500.A15/933

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Castle)

I went to the Navy Department this morning to show Mr. Adams23 the latest memorandum from the British. Mr. Adams said that it was his understanding that no actual figures would be proposed at Geneva and I told him that the Secretary had so informed the British Ambassador.

I told him that the question to be decided was whether or not we should furnish the British, for their consideration, the calculations which our naval authorities had made or whether we should ask the British to make their own independent research. Mr. Adams asked what I thought about it and I told him that I was inclined to feel that it would put us in a better position to take the initiative by showing the British our plan. I said that this seemed a stronger strategical position for us since it would be up to the British to prove wherein we were wrong. Mr. Adams said that he agreed with this entirely; that he felt, if the British drew up their own scheme, their minds would be likely to harden in favor of that scheme and that they would, as a result be less easy to deal with. He said, furthermore, that he was sure that they would be impressed with the honesty of Admiral Jones and of any plan which he might propose.

Mr. Adams then went on to say that, although this was his feeling [Page 101] with regard to showing our plan to the British, he nevertheless feared grave consequences should we hold discussions secretly with the British excluding all other interested parties. I said that, of course, I agreed with this to the extent that we could not run the risk of an outburst similar to that following the publication of the Franco-British Naval Agreement. I told him that, in my opinion, we ought not to carry on these conversations secretly but that it might not be necessary at the beginning to show our plan, before we had talked it over with the British, to the Japanese, French and Italians. I said, in support of this, that the Japanese Ambassador had remarked to me the other day that he felt an understanding between ourselves and the British was a prerequisite to any successful naval discussion. I told him that it, therefore, seemed to me that in all probability we could talk with the Japanese, French and Italian Ambassadors telling them in general what we were doing and assuring them that there was no thought of excluding them since we, after all, were not discussing final figures or ratios but merely the method of approach by which parity between Great Britain and the United States could be secured. Mr. Adams said that if we took some such action as this, he would be entirely satisfied.

W[illiam] R. C[astle, Jr.]
  1. The Secretary of the Navy.