611.003/1916

The Secretary of State to President Hoover

My Dear Mr. President: I am enclosing a copy of a preliminary memorandum drawn up in the Office of the Economic Adviser of the State Department on the subject of foreign political reaction to the proposed tariff. The most serious of the dangers to which attention is called in this memorandum are, I think, the further building up of the imperial preference system in the British Empire and the possible creation of an European economic bloc against the United States. Both these points I know you have had in mind.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
[Enclosure—Memorandum]

An analysis of the studies prepared by the Geographic Divisions on the probable foreign reaction to the rates proposed in the Tariff Bill now before Congress suggests that, if the Bill becomes law, it will confront this Department with serious political problems and may work substantial injury to American economic interests, entirely out of proportion to the incidence of the proposed rates and to the possible foreign acts of direct retaliation which they may provoke.

In general, the most considerable effects are anticipated with respect to Western Europe and France, in particular: in the British Empire, especially Canada; and in Latin America, principally in Cuba, Argentina and Uruguay. No very serious repercussions are forecast with respect to the countries whose relations with the United States are handled in the Eastern European, Near Eastern, Mexican and Far Eastern Divisions.

Western Europe

(1)
Commercial Treaties. The negotiation of commercial treaties on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis will be rendered more difficult in the case of France and Holland. In Spain a strong impetus will be given to the current tendency to denounce the modus vivendi.
(2)
Geneva Convention.35 There is an indication, voiced by Czechoslovakia and France, to make the new rates an excuse for failure to [Page 999] ratify or apply fully the Geneva Convention ending import and export restrictions. This would imply the renewal or extension of the quota or contingent system from which certain typical American products—notably automobiles—have suffered in the past.
(3)
Films. The State Department’s protest to France,36 Germany,37 Spain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary against existing or contemplated film quotas may be merged with the general subject of tariff retaliation and accordingly may be rendered ineffective or be politely ignored.
(4)
European Economic Solidarity. Powerful impetus will be given to the present tendency to build up in Europe, through a system of international cartels and tariff concessions, a solid economic front on a definitely anti-American basis. The League of Nations may be used as a center of idealistic criticism of the United States to justify economic action along Pan-European lines.
(5)
British Imperial Preference. A similar and very powerful impetus will be given to strengthening the present system of preference in tariff rates between the component parts of the British Empire. Canada, in particular, may be driven away from her neighborly and natural commercial intercourse with the United States into an attitude of economic hostility and of corresponding British political solidarity. Other British American possessions may be driven into closer economic relations with Canada. Similar forces may orientate New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia and the Union of South Africa into closer preferential relations with the United Kingdom.
(6)
Anti-American Commercial Propaganda. Opportunity will be created in the British Dominions, the Latin American, the Far Eastern and other Asiatic markets to exploit local resentment against the new rates so as to enable our competitors to recapture lost markets. Anti-American commercial propaganda may be stimulated from European competitive sources, principally British. It is interesting to note that at this time the British Government is sending a trade mission to the Argentine Republic and to Brazil.
(7)
Debts and Loans. Some difficulty may be experienced by American financiers in the negotiation of foreign loans, both through local resentment and through the argument that by putting high duties on imports we render it impossible for our debtors to repay us. The effect of this situation would be to make London, Amsterdam and Paris the appropriate agencies for international finance and to compel our financiers to transact their foreign loans through competitive banking agencies.
[Page 1000]

Latin America

The Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs observes:

“If the proposed increases in the tariff are adopted the political effect on our relations with Latin America will be out of all proportion to any probable effect on our actual importations from the countries involved. The feeling in the majority of the Latin American countries towards the United States is more unfriendly now than at any time for many years past. It has been skillfully fomented by our commercial competitors and by those elements which from conviction or for political reasons have been active in magnifying the bogie of American imperialism. Any action which can be represented, reasonably or not, as an injury to the interests of a Latin American country will play into the hands of these unfriendly elements and will afford them a pretext for a new campaign against us. The seriousness of this possibly can not be appreciated unless one has followed the violent and almost hysterical press comment in such countries as Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba during the past few months.

“In Argentina and Uruguay the threatened increase in the tariff on certain agricultural products has taken the place of the Nicaraguan question as the chief weapon of propaganda against the United States. The sensational campaign of the Sociedad Rural Argentina with its slogan “Buy from those who buy from us” is an example of the use which foreign, and particularly British, commercial interests have made of this weapon. Although this campaign has been carried to a point where it seems to have produced some measure of opposition in the Argentine itself, it will receive a new impetus when duties on such products as meat, poultry and flax seed are actually increased. The reaction in Uruguay will be very similar to that in Argentina.

“In Cuba the entire community seems to have reached a state of mind where it regards the proposal for an increase in the American sugar tariff as a matter of life and death for the Cuban Republic.

“The feeling in other Latin American countries will be unfavorably affected to a less extent. The increase in the duty on corn, for example, will injure if not kill a new and very promising industry in the Dominican Republic. Brazil will be hit by the increase on Brazil nuts. Fortunately the proposal for an increase in the duty on bananas, which would have hurt nearly all of our closest neighbors, seems to have been abandoned.”

Eastern Europe

It does not appear that the proposed changes in the tariff will have on the exports to the United States of Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, an effect sufficient to evoke protest or to give rise to a feeling of ill will.

Near East

Owing to the fact that our commercial rights are guaranteed in the Near Eastern countries held under mandate and by the Capitulatory regime in Egypt, while Greece for financial and Turkey for [Page 1001] political reasons does not desire to offend us, no special reaction is anticipated in this area. However, the Prime Minister of Egypt stated to the American Minister in Cairo that the imposition of a customs duty on cotton by the United States would depress the prices of cotton in Egypt, thus causing a financial crisis in that country and might result in an anti-American feeling which would no doubt seriously affect the sale of American goods in Egypt.

Mexican

No serious reaction is anticipated.

Far East

No serious reaction to the proposed rates is anticipated in China, Japan or Siam. It is pointed out that the duties substantially affect only $12,000,000 out of $47,000,000 dutiable products imported from China in 1927, as against $104,000,000 non-dutiable; and $17,000,000 out of $47,000,000 dutiable products imported from Japan in 1927, as against $354,000,000 non-dutiable.

  1. Convention and protocol for the abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 336.
  2. Ibid., vol. ii, p. 844.
  3. Ibid., p. 918.