Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I
723.2515/3381
The Bolivian Minister (Diez de Medina) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary of State: Confirming what I had the honor of expressing to Your Excellency at my two last interviews, I am pleased [Page 789] to enclose with this note a brief confidential Memorandum with some references which the undersigned takes the liberty of bringing to the knowledge of the Secretary of State.
I renew [etc.]
Memorandum36
The Governments of Chile and Peru have expressed in different opportunities their inclination to restore to Bolivia—who was the principal party to the War of the Pacific, which resulted in the loss of her whole sea coast and of the ports which she owned—her inalienable rights to an access to the sea.
It is sufficient to briefly recall the facts that prove the above assertion, all of which date back as from the War of 1879; otherwise it would be too long to enumerate the multiple occasions that Bolivia had—since her establishment—to acquire the territory over which ownership Chile and Peru have now an exclusive controversy, absolutely prescinding of Bolivia.
The War of 1879 had not yet come to an end when Chile began negotiations directed toward the delivery of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Having failed this desire solely for the honest and loyal sentiments that have characterized the international policy of Bolivia.
Among the basis offered by the Chilian Government to Bolivia, in May 1879, the following is drawn: “Inasmuch as the Republic of Bolivia will need a part of the Peruvian territory to regulate her own and obtain an easy access to the Pacific—which she lacks at the present time—without being subjected to the bonds imposed at all times by the Peruvian Government, Chile will not hinder the acquisition of that part of territory nor will oppose to its permanent occupation by Bolivia. But on the contrary will lend her at the present the most effective support.”
The above referred overtures were not even considered by the Bolivian Government. An honest and evident loyalty to Peru, its allied, prevented that the Chilian initiative should thrive at the very moment of the armed conflict. In the same year of 1879, the President of Chile Santamaría wrote to his compatriot Victoriano Lastarria the following: “Landlords ourselves of all the Bolivian shore and of the entire Department of Tarapaca, we must necessarily give to Bolivia a vent and an outlet, placing her between Peru and Chile. Otherwise we would choke her and would force her to seek attachments with Peru or the Argentine Republic.”
In January of 1882, the Chilian negotiator Lillo approached the [Page 790] Bolivian Plenipoteniary Baptista on the subject of the transfer of Tacna and Arica. These provinces according to Lillo, Chile was ready to cede to Bolivia in exchange for an alliance with her.
The Chilian Historian Gonzalo Bulnes, recently Ambassador to Argentina, carries the following statement in his important work “La Guerra del Pacifico” (The War of the Pacific): “Santamaría shortly after authorized Novoa to modify the method of the sale of Tacna and Arica although not essentially. The form did not worry him much. Santamaría considered easy to substitute Peru and Chile for Bolivia in Tacna and Arica and was convinced that this would happen soon after.”
Luis Aldunate former Minister of Foreign Relations of Chile stated that from the beginning of the negotiations in 1882, it was a popular policy in Chile to induce Bolivia to break away her alliance with Peru and to get an understanding with Chile.
The idea of the transfer of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia was neither strange to some of the eminent Diplomatic Representatives of the United States of America. Mr. Partridge proposed in January of the year 1883 the following suggestions for peace: 1—Unrestricted transfer of Tarapacá to Chile; 2—Cession, sale or transfer of Arica and Tacna to Bolivia, or should this prove inacceptable, to neutralize this territory; 3—Arica cannot be fortified.
Prior to this, Mr. Logan, also Minister of the United States in Chile, tried to promote an accord between the belligerent countries, offering among other suggestions the cession of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia.
On his side the Peruvian Plenipotentiary to Bolivia accredited by President Iglesias, together with the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, visited the Chilean Minister Novoa to request his authorization to enable the Peruvian Plenipotentiary to offer Tacna and Arica to Bolivia in exchange of compensations to Chile. At the same time the former Executive of Peru Sr. Garcia Calderon expressed in a reply to the communication of Mr. Logan, that if the idea of ceding Tacna and Arica to Bolivia had been submitted to him, he, as President of Peru—would have accepted the proposal without delay.
Short time afterwards and on the occasion of signing Chile and Peru the Protocol of 1883, the Minister of Foreign Relations for the Government residing at Arequipa, added in a Circular addressed to the Diplomatic Corps, in connection with the cession of Tarapacá: “That cession should have placed Bolivia in the possibility of losing her sea-coast and then, without an access to the Pacific, she could not have carried an independent commerce of her own. Such condition is not in accord with the Peruvian policies in the American Continent. [Page 791] It is essential that Bolivia should have a free access to the Pacific.” In closing he specified: “For that reason I believe that peace, giving Bolivia the participation that she must have in the negotiations, would have the approval of the people.”
In the same year the representatives of President Iglesias of Peru, among the modifications which they had attempted for the settlement of peace with Chile, stated thus: “Chile remains in possession of Tacna and Arica for ten years at the expiration of which a plebiscite should determine the nationality to which they wish to belong permanently, whether Chile, Bolivia or Peru.”
Some years later, in 1895, Bolivia and Chile reached an accord for the settlement of the war signing three treaties. One of these dealt with the transfer of the territories by virtue of which Chile made its duty to transfer Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. On this occasion the Minister of Foreign Relations of Chile negotiator of these treaties, made the following public statement:—“The granting of a port to Bolivia has been considered at all times as the fundamental foundation of every definite settlement of peace between the two nations.”
In this connection it must be remembered that in 1919 the Minister of Chile Bello Codecido was offering to Bolivia an inlet north of Arica, which could not satisfy the aspirations nor the necessities of the latter. It must also be remembered among the declarations of each one of these countries, some of the more recent ones.
On the delivery of his Letters of Credence by the undersigned appointed Bolivian Minister to Peru in 1927, President Leguia stated in his remarks of reply: “Bolivia knows, because I have promised it since 1925, that Peru is determined to cede her, South of Arica, without expecting compensations, a strip of land for her communication with the sea. This promise disclosing the friendship of Peru for her younger sister nation—the preferred of Bolivar—interprets effectively our purpose that Bolivia should obtain an access to the ocean which she needs to facilitate her economical development.”
Some years back, in 1910, the Peruvian Minister in La Paz, Sr. Solon Polo, had indicated to the La Paz Foreign Office: “In the estimation of the Government of Lima it would not be difficult to find out the means for an agreement, provided that the Province of Tacna should belong to Peru.”
Furthermore: upon entering into the pacts of Peace between Chile and the Republics of Peru and Bolivia—though separately arrived at—Chile as much as Peru acknowledged the right of Bolivia to recover her access to the sea, offering on their part to contribute to such legitimate right. It will be enough to mention recent occurrences and declarations from each one of the two Governments. [Page 792] While Chile solemnly stated in 1921, before the League of Nations, that she was ready to contemplate directly with Bolivia the best means to assist her in her development through direct negotiations freely accorded, and in 1926 agreed to accept in principle the proposition offered by the Secretary of State Mr. Frank B. Kellogg to cede to Bolivia in perpetuity the territories of Tacna and Arica, Peru through his Chief Executive Leguia—as in various other occasions—also offered to Bolivia his assistance to regain her maritime entity. Later Peru declared in reply to Mr. Kellogg’s suggestion that the rejection did not carry with it the intention of obstructing any other solutions. She also left in record that Peru had accepted the partial or complete internationalization of the provinces and had accepted also their division giving Bolivia gratuitously an outlet to the shore and there an inlet whose conditions would allow it to be converted into a large, suitable and safe port. Finally declared that was disposed to listen to all suggestions, but under the condition that the towns of Tacna and Arica be returned to Peru.
It cannot be overlooked that in that reply to Mr. Kellogg, Peru clearly states: “It would not had [have] meant a moral victory for either Peru or Chile to make a division of the territory in the form above indicated (by Peru), because such a division would have taken into consideration reciprocal and equitable concessions in respect to the interest of both countries and might even lead to the cession of a port to the Republic of Bolivia.”
In that same year of 1926, the President of Peru expressed in his Message to Congress: “The Problem of the Pacific can only be resolved by invoking the rights of Peru, and in every case our fraternal good-will to assist Bolivia in obtaining an outlet to the sea which she so necessarily reclaims.”
The above antecedents and several others which are not herein considered for the sake of briefness, prove therefore that Peru as well as Chile have publicly declared their readiness to contemplate suggestions leading to the attainment of the legitimate desire for a port by Bolivia.
Instead, the clause which seemingly Chile intends to include in the negotiations being carried out in Lima to determine that neither Chile nor Peru shall be able—without previous and mutual consent—to cede to a third party any portion of the territory referred to in this agreement, nor to construct new international lines, is decidedly in contradiction with those declarations as well as with the policy pursued by both countries in connection with the maritime problem of Bolivia, fundamental for the development and the ulterior life of this Republic.
Such stipulation would render impossible or would delay every free ‘accord with either one of the two countries once established such [Page 793] hateful joint-ownership intended to last indefinitely and in evident detriment of the nation that had to bear the greatest portion of the burden as one of the belligerents in the contest of 1879.
That limitation of sovereignty of the contracting parties effectively restricts the rights of Bolivia to freely and separately contract with each of the two countries also parties in the international conflict which final settlement is desired.
In regard to the obligation that Peru and Chile should contract to build no new international lines without the previous and mutual consent of both parties, it would be detrimental not only to their sovereignty and to their own conveniences, but to the rights and interests of other countries—not a part to this agreement—who are seeking their development by means of systems of communication which would firmly tie them fostering their importance and increasing the yield of the foreign capitals invested there. That clause will also injure to a great extent and indirectly even the interest of nations such as the United States who have large capitals invested in Bolivia.
If Bolivia showing an unrestricted spirit of harmony and Americanism has never intended to upset the course of the negotiations started between Chile and Peru absolutely ignoring her—because she has rested assured by the most formal and renewed declarations of the two friendly nations—she cannot refrain any longer from respectfully calling the attention of the Government who is propitiating a final settlement between those countries, to the inconvenient and unsuitable clause already referred to as this would be in contradiction with their renewed offers and would also destroy or at least impend the most noble intentions which originated the suggestion for its solution of Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State of the United States of America.