500.A15/870
The Department of State to the British Embassy
Memorandum
The memorandum which the British Embassy was good enough to communicate to this Government on April 10, 1929, further contributes to the removal of any possible misunderstandings between the two Governments as to their attitude at the present meeting of the Preparatory Commission, and the American Government is grateful for the frankness with which the British Government has set forth its views and the considerations which it feels should be taken into account before discussion of the naval question.
If the Government of the United States rightly understands the suggestions of the Memorandum of the British Government, they may be stated thus:
That further public discussion and possible controversy regarding naval disarmament shall, if possible, be avoided until opportunity is had for a full and confidential exchange of views between the two Governments regarding their own naval situations.
[Page 89]From the wisdom of such a course, if it be feasible, the Government of the United States will not dissent. The problem facing the two Governments is how may the time for such an exchange of views be now found, with an actual meeting of the Preparatory Commission at present progressing at Geneva. This problem is complicated and made more difficult by the fact that, as the Memorandum is understood, the British Government must consult the Dominion Governments before acting, and final decisions must seemingly await the British general elections. However, the Government of the United States appreciates both these inhibitions and is disposed to yield to them so far as the nature of the subject and the situation will permit.
As a means of securing the necessary time, the British Government suggests, as the Memorandum is understood, that the Preparatory Commission should proceed for the present along existing lines in an effort to draft a skeleton convention embodying general principles, to which should be attached schedules or tables that when completed should lay down figures as to forces and armaments within which the powers signatory must keep; or, failing an agreement upon such a skeleton convention, the Commission should be asked to consider whether alternative procedure by programs would not be more effective, the program of each power to be in the best and fullest form it could devise. It seems to be recognized in the Memorandum that this latter proceeding would probably result in each power laying down its maximum needs, but the Memorandum suggests that this tendency would have, to offset it, the desire of each power, responsive to public opinion, to appear in the best light.
It is suggested in the Memorandum that the adoption of this latter course would require an adjournment of the Commission to give the members an opportunity to consult their Governments.
It need scarcely be pointed out that since the alternative suggestion, taken by itself, has in it no element that would certainly make for curtailment of armament, it could not command the approval of the Government of the United States which is keenly desirous actually to curtail and limit naval armament—the only armament in which it is itself directly interested. However, as an expedient, if it should prove feasible, for meeting any impasse that may arise in connection with the present plan and for gaining the time necessary for the United States and the British Governments to attempt an accord and understanding upon their own naval disarmament, the suggestion of an introduction of programs ultimately to be agreed upon at a final conference merits careful consideration, on the basis that the decision reached on the point shall not substantially sacrifice any interest involved in world disarmament.
It would seem therefore that the Preparatory Commission should now proceed pursuant to its regular program. If it shall appear, as [Page 90] time goes on, that progress cannot be made along that line, the Government of the United States will be glad to consult with the British Government as to whether some other plan might not be followed by the Commission to the end of avoiding any controversies between the two Governments which might disturb the full sympathy, friendship and accord of the two great peoples.
The American Government believes the essential matter at this time to be an understanding between the principal naval powers regarding the ratio in which and the extent to which they are willing to reduce naval armaments. Programs presented by the principal naval powers as the result of the agreed plan for reduction would encourage reduction throughout the world, whereas, programs drawn up on the basis of existing conditions would tend rather to encourage other nations to increase their navies. Naturally this Government regrets that there is so brief a time before the meeting of the Commission and hence it would be extremely difficult to work out in any detail a scheme for a basis of agreement, but it is most happy to suggest that as a result of a long series of studies on the subject, it is prepared whenever the occasion arises to examine with the British Government the possibility of a limitation of the naval types not already covered by the Washington Convention, which should take into account the relative value of ships of varying unit characteristics such as displacement, gun caliber and age.
These studies have convinced the American Government that a formula for estimating equivalent tonnage is possible and offers real hope of an arrangement acceptable to both countries. The studies in question which have been made during a considerable period were undertaken and carried out in an earnest desire to find some effective method for dealing with naval armaments while at the same time taking into full consideration the views put forward by the British Government as to its special naval needs.
The American Government would be most happy to be informed when the British Government feels that it can take up this suggestion which embodies the earnest hope of this Government that the naval problem may soon be settled to the satisfaction of both peoples.