Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I
500.A15a3/40
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 29.]
Sir: Referring to the Embassy’s strictly confidential telegrams No. 158 of June 17, 4 p.m., and No. 159 of June 18, 1 p.m., I have the honor to enclose the text of my speech at the dinner given in my honor by The Pilgrims on Tuesday, June 18th, at the Hotel Victoria, London. I am sending the text published in the Times of June 19th. The few minor inaccuracies printed have been corrected in ink on each copy forwarded.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I have [etc.]
Counselor of Embassy
Speech Delivered by the American Ambassador (Dawes) at the Banquet of the Society of Pilgrims of Great Britain, June 18, 1929
We are in a period when mankind, emerged from its greatest cataclysm—the World War—is lifting its eyes from the darkness of the past toward the sunlight of international peace and tranquillity. It is the era of effort for world construction—moral and material.
The ratification of the Kellogg Peace Treaty, which is the agreed-upon expression of a world intention, has one of its first effects in a pronounced change in the form of the international discussion of the world’s peace. The closing of the discussion upon the form of the expression of the principle, and the inception of the discussion of the practical methods by which to make it effective, prove the existence of the general determination to make the treaty not a mere gesture, but the foundation of an era of “Peace on earth and good will toward men.”
[Page 122]The matter of first importance at the present time is that the friends of the world’s peace move unitedly toward that objective with a clear understanding among themselves that any effort which is not a united effort is liable to be ineffective and tending toward disintegration. To avoid confusion and delay endangering their common objective, they now should not only unitedly consider what steps should be taken toward it, but the order in which those steps are to be taken.
The importance of an early agreement on naval reduction by the nations is of outstanding importance at the present time, and it would seem to be the next step to be taken toward world peace. As to any other controverted questions between any nations or between Great Britain and the United States, their future peaceful settlement, either way, will not be endangered by the cessation of an enormously expensive naval competition in progress during their discussion.
Congress has already by law committed the United States to an immediate naval programme involving over $250,000,000, giving, however, to the President the power to suspend it in the event of an international agreement for the limitation of naval armament.
On May 31 last the Secretary of State of the United States said: “I have in my possession a memorandum from the Director of the Budget showing the cost of the programme recommended by the Navy Department in case the policy of naval reduction which the President advocates is not adopted. That memorandum shows that the authorized and contemplated naval programme for the construction of new ships alone amounts to $1,170,800,000. When it is borne in mind that the foregoing figures involve the construction programme of only one nation, and that if it proceeds other nations will be impelled to follow suit, the burden of unproductive expenditure which will be imposed upon the economic world during the next 15 years can be to a certain extent realized.”
My address tonight concerns itself with suggestions as to a change in the method of future negotiations for naval disarmament. Agreement upon a method of negotiation must concern, from the very beginning, all interested naval Powers and should have not a partial, but a world, sanction. While in the course of the discussion I may refer to the principle of equality of naval power as between Great Britain and the United States, it is only because the outcome of previous conferences shows that this is the agreed policy of both Governments. My theme is what method of procedure had best be adopted to translate a policy of naval reduction into a fixed agreement between the nations—a step so important to the peace of the world and to the happiness hereafter of mankind.
Edmund Burke, in his “Observations on a Late [the Present] State [Page 123] of the Nation,” once made a profound remark about politics which he could have made with equal truth of law, of government systems, and of dealings with international relations of all kinds, including methods of negotiation for reparation settlements or reduction in naval armament. “Politics,” said he, “ought to be adjusted not to human reasonings but to human nature, of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the greatest part.”
The long time which elapsed after the ending of the Great War before a proper method of negotiation for reparation settlements was evolved was because the first method was adjusted to human reasoning and not to human nature. That method was to have the recommended settlement prepared by the continuing and concurrent work of economic experts and statesmen combined.
Since the reparation settlement involved, in each one of the nations interested, both an economic and a political problem, it was reasonable to suppose that it would be best determined by the joint effort of statesmen and of economists working together. This futile effort continued so long before its abandonment that all Europe was brought to the brink of economic and political chaos. And then only, in the latter part of 1925, did the Reparations Commission as an experiment decide upon the separate formation of the First Committee of Experts. This expedient, viewed at that time as almost hopeless by most economists and entirely so by most politicians—then designated by one great member of the Reparations Commission as the “prescription of a pill for an earthquake”—proved successful.
The formation of that Committee was not a triumph of intellect—it was the triumph of despair. It was adopted because nothing else had worked. Its success was due to its unconscious but proper adjustment to the law of human nature. What happened thereafter demonstrated that by accident the world had discovered that the proper method of settling an international problem, involving a separate economic and political problem in each country, was to use independent experts whose suggestions involved their interpretation of the correct and fundamental economic principles involved in the situation, their formula then to be handed over to the statesmen, who, reinforced by general public confidence in the impartiality of expert opinion, could better bring the respective public sentiments into acceptance of the necessary working compromise between political expediency and economic principles.
In committees formerly composed of co-labouring statesmen and economists, the economists had always stood rigidly for conclusions endangering the statesmen and the acceptance of the Plan, and the statesmen for conclusions which would stultify the economists and endanger the success of the Plan. Under such circumstances [Page 124] the arrival at a constructive compromise was well-nigh impossible. The method was not adjusted to the law of human nature.
Economic and technical problems are one thing—governmental and political problems another. The rigid attitude and determined expressions of international economic and technical specialists as to the inviolability and sacredness of technical principle is perhaps praiseworthy, but we must remember that these expressions are often incident to a doubtful embodiment of them in a personal interpretation of their applicability to international political situations, of which the experts are not always competent diagnosticians.
One who is inclined to believe that economists and technicians, claiming to be guided in their intellectual voyages by the stars and compasses and high lighthouses of fixed principles, never compromise, as do the alleged unworthy politicians, is lacking in experience in international economic negotiations. For six years after the War the unhappy Reparations Commission, besides its other misfortunes, was surrounded by an army of economic experts representing the different nations interested in the problem. These experts delivered innumerable written ultimatums as to the correct economic principles which underlay their divergent recommendations which filled vast untouched libraries and now moulder in their unruffled dust. The disagreements of these experts with each other, each swearing devotion to infallible principle, was as complete and overwhelming as those which characterized the deliberations of the supposedly less worthy, entirely confused, but fully as determined politicians and statesmen.
I remember during the last two weeks of deliberation on the part of the First Committee of Experts appointed by the Reparation Commission that, as the inside expert Committee was labouring with the formulation of its conclusions, almost all of them more or less the result of a compromise, they faced a snowstorm of protesting papers filled with the voluminous but disagreeing economic advice of outside experts removed from the field of negotiation.
What I have said has a most direct bearing upon the question of the method of conducting the great negotiation for naval disarmament soon justly to occupy the attention of the world. The question is how best to adjust the methods of negotiation to accord with the laws of human nature so that a successful outcome, so vital to the welfare of the world, may not be unnecessarily endangered.
International naval reduction is a task the successful accomplishment of which requires the cooperative employment of two distinctly unrelated talents—that of naval technical experts and of statesmen.
Important as is a preliminary expert examination of economists to report to the statesmen on an international problem involving both an economic and political phase, it is even more important where naval [Page 125] technicians and statesmen confront a problem involving both a technical and political phase. But here we must keep in mind the law of human nature. In the case of a preliminary use of economic experts, their prime objective is a formula which will recognize the dominance of economic law, and the success of the statesmen in reaching the second objective of accommodating the expert formula to the political conditions in the respective countries is something as much desired by the economic experts as by the statesmen themselves. That later achievement only will crown with success the preliminary expert effort. This attitude has recently been twice demonstrated. So anxious was the first Economic Committee of Experts, Reparations Commission in 1924, that their report should be the basis of a successful settlement that they were engaged continually during their work in adjusting the form of their statement to expected political repercussion.
It was their constant endeavour to frame their conclusions in such language as would make them easily understood and be as inoffensive from a political standpoint as was possible. This effort to adjust economic necessity to political expediency led them to many collateral individual conferences for advice from European statesmen during their work. As a result, when the report of the First Committee of Experts was delivered to the statesmen of the London Conference, the latter found it unnecessary to change the Plan, but only to supplement it by collateral international agreements relating to it, making it politically acceptable to all the nations concerned. And thus it was with the world-important report of the Second Committee of Experts just completed. It was their intense desire to have a constructive outcome of their work, as much as because the work itself was a diplomatic as well as an expert employment, that led them to consult constantly with the leading European statesmen during their epoch-making labours. This desire on the part of these Economic Committees accorded with the law of human nature. But in the case of naval technical experts, working for a formula for naval equality, the law of human nature runs contrary to such an attitude. It would be vastly more difficult, other things being equal, for a mixed commission of navy technicians and statesmen to agree on a plan for naval disarmament than for a mixed commission of economists and statesmen to agree upon a reparations settlement, practically impossible as history has shown the latter to be.
A naval expert is qualified to define accurately the principles which should determine abstract naval equality, but the law of human nature decrees that his opinion is relatively not as safe in a programme which he formulates as a practical interpretation of those principles applied to a partial destruction of his own navy. The proper pride of a naval officer’s life is his navy. His whole professional career [Page 126] impels him to think of a navy only in terms of victory. He not only instinctively feels, but he is rightly taught to feel, that he must strive not for equal navies, but for a superior navy. It is difficult for him to forget that with a superior navy, victory is probable, with an equal navy doubtful, with an inferior navy almost hopeless. Other things being equal, I fear no naval officer ever inherently favours equality.
The naval officer has his duty to perform to his State, and it is primarily to secure it against attack. He therefore trusts to his ships and his armament. It is the duty of the statesman to remove from his State the danger of attack. Upon the latter primarily lies the duty of peace-making, and in these negotiations he must hold the initiative. He is the one to build up the new order and to start the new policy, guided as he goes by the advice of those competent and patriotic naval experts who serve him. What differences there are in their respective duties can be coordinated into a policy of statesmanship, and that and that alone is what I have in mind in what I now say.
I have no knowledge of the qualifications and records of any naval officers heretofore engaged in these negotiations, or acquaintance with them. I am concerned only that the methods under which this work is to be done, whoever may do it, shall be adjusted to the laws of human nature.
At the beginning of the work the contribution of the naval experts to the problem should be a definition of abstract equality. It is certainly possible for naval experts to arrive at a definition for evaluation of fighting strength of ships. Thus, for instance, one might find a yardstick with which to determine the military value of individual ships. These ships might differ in displacement, size of guns, age, speed, and other characteristics, and yet such an agreed properly weighted value might be given to each of these differing characteristics as to make it possible to compare, for example, the cruiser fleets or combined fleets of two navies, and establish a parity between them. If naval experts rise to the proper sense of their responsibility, the use by statesmen of their yardstick will not be one which will invite peril from those extreme pacifists and extreme militarists who form the “lunatic fringe.”
But, again, in connexion with the method of preparing the naval yardstick, let us consider the law of human nature. Should a Commission composed of the representatives of each Navy concerned meet to reach agreement upon this yardstick, they would be asked to agree upon something the use of which will reduce in number the idols of their hearts—the ships of their navies. I am casting no reflection here upon naval officers when speaking of the law of human nature which subconsciously influences the actions of all mankind, [Page 127] learned or ignorant, good or bad, rich or poor, skilled or unskilled, great or humble, old or young of every race and nationality of the world.
I have already spoken of the fallibility and lack of agreement of expert and economic opinion as exemplified by the experience of the Reparations negotiations. I will say, frankly, that from a commission of naval experts of the respective nations meeting together and called to evolve a final definition of the naval yardstick, I personally should expect a failure to agree.
It would seem that, to adjust to human nature the method of arriving at naval reduction, each Government might separately obtain from their respective naval experts their definition of the yardstick and then the inevitable compromise between these differing definitions, which will be expressed in the final fixation of the technical yardstick, should be made by a committee of statesmen of the nations, reinforced from the beginning by these separate expressions of abstract technical naval opinion and able again to seek further naval advice, if necessary, before the final fixation.
These statesmen should further be the ones to draw up for the world the terms of the final agreement upon naval reduction, which should be couched in those simple terms understandable to the ordinary man in the street, which, while the pet aversion of the casuist, are the highest expression of true statesmanship. That final agreement, covering the quantitative dispositions, will go to the nations for approval or rejection.
If this should be the outcome, let those entrusted with the last draft of the conclusions of the last Conference be men born with the faculty of clear and concise statement, for that document must appeal to the composite will of the peoples of the nations, and in order to make the proper appeal it must be read generally and understood.
There, again, we remember the operations of the law of human nature, and will hope that in these men the temptation to show erudition be subordinated to writing that which, while properly covering the cause, may be understood by the audience. A clear statement of the case, understandable by all, should mean success.
And here let me anticipate the possible comments of those whom we have always with us on both sides of the ocean—the social purveyors of the trivial in international discussion who talk so continually about good relations and do so little to forward them.
In all I have said tonight I intend nothing in derogation of the absolute necessity for the consideration and presentation of the naval side of this question by its ablest experts the world over, and, on the other hand, nothing in derogation of the absolute necessity of bringing to the political side of it the highest qualities of statesmanship [Page 128] which the world can provide. But to properly solve the problem we must adopt a method which brings the full weight of both of these classes of men to bear upon it, without their unnecessary collisions during the first formulating period when they are primarily concerned with two separate objectives.
Again, and also anticipating certain comment, let me say that while it is the fashion of these sensational days to attribute to any statement of irritating fact by a public man some malevolent purpose towards individuals, there is nothing of this in my mind.
The Committee from the Governments which met at Geneva to agree upon naval disarmament was a mixed commission of statesmen and naval technicians, and, in my judgment, that was the reason for its failure. The method was adjusted to human reasoning, but not to human nature.
We should not look upon the failure at Geneva in 1927 as the failure of individuals, but of the method under which they were asked to function. This may be said, however, that under the laws of human nature, probably 90 per cent, of Englishmen think the American Delegation was responsible for the mistake, and 90 per cent, of Americans think that the British members of the Commission were responsible for the mistake. The great, overwhelming, and soul-satisfying fact about it is that the British and American people are a unit in agreeing that, whoever was responsible for it, a mistake was made. And of what is this significant? It means that in the inarticulate consciences and hearts of the two great English-speaking peoples there is upheld, sacred and inviolate, the principle of the equality between them of naval strength. Their attitude upon this question—unmistakable—assumed as out of the realm of debate even by the nationalistic demagogues of both countries—while decorated by reason, is based under the providence of God upon fundamental human instincts and a commingling of the blood.
In these circumstances, let us be hopeful for the cause of world peace and the progress of civilization; for in the joint hands of these same English-speaking peoples rests not only their secure guarantee, but as well the ark of the covenant of human freedom.