were of a character to be solved by arbitration and that we must use every means to bring that about. He observed that while it is true that neither China nor Russia can afford to make war this fact might not prevent war and we could not afford to risk proceeding on the assumption that war would not occur.

My conversation with the Italian Ambassador was along the same lines as with the others.

Stimson