Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I

710.11/1306a

The Secretary of State to American Diplomatic Officers in Latin America

Washington, February 28, 1929.

Sirs: The discussions in the United States Senate incident to its consideration of the Multilateral Peace Pact,¹ and the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs² which dealt briefly but specifically with the Monroe Doctrine, have given rise to questions regarding the true meaning given by the United States to that Doctrine. The present seems a propitious opportunity to prepare for communication to the countries of Latin America when the occasion shall be thought by the Department to be opportune, the views of the Government of the United States on the scope and purpose of that Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine is sometimes conceived as a policy formulated by President Monroe and his Cabinet solely as a result of the formation in Europe of the Holy Alliance, and the operations, through France, of that Alliance against Spain. This is not a true appraisal of the Doctrine. The formation of the Holy Alliance and its subsequent activities constituted the occasion for casting into definite formula the principles behind the Doctrine, and for announcing such formula when made; but the principles of the Doctrine are as old as the nation itself. They were understood and, from time to time, announced, as occasion required, by the Revolutionary Fathers themselves.

The fundamental concept of the Doctrine is the peace and safety of the Western Hemisphere through the absolute political separation of Europe from the countries of this Western World, subject to this exception that the principle was not to be operative as against those American possessions which were held by European powers at the time the Doctrine was announced. A mere statement of this principle shows that while announced by the United States, in 1823, and by it since maintained for the primary purpose of protecting the interests, integrity, and political life of itself, yet all the other independent republics of the Western Hemisphere have, for a century, been equal beneficiaries with the United States in the advantages which have flowed from the complete political separation of Europe from the Republics on the Western Hemisphere.

A brief survey, first, of certain significant events of the colonial experience of the British colonies in America, and, next, of matters connected with the development of the principles finally embodied in Monroe’s formulae, makes entirely clear the purpose and scope of the Doctrine as announced by President Monroe in his message to Congress of December 2, 1823.³

Prior to the War of Independence the British colonies in America had been involved in four major wars between themselves and the French colonies. No one of these wars arose by reason of conditions in colonial America; each was but an echo of some European conflict, in the causes and with the issues of which the colonies had no concern whatever. After each of these wars, except the last, and notwithstanding what the colonies lost by waging them, in treasure and men, to say nothing of the burnings, tortures, scalpings, and murders incident to the outlying frontier operations of Indian war-parties, the respective European mother countries resumed as to the colonies practically the pre-war status,—all the suffering, privation, hardship, and loss of the colonists going for naught. The American colonies were in fact mere pawns in the game of European politics, to be taken or sacrificed as the immediate interests of the parent countries appeared to require.

All of this was an incident of the mere neighborhood of the colonies of the two Powers upon this continent and was so well understood by the Revolutionary Fathers of the United States that Washington in his Farewell Address warned and admonished liis fellow citizens in these words:⁴

“The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. …

“Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

“Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?”

Three years before Washington’s address Jefferson, writing to our representatives in Spain, visualized the same principle,⁵ and one year after the address (1797), President Adams, in a special message to Congress dealing with the relations between the United States and France, again affirmed that “we ought not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe, but to keep ourselves always distinct and separate from it if we can, …”⁶

In the years which immediately followed, the representatives of the United States in London, Paris, and Madrid, carrying out the policies and instructions of their Government, announced and reannounced principles which Monroe a quarter of a century later incorporated in his famous declaration.

Nor were certain of these principles peculiar to the United States. Great Britain, for reasons of her own (which indeed were, in certain aspects, not unlike the considerations which moved the United States) entertained, equally with the United States, certain of those fundamental views. As early as 1798, Great Britain, not wishing France to have the advantage of an augmentation of Spanish American resources, intimated to the American Minister to Great Britain that she desired with our cooperation to separate South America from Spain.⁷

Speaking of the Floridas, Mr. King, American Minister to Great Britain, advised Lord Hawkesbury, in the same year (1798), that “we should be unwilling to see them transferred except to ourselves;” and speaking of Louisiana, King declared we should be unwilling “it should pass into the hands of new proprietors.”⁸

The correspondence between ourselves and Great Britain, France, and Spain immediately preceding the Louisiana purchase, and the negotiations between ourselves and France leading to the cession to the United States of the Louisiana territory, brought out that the United States had not favored, and could not favor the transfer to Great Britain of the Spanish possessions on the Mississippi; that the cession of the Floridas and Louisiana worked “most sorely on the United States” and reversed “all the political relations of the United States”; that by securing Louisiana France had “assumed to us the attitude of defiance” and made “it impossible that France and the United States can continue long friends”.⁹ It was repeatedly declared during this period that “mere neighborhood could not be friendly.” In 1803 Jefferson in a message to Congress called attention to the fact that

“… Separated by a wide ocean from the nations of Europe and from the political interests which entangle them together, with productions and wants which render our commerce and friendship useful to them and theirs to us, it can not be the interest of any to assail us, nor ours to disturb them. We should be most unwise, indeed, were we to cast away the singular blessings of the position in which nature has placed us, the opportunity she has endowed us with of pursuing, at a distance from foreign contentions, the paths of industry, peace, and happiness, of cultivating general friendship, and of bringing collisions of interest to the umpirage of reason rather than of force.”¹⁰

In 1811 the Congress of the United States itself in a resolution which dealt primarily with the foreign possessions lying immediately south of its southern borders, said:

“Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American provinces; and considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and commerce; therefore

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the United States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, can not, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory; they, at the same time, declare that the said territory shall, in their hands, remain subject to future negotiation.”¹¹

The threatening European events of this period, which had so stirred the American people, had even a greater repercussion in Spanish America. News of the enthronement of Joseph Bonaparte in Spain, under the fiat of Napoleon and with the support of his armies, threw Spanish America into political turmoil and while action was taken towards formally recognizing Ferdinand in Mexico City, Caracas, Bogotá, Chuquisaca, and Buenos Aires, yet as early as 1809 incipient separatist movements occurred in Chuquisaca, La Paz, Quito, Bogotá, Caracas, and Valladolid (in Mexico). The movement for independence so begun was destined not to fall but to continue until all the Spanish colonies upon the mainland of the Western Hemisphere were free and independent. Out of the woe and suffering of the civil wars which drenched the Spanish Americas in blood for the next decade, arose the great national heroes, Bolivar, San Martin, O’Higgins, Moreno, Artigas, Sucre, Hidalgo, and Morales, who, together with the patriots of the United States, gave to men in modern times free political institutions and made the Western World the home of popular, democratic government.

In the midst of this conflict which, beginning in 1809, was virtually concluded by 1823, the great powers of Europe called the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle. On the Agenda for this Conference was the proposal to discuss mediation between Spain and her revolted American colonies.

Prior to the meeting of the Conference the Due de Richelieu of France approached the Minister of the United States at Paris, Mr. Gallatin, concerning the possibility of the United States joining in the Conference to discuss this question. Mr. Gallatin advised the Due that so far as he was able to judge

“… no expectation could be entertained that the United States would become parties in the proposed mediation, much less that they would accede to any measures having for object the restoration of the supremacy of Spain over the colonies which had thrown off her yoke.”¹³

To the suggestion of the Due that the revolted colonies were unfit for liberty or for forming any permanent government, and that therefore some prince of the Spanish family should be sent to America as an independent monarch, Gallatin affirmed

“… that with the form of government which suited the colonies, or which any of them might select we had nothing to do; that it was only to the preservation of their independence that I had alluded; and that it appeared to me doubtful whether a Spanish prince would be considered as securing that. As to the capacity of the colonists to form a government sufficient to carry on their business and to entertain foreign relations I expressed my astonishment that any doubt could exist on that point and mentioned San Domingo as a proof that even slaves could establish governments of their own, totally independent, at least of their masters.”¹³

The position of Britain (regarding the Spanish American colonies.) at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle has been described by an able British author as follows:

“The matter was finally settled in an interview between Alexander and Castlereagh. Castlereagh was entirely opposed to the use of force. The Alliance, he said, was not competent to arbitrate or judge, and was therefore not competent to enforce any such judgment directly or indirectly; it could only mediate or facilitate, but not compel or menace. As for the commercial boycott (to use a word of later date), which had been suggested, Great Britain could be no party to it. We had had a large direct trade with France during the war, and had suffered her armies to be clothed by our manufactures; how could we interdict commerce with South America in time of peace? Since Russia could not fight either by arms or by an interdict on trade, it would be better to tell Spain so at once than to buoy her up by false hopes in the maintenance of a false attitude. There was, besides, the moral responsibility involved in forcing the colonies to submit to such a Government as that of Spain.

“It was the last argument, wrote Castlereagh, which made Alexander’s mind ‘shrink from the subject.’ He expressed his regret that he had not taken the British minister’s advice before the matter had been carried so far. As it was, he at once conferred with his ministers, with the result that at the next conference their tone was so altered that Richelieu withdrew his project. Thus ended the question so far as the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle was concerned.”¹⁴

Thus forewarned as to the attitude of the United States and advised of Great Britain’s unwillingness to participate, the powers took no action at Aix-la-Chapelle with reference to Spain and her revolted American colonies.

Two years later, John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, instructing the American Minister to Russia, Mr. Middleton, declared on July 5, 1820,

“The political system of the United States is also essentially Extra-European. To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entanglement in the European system, has been a cardinal point of their policy under every administration of their Government from the Peace of 1783 to this day. If at the original adoption of their system there could have been any doubt of its justice or its wisdom, there can be none at this time. Every year’s experience rivets it more deeply in the principles and opinions of the Nation.”¹⁵

Speaking of the system of the Holy Alliance and of the principles upon which it worked, Mr. Adams continued:

“… But independent of the prejudices which have been excited against this instrument in the public opinion, which time and an experience of its good effects will gradually wear away, it may be observed that for the repose of Europe as well as of America, the European and American political system, should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible.”¹⁶

In the year following, 1821 the Emperor Alexander of Russia issued an imperial ukase¹⁷ which barred all non-Russians from the Aleutian Islands and the northwestern coast of America appertaining to Russia, and reserved the pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishery exclusively to Russian subjects. Vessels approaching these coasts within less than 100 Italian miles would be subject to confiscation along with all their cargoes.

Against this action the British Government protested as early as January 1822. In the spring of 1823 the matter was taken up between Secretary Adams and Baron Tuyll, the latter representing Russia in the United States. In the course of the discussion which followed, Secretary Adams on July 17, 1823, advised Baron Tuyll specifically

“… that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any European colonial establishments.”¹⁸

At Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) Alexander of Russia, still fired with zeal for human rights as he conceived them, and eager to use the army and resources of Russia to the furtherance of those rights, exclaimed to Metternich, “My army as well as myself is at the disposal of Europe.” At Troppau, in October of 1820, in a conversation between the same men, Alexander declared: “Tell me what you desire, and what you wish me to do and I will do it.” Two years later, at Verona, Alexander, now thoroughly reactionary, proposed to march 150,000 men through Germany into Piedmont where they would be available as a police force for keeping the peace of Europe, and specifically where they might be used either against France or Spain as occasion might require.¹⁹

The great powers of Europe were by this time thoroughly suspicious, not so much of the actual designs which Alexander might have, as of the uses to which he might be induced to devote his resources and army.

Unable to agree with the plan of the other great powers at Verona (1822), Great Britain’s representative, the Duke of Wellington, withdrew from the Congress on the ground that Great Britain could not be a party to any declaration against Spain nor to any hostile interference in her internal affairs nor to any defensive alliance between the powers.

However, the Conference determined that France might intervene in the domestic affairs of Spain; and on April 7, 1823, a French army of 95,000 men under the Due d’Angoulême crossed the Bidassoa and, entering Spain, placed Ferdinand VII upon the throne.

This act of high political intervention in the domestic concerns of another power, coupled with the avowed disposition of the four great powers of Europe, (Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France) to use their military forces for similar purposes in other countries offending their will, and the known preferences of those same powers with reference to the Spanish possessions in America, aroused apprehension not only in the United States and the Spanish Americas but in Great Britain also. The result was that in August of 1823, British statesmen reverted to the position announced on February 15, 1798, by Lord Grenville to Mr. King, Minister of the United States, when Grenville intimated a desire to enter upon negotiations with the United States to prevent Spanish America from falling into the hands of France.²⁰ Canning now affirmed

“… that as His Britannic Majesty disclaimed all intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, he was also satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring any of them under her dominion, either by conquest or by cession from Spain. … that Great Britain certainly never again intended to lend her instrumentality or aid, either [whether] by mediation or otherwise, towards making up the dispute between Spain and her colonies, but that if this result could still be brought about she would not interfere to prevent it. … he too believed that the day had arrived when all America might be considered as lost to Europe so far as the tie of political dependence was concerned. … that he hoped that France would not, should even events in the Peninsula be favorable to her, extend her views to South America for the purpose of reducing the colonies, nominally, perhaps, for Spain, but in effect to subserve ends of her own; but that, in case she should meditate such a policy, he was satified that the knowledge of the United States being opposed to it, as well as Great Britain, could not fail to have its influence in checking her steps.”²¹

Two days later (on August 20, 1823,) Canning addressed a “private and confidential” communication to Mr. Rush, Minister of the United States, in which Mr. Canning inquired whether or not Mr. Rush was, under his powers, authorized to enter into negotiations with Great Britain with reference to the Spanish Americas, and declared as to Great Britain:

“For ourselves we have no disguise.

• “1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
• “2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent states, to be one of time and circumstances.
• “3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiation.
• “4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.
• “5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference.”²²

Within the next two days, other communications of the same tenor passed between Mr. Canning and Mr. Rush, and on August 23, 1823, Mr. Rush forwarded all of them to Mr. Adams.

They were received in Washington on October 9, 1823, and on October 17 President Monroe sent copies of them to Mr. Jefferson for his comments. In the transmitting communication, President Monroe, after raising certain questions with reference to the situation created by this correspondence, continued:

“My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British govt., & make it known that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us.”²³

To this communication Mr. Jefferson replied on October 24, 1823, stating:

“The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and particularly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom…

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, cession or acquisition in any other way.”²⁴

These communications from Mr. Rush were sent also to Mr. Madison, who on October 30, 1823, transmitted to President Monroe his observations which included the following:

“From the disclosures of Mr. Canning it appears, as was otherwise to be inferred, that the success of France against Spain would be followed by an attempt of the holy allies to reduce the revolutionized colonies of the latter to their former dependence.

“The professions we have made to these neighbours, our sympathies with their liberties and independence, the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the great powers, confederated against the rights and reforms of which we have given so conspicuous and persuasive an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade.”²⁵

This was the situation when on October 7, 1823, President Monroe began a consideration of the question with his Cabinet. It is unnecessary to deal with their deliberations regarding this matter, for as seems clear from the message of President Monroe to Congress of December 2, 1823, the Cabinet merely framed certain formulae embodying the principles that had been for years in the minds of every American statesman and that had on many occasions been declared and acted upon by the Government of the United States and to some extent by the Government of Great Britain.

So much misconception of the import and scope of the principles declared by Monroe has crept in to the popular mind not only of the United States but of other countries, that it will be useful to repeat here the exact language of Monroe’s declarations which have come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. These declarations were embodied in the following paragraphs of the message:

“At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” (Par. 7)²⁶

It will be observed that this paragraph deals with the question of future colonization by any European powers of the American continents. While the occasion for this was the encroachment of Russia only and on the northwest coast of America alone, yet the declaration as made referred to any European powers and covered the whole of the American continents. Thus was implemented the statement made by Secretary Adams on, July 17, 1823, to Baron Tuyll “that the American continents are no longer subject for any European colonial establishments.”²⁷ President Monroe declared that the “rights and interests of the United States are involved” in this principle.

It is most essential to observe that the principles announced in this paragraph relate entirely to the relationship between the American continents and European powers; there is no word in the statement that relates to the inter-relationships of the independent states of the American continents; and the “rights and interests of the United States” which were involved, were the rights and interests as against Europe and not against the Latin Americas.

The succeeding portions of President Monroe’s message which deal with this subject are embraced in paragraphs 48 and 49 and read as follows:

“It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

“The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.”²⁸

Of the matters covered by the foregoing paragraphs the following are to be specially noted.

a. Referring to the “allied powers” (at that time Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France) it is declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of those powers “to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”

This declaration, like the one regarding colonization, visualized a United States against Europe, not a United States against Latin America. It is not confined to the continents only, nor, explicitly to the areas then known; it covers the whole Western Hemisphere, then discovered or thereafter to be discovered. It declares that the extension of the allied “system to any portion of this hemisphere” would be “dangerous to our peace and safety”. In other words, here is the reannouncement of the principles proclaimed by Washington, Adams, and Jefferson, that the Americas must be politically independent of Europe. This general principle was subject to one reservation as follows:

b. “With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.”

But in this there is no suggestion of the United States against Latin America; it deals solely with the relationship which the United States has to the possessions of Europe on this hemisphere.

c. As to the revolted Spanish colonies which had declared their independence and maintained it and the independence of which the United States had recognized, it was declared “we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”

Again, the relationship set out is one between Europe and the United States as the attitude of Europe might affect the revolted Spanish colonies. There is no suggestion of interference by the United States with the Latin Americas as between and among themselves nor as between them and the United States; there is no suggestion that the United States would itself undertake to control the growth, the development, or the destiny of any Latin American state. The full scope of this announcement is that the United States would as a measure of self defense, protect the weak and struggling revolted Spanish colonies trying to make good their independence, from “any interposition” by European powers “for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny.”

This inhibition was levelled not only at the allied powers but at any European power. It did not exclude Spain: it certainly included Great Britain. At the same time we pledged continued neutrality in the war between Spain and the new Governments.

The language held in these various declarations,—“dangerous to our peace and safety”, “manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States”, “endangering our peace and happiness”,—is one of the formulae used when nations, speaking among themselves, refer to matters involved in their self-preservation, their self-defense, or the warding off of imminent danger. I again reiterate that there is no word or intimation in the entire declaration which visualizes a hostility or aggression or an intent to control or direct the affairs of Latin American States by the United States, save only (as must be implicit in the Doctrine as to a situation difficult to conceive) where an American State should join with a European State in carrying forward any of the matters against which the inhibitions were raised.

On the other hand, any measures which the United States might take, under and pursuant to the principles laid down by Monroe, must inevitably react to the distinct and positive advantage of Latin American States; and whatever may be the situation after a hundred years of growth and development on the part of Latin American Republics, in which they have acquired strength and defensive power, no reasonable question can exist but that at the time the doctrine was announced it was and is to them a shield of utmost value, for, as Canning said, with reference to the suggestion that France might take part in “reducing the colonies, nominally, perhaps, for Spain, but in effect to subserve ends of her own”, if France “should meditate such a policy, he was satisfied that the knowledge of the United States being opposed to it, as well as Great Britain could not fail to have its influence in checking her steps.”²⁹

Furthermore, though after the announcement of the Doctrine the contest between Spain and her colonies was as to various regions, either continued or renewed, and while half a century later the conflict was actually renewed by Spain against certain of her former South American colonies, yet an intimation in each case from the Government of the United States of the principles announced by Monroe was sufficient to protect the Latin American States involved from a subversion of their government or an occupation of their territories.

Just as these principles (in their development) guided the United States in its interrelations with Europe, from Washington’s administration to Monroe’s declaration, so have they been followed by the United States during the hundred years since the Doctrine was announced.

It is history that the overtures of Canning in 1823 contained a suggestion that the United States and Great Britain should enter into a convention embodying the substance of the five points covered by Mr. Canning in his letter to Rush of August 20, 1823.³⁰ Notwithstanding Mr. Jefferson seemed not unfriendly to this suggestion, nor apparently was Mr. Madison, nor even President Monroe in the first instance, yet it was finally decided not to make a joint declaration with Great Britain, nor a conventional arrangement with her, but instead to make for the United States a declaration of its own international, political policy with reference to matters which the United States regarded as “dangerous to our peace and safety”, as a “manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States”, or as “endangering our peace and happiness”, that is, matters which involved the self-defense of the United States, its self-preservation, or its protection from imminent danger.³¹ The declaration was made upon the responsibility of the United States alone arid as involving the interests of the United States only. Suggestions since made by other States for some conventional understanding regarding the Doctrine, have been politely but firmly declined.

While appreciating the strength which Great Britain’s attitude on the matter gave to the position which the interests of the United States required it to take, and while the United States was encouraged, at least in part, to make the declaration by reason of this attitude of Great Britain, nevertheless the declaration when made, was the declaration of the United States only; it defined a policy of the United States speaking for itself alone; and from the day of its announcement until the present time it has been, as it remains, a unilateral declaration of policy by the United States of America. The United States alone determines when actions violative of the principles have been taken; it alone determines what, if any, measures, and the kind and extent of the measures which shall be used to combat the aggression inhibited by the Doctrine.

The Doctrine served, at the time, the significant, important, and useful purpose of declaring to the world certain acts which the United States would regard as inimical to its welfare, its self-defense, its self-preservation, or its protection from imminent danger. Europe, thus forewarned, did not, at the time, and has never since, pushed to extremes any ambitions it, or any of its component nations, may have had against the Republics of this hemisphere. The Doctrine has, as upheld by the United States, given to those same Republics a feeling of security they could not otherwise have possessed; it has given to them a freedom from anxiety of possible aggression and a relief from actual restraint that has enabled them to go forward steadily in a great, forward-looking growth and development, free from European menace even to the highest destiny great nations may carve for themselves.

Not only was Monroe’s declaration a unilateral act of high policy on the part of the United States in so far as determining when and where actions, violative of the precepts of the Doctrine, were under consideration or actually under way, and in so far as carrying out measures for the implementing of the Doctrine, but it was very early declared that by announcing the Doctrine the United States created no obligation against itself and in favor of other countries. As the result of certain loose expressions used by Mr. Poinsett, while representing the United States in Mexico, Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, in reporting to the House of Representatives certain correspondence under date of March 29, 1826, used the following language:

“That The United States have contracted no Engagement, nor made any Pledge to the Governments of Mexico and South America, or to either of them, that The United States would not permit the interference of any Foreign Powers, with the Independence or form of Government of those Nations; nor have any Instructions been issued, authorizing any such Engagement or Pledge. It will be seen that the Message of the late President of The United States of the 2d December, 1823, is adverted to in the Extracts now furnished from the Instructions to Mr. Poinsett, and that he is directed to impress its principles upon the Government of The United Mexican States.

“All apprehensions of the danger, to which Mr. Monroe alludes, of an interference, by the Allied Powers of Europe, to introduce their Political Systems into this Hemisphere, have ceased. If, indeed, an attempt by force had been made, by Allied Europe, to subvert the Liberties of the Southern Nations on this Continent, and to erect, upon the ruins of their Free Institutions, Monarchical Systems, the People of The United States would have stood pledged, in the opinion of their Executive, not to any Foreign State, but to themselves and to their posterity, by their dearest interests, and highest duties, to resist, to the utmost, such attempt; and it is to a Pledge of that character that Mr. Poinsett alone refers.”³²

As I have already said, the Doctrine laid down principles which were to be operative as between the United States and Europe, not as between the United States and the Latin American Republics save in the most unlikely event of a Latin American Republic being involved in a conspiracy with a European power to run counter to the principles of the Doctrine. The Doctrine did not lay down any principles that should govern the relationships between the United States and Latin American Republics, nor between and among the Latin American Republics themselves, nor between the Latin American Republics and European countries save only in those matters specifically inhibited by the terms of the Doctrine.

As President Roosevelt said:—

“… The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World power at the expense of any other.”³³

In accordance with this conception, it was very early declared that the principles of the Doctrine had no application to wars between American States themselves; nor were the principles considered to apply (at least immediately after their promulgation) to a war confined to a parent country and its former colony, though later (by the middle of the last century) it was specifically declared that the United States would deny the rightfulness of Spain’s re-annexation of certain territory which, though once a Spanish colonial possession, had established and maintained its independence from the time of the announcement of the Doctrine.

It has been many times affirmed by the appropriate authorities of the United States that the principles of the Doctrine are challenged by wars between American States and European powers, only when such wars threaten the subversion or exclusion of the self-determined government of a free American State, or the acquisition by a non-American power of the territory of one of these States.

As Mr. Roosevelt said:

“We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.”³⁴

An analogous rule was stated by Mr. Sherman, who instructed Mr. Powell, the Minister of the United States to Haiti in 1898, that

“You certainly should not proceed on the hypothesis that it is the duty of the United States to protect its American neighbors from the responsibilities which attend the exercise of independent sovereignty”;³⁵

or as the general principle had been earlier stated by Secretary Cass—

“It is the established policy of this country not to interfere with the relations of foreign nations to each other and that it would be both improper and impossible for the United States to decide upon the course of conduct towards Venezuela which Spain may think required by her honor or her interests.”³⁶

Nor is the Monroe Doctrine to be understood, nor has it ever been so interpreted by the United States, as inhibiting any form of government which any American Republic might desire to establish for itself. The United States has willingly yielded to the peoples of this hemisphere the right to set up any form of government they wished; it has recognized and dealt equally and freely with the monarchies in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and Brazil, and with the Republics in those and other Latin American countries. Its attitude toward Emperor Maximilian in Mexico was, as expressed by Secretary Seward to Mr. Adams, the Minister of the United States to Great Britain (March 3, 1862) that the United States owed a

“… duty to express to the allies, in all candor and frankness, the opinion that no monarchical government which could be founded in Mexico, in the presence of foreign navies and armies in the waters, and upon the soil of Mexico, would have any prospect of security or permanence.”³⁷

Later Mr. Seward, in reply to a communication from the French Minister of November 29, 1865, said:

“The real cause of our national discontent is, that the French army which is now in Mexico is invading a domestic republican government there which was established by her people, and with whom the United States sympathize most profoundly, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it and establishing upon its ruins a foreign monarchical government, whose presence there, so long as it should endure, could not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions.”³⁸

Thus the Monroe Doctrine has nothing whatever to do with the domestic concerns or policies or the form of government or the international conduct of the peoples of this hemisphere as among themselves. Each of the Republics of this half of the world is left free to conduct its own sovereign affairs as to it seems fit and proper. The principles of the Monroe Doctrine become operative only when some European power (either by its own motion or in complicity with an American state) undertakes to subvert or exclude the self-determined form of government of one of these Republics or acquire from them all or a part of their territory; and the principles of the Doctrine are then vitalized solely because the aggression of the European power constitutes a threat against the United States, not because of its effect upon the other American state.

It has sometimes been said that the treaty and conventional relations which have been created between the United States and certain Caribbean powers are the fruition of the application of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Nothing could be farther from the truth. These relations have been built between the United States and those powers by the free and voluntary act of the parties concerned; they have in each case been created either for the protection of these powers from foreign aggression which, had it taken place, might have been violative of the Monroe Doctrine, or to insure a domestic tranquillity which was to make for the peace, prosperity, and happiness of the people concerned. But the treaty and conventional obligations incurred, the treaty and conventional rights created, being wholly between and relating solely to American powers, have nothing whatever to do with the Monroe Doctrine which, by definition, is concerned only when a European power is involved in some aggression upon this hemisphere.

At times effort has been put forth to make it appear that on the rare occasions when the United States has been forced to land forces in areas of this hemisphere for the protection of American life, it has done so pursuant to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. This is not true. The United States has landed troops for the same purpose in other parts of the world with perhaps at least equal frequency, and no one has suggested or would suggest that such landing was pursuant to the présuméd mandates of the Monroe Doctrine. The historical fact is that, under principles universally recognized as justifying such an act, troops have been landed by all the great powers in temporarily disturbed areas in which local governments were not able, for the moment, to protect foreign life. These occupations are always temporary and terminate so soon as the local sovereign becomes able to maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of foreigners within the disturbed areas. Such landings do not constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of nations. They are merely interpositions, police measures taken to assist the local sovereign where his own power is, for the time being, inadequate to afford necessary protection.

As I have repeatedly affirmed, the Monroe Doctrine is a unilateral Doctrine; the principle of self-defense on the part of the United States was implicit in the Doctrine, and has been repeatedly declared by American statesmen from the time of its announcement until the present time. It would be superfluous for me to list here the expressions to this effect of statesmen of the earlier days of the Republic, but I may call to your attention the expressions of American Statesmen during this century,—a period during which there have been voiced some false interpretations of the Doctrine to the effect that instead of being a Doctrine of self-defense, it was a Doctrine of excuse and justification for armed aggression.

Secretary Knox, speaking in 1912 [1911], affirmed:

“The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is considered by us essential to our peace, prosperity, and national safety.”³⁹

Senator Lodge, speaking of a Resolution which he had introduced into the Senate of the United States, (July 31, 1912) stated:

“… It rests on the principle that every nation has a right to protect its own safety,… The Monroe Doctrine was, of course, an extension in our own interests of this underlying principle—the right of every nation to provide for its own safety.”⁴⁰

Mr. Root, speaking in 1914 on the subject of the Monroe Doctrine, affirmed:

“It is a declaration of the United States that certain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly. …

“The Doctrine is not international law, but it rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by international law. …

“We frequently see statements that the Doctrine has been changed or enlarged; that there is a new or different doctrine since Monroe’s time. They are mistaken. There has been no change. …

“Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon this nation’s right of self-protection, it can not be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by American States or any number of them.”⁴¹

On January 9 [6], 1915 [1916], President Wilson declared:

“The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It always has been maintained, and always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility. But the Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European governments should not attempt to extend their political systems to this side of the Atlantic.”⁴²

Mr. Hughes, writing in 1923, declared:

“The Monroe Doctrine is not a policy of aggression; it is a policy of self-defense. … It still remains an assertion of the principle of national security. …

“The decision of the question as to what action the United States should take in any exigency arising in this hemisphere is not controlled by the content of the Monroe Doctrine, but may always be determined on grounds of international right and national security as freely as if the Monroe Doctrine did not exist. …

“The Monroe Doctrine rests ‘upon the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself.’”⁴³

Speaking to the American Academy of Political and Social Science on November 30, 1923, Mr. Hughes declared:

“It should be recognized that the doctrine is only a phase of American policy in this hemisphere and the other phases of that policy should be made clear. … The principle of exclusion embodies a policy of self-defense on the part of the United States; it is a policy set up and applied by the United States. While the Monroe Doctrine is thus distinctively a policy of the United States maintained for its own security, it is a policy which has rendered an inestimable service to the American Republics by keeping them free from the intrigues and rivalries of European powers.”⁴⁴

It is high time that misunderstanding as to the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine shall cease; that international trouble makers shall find so clear a conception of the Doctrine in the minds of the people of this hemisphere that false representations concerning it shall no longer find lodgment in the prejudices upon which such misrepresentations have heretofore lived; that irresponsible exploiters of great economic resources shall not be able hereafter to invoke an untrue concept of the Doctrine to justify and induce unwarranted international attitudes and actions; that poorly visioned, grandiose schemes of the dreamers of unrighteous dominion shall no longer be built upon erroneous principles unknown to the Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine is not now and never was an instrument of aggression; it is and always has been a cloak of protection. The Doctrine is not a lance; it is a shield.

I submit the foregoing to you as an official statement of and commentary upon the Monroe Doctrine which it is hoped may tend to clear up past uncertainties, remove hitherto existing apprehensions, if any, and so open the way for such a mutual understanding and appreciation of the Doctrine as shall serve to augment between the United States and Latin American countries that existing good will which already binds us together as members of the great sisterhood of Republics which, as time goes on, constantly embraces new peoples of the world.

You will be prepared to communicate the foregoing to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at such time and in such manner as the Secretary of State shall direct; in the meanwhile you will hold this instruction strictly confidential.⁴⁵

I am [etc.]

Frank B. Kellogg

1. Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.
2. The General Pact for the Renunciation of War: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 70th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1928).
3. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1896), vol. ii, pp. 207–220.
4. September 17, 1796; Richardson. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, pp. 213, 222–223.
5. See John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 369.
6. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, pp. 233, 238.
7. Cf. The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, ed. by his grandson, Charles R. King (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons), vol. iii, p. 561.
8. The first quotation appears to be from Mr. King’s despatch No. 20 of June 1, 1801; the second quotation from Mr. King’s memorandum book, September 22, 1798. Ibid., pp. 469, 572.
9. The excerpts are from a despatch from Jefferson to Livingston, April 18, 1802; see Moore, Digest, vol. i, pp. 435–436.
10. October 17, 1803; Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, pp. 357, 361–362.
11. Approved January 15, 1811; 3 Stat. 471.
13. Gallatin to Adams, August 10, 1818; The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. by Henry Adams (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1879), vol. ii, p. 73.
13. Gallatin to Adams, August 10, 1818; The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. by Henry Adams (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1879), vol. ii, p. 73.
14. Walter Alison Phillips; The Confederation of Europe, (London, etc., Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914), p. 258.
15. Moore, Digest, vol. vi, p. 378.
16. Moore, Digest, vol. vi, p. 379.
17. The ukase is printed in translation in Alaskan Boundary Tribunal: Appendix to the Case of the United States (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1904), vol. ii, p. 25.
18. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, ed. by Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1875), vol. vi, p. 163.
19. See Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, pp. 168, 219, 270.
20. Cf. The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, vol. iii, p. 561.
21. See despatch No. 323, August 19, 1823, from the Minister in England (Rush) to the Secretary of State (Adams), Moore, Digest, vol. vi, pp. 386, 387, 388.
22. Moore, Digest, vol. vi, p. 389.
23. Ibid., p. 393.
24. Moore, Digest, vol. vi, pp. 394–395.
25. Ibid., p. 396.
26. Paragraph 7, message of December 2, 1823; Moore, Digest, vol. vi. pp. 401–402.
27. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, vol. vi, p. 163.
28. Moore, Digest, vol. vi, pp. 402–403.
29. Moore, Digest, vol. vi, p. 388.
30. See Moore, Digest, vol. vi, p. 389.
31. See ibid., pp. 393–401.
32. Gale and Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress, 19th Cong. 1st sess., vol. ii, pt. 2, Appendix, p. 83.
33. Annual message, December 3, 1901, Foreign Relations, 1901, pp. ix, xxxvi.
34. Ibid., pp. xxxvi–xxxvii.
35. Moore, Digest, vol. vi, p. 476.
36. Ibid., p. 530.
37. See J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, December 17, 1928 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 138.
38. Moore, Digest, vol. vi, p. 501.
39. The Pending Arbitration Treaties: Address of Hon. Philander C. Knox before the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Cincinnati, Ohio, November 8, 1911 (n. p., n. d.), p. 31.
40. Congressional Record, vol. 48, pt. 10, p. 10045.
41. Speaking before the American Society of International Law, April 22, 1914, on the subject, “The Real Monroe Doctrine”, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1914, pp. 6, 10, 11, 12, 19.
42. Address to Pan American Scientific Congress, Washington, January 6, 1916, on “What is Pan-Americanism”, in The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, ed. by Ray Stannard Baker and William B. Dodd (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1926), vol. i, p. 443.
43. “Observations on the Monroe Doctrine” by Hon. Charles E. Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States, American Journal of International Law, vol. 17 (1923), pp. 611, 615, 616, 619.
44. On the subject, “The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine,” International Conciliation, Documents for the Year 1924, No. 194, pp. 14–15.

45. Apparently the foregoing was never communicated to the respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

    In a letter of June 25, 1930, to his successor, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Mr. Kellogg with respect to this instruction wrote (710.11/1449): “It seems to me that … the note ought to be delivered to the various countries and published.”

    To this letter the Secretary of State replied on June 28, 1930 (710.11/145):

    “I have now read the note and it seems to me an excellent statement of the history and scope of the Monroe Doctrine.

    “I have called its attention to the President with a view to releasing it but he has requested me to continue to hold it for awhile, thinking that at the present moment it might cause embarrassment in other matters.”