551.58B1/56
The Chief of the American Delegation (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 3.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith the Final Text of the Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency signed today at Geneva by 23 states,10 of which a list follows:
- Albania
- Austria
- Belgium
- Colombia
- Cuba
- Czechoslovakia
- Danzig
- France
- Germany
- Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- Greece
- Hungary
- India
- Italy
- Japan
- Luxemburg
- Netherlands
- Poland
- Portugal
- Rumania
- Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
- Switzerland
- U. S. S. R. (Russia)
Four other countries enumerated below have expressed their intentions to sign in the near future:
China, Denmark, Finland, Nicaragua.
Inasmuch as this Conference worked on principles somewhat different from those which are ordinarily employed in preparing conventions, I think it well to explain that practically all the debates took place in a Special Subcommittee, to which the most difficult questions were referred. No minutes were taken of the proceedings of the Special Subcommittee. The Department will not find, therefore, any full account of these debates in the procès-verbal, and I will have to enter somewhat at length on an analysis of the argument, depending on my memory for this purpose.
In its instruction No. 426, the Department adopted a position somewhat in opposition to the draft convention on the following points:
- (a)
- Paragraph 1, Article I;
- (b)
- Paragraph 6, Article I;
- (c)
- Paragraph 14, Article I;
- (d)
- Paragraph 16, Article I;
- (e)
- Article II.
For the sake of convenience I shall treat these matters seriatim.
The Department will remember that I explained in my telegram No. 2, April 9, 7 p.m.,11 that two subcommittees were set up, Committee [Page 404] A for legal questions, Committee B for administrative or enforcement questions. It was subsequently found advisable to further reduce the number of participants in Committee A and therefore a “Special Subcommittee” was instituted. In addition to the committees mentioned above a committee of Draft and Coordination was instituted, composed of the President, Dr. Posposil, myself, Vice-President, the President and Vice-President of Committee A, M. Servais (Belgium), and Sir John Fischer Williams (Great Britain), and the President and Vice-President of Committee B, M. Delaquis (Switzerland), and Count Chalendar (France). Added to this was Mr. Pella (Rumania) as rapporteur of Committee A.
- (a)
- Article I, paragraph 1, draft convention. In an early session of the judicial committee, Mr. Pella (Rumania) moved that the words “or to recommend to their legislative bodies the adoption of” be inserted after the word “adopt” in the second paragraph. I immediately seconded this motion, whereupon the Chairman ruled that this raised a question on which debate had better be reserved and it was subsequently ordered that this should be one of the subjects of discussion in the Special Subcommittee. In the sessions of the Special Subcommittee I supported warmly Mr. Pella’s proposal, using the arguments advanced in the Department’s 426. It appeared at once that in the minds of the great majority of the delegates the insertion of such a clause would greatly weaken the force of the convention, since it was pointed out that this would permit the ratification of the convention without the adoption of the necessary legislation. It was clear that the states of Eastern Europe especially were unwilling to depend on the good faith of their neighbors in this connection and that it was essential if they were to adhere to the convention, to find a formula which would make ratification dependent upon legislation in conformity with the convention having been adopted. This led us after prolonged argument to the adoption of a formula which the Department will find in Article 23 of the convention, together with the elimination of the subparagraph of paragraph 1, Article I. Inasmuch as this seemed to cover the objections which the Department had raised to the original text, and at the same time to establish the principle that ratification was dependent upon laws conforming to the convention, I acquiesced in this solution and was gratified to find that the Department had approved the thought therein contained in its telegram No. 1, April 17 [18], 3 p.m.12
- (b)
- The foregoing paragraph brings me, both in seriatim consideration and in logical thought, to the contemplation of paragraph 6 of Article I, concerning which paragraph the Department had informed me that our legislation was not in entire conformity with [Page 405] the draft convention but that legislation designed to make it so conform might be proposed by us. Under the present drafting of the treaty, therefore, the Department would naturally consider the advisability of submitting a bill equalizing penalties in the sense of paragraph 6, Article I, now Article 5 of the Final Convention. Such legislation would, as far as I can see, and Mr. Moran shares this opinion, be the only special legislation which it would be necessary for us to adopt in order to conform with the terms of the convention. I call attention again to the foregoing paragraph—to Article 23 and its implication that legislation has been adopted before ratification.
- (c)
- Paragraph 14, Article I, draft convention. This Article as finally adopted stands as Article 14 of the text. In a session of Subcommittee B, Mr. Moran made a statement following the lines of your instruction beginning page 4 of No. 426 and declared that the words “so far as it considers expedient” had been inserted in the draft convention to meet the objections that he had already raised in the sessions of the Mixed Committee to any obligation on the part of the United States to supply such canceled specimens. Our attitude and the nature of the obligation so far as it applies to us is thoroughly understood by the conference.
- (d)
- Paragraph 16, Article I, now Article 16 in the final text. This Article caused me a considerable amount of perplexity since it was extremely difficult to ascertain from my colleagues exactly what was meant by “letters of request”, or “commissions rogatoires” in the French text. It finally became apparent that the phrase as used was equivalent to “letters rogatory” in our terminology and I therefore caused to be inserted a foot note to page 4 of the Final Act, stating that “this expression has the same meaning as letters rogatory.” There was a very evident disposition on the part of the majority of those present to simplify the procedure for the transmission of letters rogatory, since in Continental practice such letters are accepted in certain cases as evidence even in criminal procedure. The discussion on this Article occurred so late in the debates that I was forced to act without the opportunity of consulting you in detail. However, when your telegrams Nos. 4 and 5, of April 18, 4 p.m., and 6 p.m.,13 respectively, arrived, I satisfied myself to the best of my knowledge, after consultation with some of the best jurists on the Commission that the anxieties evidenced in the Department’s telegram were met by the text. The Department will note that in the four concluding paragraphs of the Article it is provided that each High Contracting Party shall notify the others of the method of transmission which it will recognize for letters rogatory, and that, [Page 406] further, until such notification is made existing procedure shall remain in force. Also that the Article shall not be construed as an undertaking that any party will adopt in criminal methods any form or methods of proof contrary to their law. With regard to the matter of expense, as I pointed out in my telegram No. 8, April 18, 10 a.m.,14 for such states as make the practice of the use of letters rogatory in criminal procedure it has been the custom to make no charge for such procedure other than for expert testimony. I felt that you would not wish me to prevent these states from adopting a text which might simplify their own procedure, if at the same time such text left us free to follow our ordinary practice. If there were any doubt of our position in regard to Article 16 it would appear to me that such doubt was eliminated by the phraseology of No. 4 of the Interpretations contained in the Protocol on page 8, to the effect that the High Contracting Parties are required to execute letters rogatory only in the limitations provided for by their domestic law.
- (e)
- Article II of draft convention, now Article 10 of the final text. This Article gave rise to one of the most protracted debates which took place in the Special Subcommittee. In accordance with the suggestion which I ventured to make in my No. 1, April 8, 9 a.m. [p.m.], amended by your unnumbered, April 9, 6 p.m.,15 I submitted an amendment dealing with this problem of extradition. In the Special Subcommittee I pointed out that the amendment had the defect which you observed in the first paragraph of your telegram which I have just mentioned, namely, that so far as concerns countries not having treaties of extradition the present situation was not relieved. The proposals were many and varied as to how we should reach a text which would embody the suggestions contained in my amendment and at the same time stop the gap which you had suggested, and the final text of Article 10 is designed to cover both cases. I believe that the Department will find it satisfactory in that it refers to definite offenses which are listed in Article 3, in that it makes extradition dependent upon treaty for countries which subject their extradition to treaty provisions, in that it supplements existing treaties in so far as they do not cover the offenses listed in Article 3, in that it provides for extradition between states which do not make extradition conditional on treaty or reciprocity, and in that such extradition shall be granted in accordance with the law of the country, including, in the case of the United States, duly ratified treaties.
A very interesting discussion arose on paragraph 9 of Article I [Page 407] of the draft convention in relation to the political motive. Many of the states, and especially the neighbors of Hungary which were still deeply under the influence of the events connected with the Hungarian counterfeiting case in which Prince Windeschgraetz played an important part, made a determined struggle to insert in the convention a declaration to the effect that in cases of counterfeiting the political motive should not afford a valid excuse either for the escape of punishment or refusal of extradition. The British Delegation and others were, on the other hand, equally determined that the traditional right of asylum should not be infringed, even though they were unable to formulate suppositious cases in which counterfeiting might be considered a political offense. Since I had no definite instructions from you on the subject, I did not play a very active part in this discussion but confined myself in the Special Subcommittee to stating that I hardly believed that my Government would go so far as to adopt measures which could be considered as a limitation on the right of asylum or upon application of internal law. A compromise was finally reached; in Article 3 of the present text it is provided that the offenses enumerated shall be punishable as “ordinary crimes”, which is the nearest translation which we could reach of the French expression “droit commun”, which of course can not be translated as “common law”. At the same time Article 18 of the present text was added so that as far as the application of internal law is concerned it should not be assumed that the wording of Article 3 has made any change. Naturally, those states which desired to go much further were not satisfied with this solution, and they have therefore formulated among themselves an additional protocol which is found on page 22 of Document C. F. M. 12 of the final text. As far as the rest of the Articles are concerned, I believe that the Department will not consider that the changes from the draft convention are material or of great interest to ourselves. As far as the administrative clauses are concerned, Mr. Moran has expressed himself satisfied.
I made a declaration in the final plenary session in accordance with my telegram No. 10 of April 18, 10 p.m. As I indicated, Article 20 of the present convention gives us ample time to sign at our convenience. I venture to make the suggestion, however, that if the Department believes that we can with benefit sign this convention, it would be advisable to authorize me to do so at the earliest possible moment in order that the full sympathy of our Government with this movement may be shown, and in order that no doubt may arise in the participating countries as to our willingness to cooperate with them in this matter. This argument, to my mind, carries special weight, as the first state to establish a central office such as are [is] [Page 408] contemplated in this convention was the United States, and our central office has to a large measure been considered the example which should be followed by the others.
As the Department knows, the Final Act consists, in the practice current in Geneva, of a series of “voeux”, or aspirations, which all those present at the Conference sign as a rule. The Final Act, however, has no force of law, is in no sense a contractual obligation, nor is it subject to ratification nor is it even to be considered in connection with ratification of the Convention and Protocol. It consists of recommendations which are pushed by divers individuals in the Conference and are often inserted to give them satisfaction in order to avoid their continuing their efforts to insert them in the body of the Convention. It might be termed the waste-basket of the Convention. Thus the Department will find in the clauses of the Final Act recommendations to the Council of the League in which I hardly think we should participate. Also there are certain recommendations of an administrative nature with which Mr. Moran is not in accord. I think it highly probable that the Department will desire, if it considers that signature can properly be affixed to the Convention and Protocol, that signature should not be affixed to the Final Act. As a matter of fact, since we have delayed signature, it will not be remarked if I fail to sign the Final Act at the time of signing the Convention and Protocol.
In asking the Department’s indulgence towards the form of this despatch, which is drafted in the haste necessarily incident to the work of the Preparatory Commission of Disarmament, I have the honor to express on my own behalf and that of the Delegation, our appreciation of the Department’s sympathetic cooperation.
I have [etc.]